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Abstract
This thesis investigates two main prerequisites for diligent executions of boards’
roles i.e. board’s ability and directors’ incentives. The first part of this thesis offers
some insights into boards’ characteristics of most concern to both regulators and schol-
ars. Specifically, it provides a timely review, over the last fifteen years (2000-14), of
different board’s diversity attributes (i.e. statutory, competitive, and demographic),
board’s competitive capital, and board’s busyness in the UK public listed companies. In
addition, it investigates whether differences exist in those characteristics across various
FTSE Indices and also before and after the financial crisis.
Firstly, it is found that statutory diversity is commonly shared among the boards
compared to other diversity attributes, i.e. competitive and demographic. This re-
flects the regulators’ focus on statutory diversity over the years. Nonetheless, the data
shows that the UK public listed companies were increasingly diversifying their boards,
competitively and demographically, over the last fifteen years. During the post-crisis
period, UK boards witnessed a significant increase in diversity level, especially BOFIs’
boards. This is consistent with many commentators’ calls for more diversified boards
after the crisis. Secondly, with regard to board’s competitive capital, there is a gen-
eral increase in different board’s competencies. In line with the recommendations of
post-crisis regulations, the analysis shows a significant increase in the level of board
competitive capital of UK boards over post-crisis period. Thirdly, although the litera-
ture used different measures of board busyness, the findings suggest that the incidence of
board’s busyness seems to be decreasing over the last fifteen years in the UK regardless
of the measurement used. Furthermore, the data suggests that the post-crisis attempts
to limit the occurrence of board busyness are successful as UK public listed companies
witnessed a significant decrease in the percentage of busy boards. Fourthly, correlation
analysis indicates a significant positive relationship between all diversity indices and
board’s competitive capital, and market-based measures of firm financial performance.
The analysis also shows no correlation between general measures of board’s busyness
and firm performance.
The second part of this thesis involves two empirical chapters dedicated to explor-
ing the extent of efficiency of the UK directors’ employment market, both internally
and externally, in potentially creating incentives for NEDs to behave in the sharehold-
ers’ interests. Chapter Four specifically investigates to what extent NEDs in the UK
‘external’ employment market is rewarded (penalised) through gaining (losing) an ex-
ternal board seat for their perceived satisfactory (unsatisfactory) performance. On the
other hand, Chapter Five investigates to what extent NEDs’ probability of turnover
(i.e. internal employment market) is associated with their perceived (un)satisfactory
performance. The focus on these two chapters is on NEDs serving on banks and other
financial institutions (BOFIs). NEDs’ perceived performance is expected to be based
on the performance of NEDs’ affiliated firm(s) and their individual set of qualifications
and skills (i.e. reputational capital).
The findings in Chapter 4 provide evidence that the number of board seats held
by NEDs in the BOFIs is mainly associated with their reputational capital rather than
the performance of their affiliated firm(s). However, both the affiliated BOFIs’ market
performance and reputational capital are significantly associated with NEDs’ number
of board seats in the post-crisis period. The results may be attributed to the changes
in the corporate governance environment after the crisis whereby NEDs were held more
accountable for their BOFIs’ poor market performance.
Finally, the results in Chapter 5 show a significant correlation between NEDs’
turnover and their affiliated firm’s financial performance, and reputational capital rel-
ative to the board. It also indicates that, following the crisis, only the turnover-
performance association is statistically significant. This suggests the existence of ex-post
settling-up mechanism in the UK BOFIs whereby NEDs can lose their board seats in
the wake of a period of poor financial performance.
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‘The entirely preventable financial catastrophe we have watched unfold over the
past 18 months has many culprits: reckless executives who gambled with their
company’s futures, feckless regulators and somnambulant boards of directors. But
while executives and regulators have justifiably taken heat for this multifaceted
debacle, board members have largely been let off the hook. Why?’
(The Washington Post, 2009)
In popular accounts, the boards of failed BOFIs1, especially the non-executive di-
rectors (NEDs), were blamed for failing to do their jobs of monitoring firms’ man-
agement and ensuring their long-term survival effectively. The criticism against
NEDs, who are presumably central to the financial crisis, ranges from questioning
their relevance to firms’ performance to highlighting some of their ‘fixable’ deficits
that may have undermined performance. Each end of this spectrum suggests dif-
ferent types of solutions to prevent future high-profile crises.
The first group of solutions are motivated by the notion that reliance on
board of directors, especially NEDs, as the main governance mechanism is at best
1This is the acronym used in the Walker Review (2009) when referring to the financial sector.
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misplaced due to several structural challenges as debated in the literature; for
example, the ‘board capture’ (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011), the ‘independence para-
dox’ (Kang, Cheng, and Gray, 2007), and the ‘inconsistency of boards’ dual role’
(Kim, Mauldin, and Patro, 2014). These inherent obstacles, arguably insurmount-
able, in the modern boards render NEDs ineffective in shaping firm’s behaviour.
Therefore, corporate governance reforms should focus on improving effectiveness
of capital market discipline (e.g. mandating transparency, incentivising informed
trading, and increasing accountability) rather than ‘misguided’ board-based regu-
latory solutions (Fisch, 2010).
The second group of solutions still believes in the vital role NEDs play in
today’s corporate governance. For this group, the crisis can be traced to some
board-level deficits related to NEDs’ traits that need attention and improvement.
For instance, the proxy statement by Bear Stearns Companies in 2007 shows two
members of its audit committee having six external seats on other audit com-
mittees. However, the board stated that this “does not impair their ability to
effectively serve on the Company’s Audit Committee and that their service on
the Audit Committee is in the best interest of the Company and its stockhold-
ers”. Proponents of this view continue to argue that business history has shown
that market discipline alone is not sufficient to guide firms’ management to act
in shareholders’ best interest. Consequently, regulators are most encouraged to
tackle these board deficits through a series of board-centred legislation.
Among the various NEDs’ ‘fixable’ attributes, the most highlighted issues in
the media and targeted by regulators are those related to their incompetence, lack
of commitment and busyness, and insufficient incentives. They highlighted that
NEDs would be more vigilant and able to prevent their firms’ excessive risk taking
if they had enough expertise and knowledge, were more committed to their firms,
and had an appropriate incentive structure in place. Indeed, since the financial
crisis, many researchers attempt to test this notion by examining the association
between US boards’ general attributes and their firms’ performance during the
crisis. These board attributes include CEO’s compensation structure (Fahlenbrach
and Stulz, 2011), shareholders friendly boards (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012), boards’
independence (Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2012; Minton, Taillard, and Williamson,
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2011), boards’ financial experience (Minton et al., 2011), boards’ risk-governance
(Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid, 2012), and internal corporate governance mechanisms
(Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian, 2009). The implication of such studies is that,
if BOFIs with ‘healthy’ boards performed relatively better during the crisis, then
regulators’ intervention by imposing more board-centred reforms is justified and
worth pursuing further in the future. However, the results of these studies are
mostly inconclusive and cannot be generalised due to the significant differences in
regulations across the countries in addition to their narrow focus on only the crisis
period.
Consistent with the second view, this thesis holds boards in general and NEDs,
in particular, to be capable of preventing future corporate governance crisis if some
improvements are made in two aspects; boards’ ability and incentive system. This
thesis consists of three main empirical chapters that address various criticisms
related to boards with a particular focus on NEDs. The first one focuses on
the deficits or shortfalls in the boards’ abilities, while the other two chapters are
dedicated to directors’ employment market as a potential incentive structure in
the UK.
1.2. Background of the Study
The financial sector is undeniably an essential and crucial sector in today’s
economy. The importance of BOFIs is not only due to the strategic resources that
they control but also their major role in reinforcing good corporate governance.
In Continental Europe, banks have been an active contributor in maintaining
corporate governance healthy through equity-holdings and reciprocal board mem-
bership. In the UK, banks traditionally failed to play an active role but other
financial institutions such as pension insurance and mutual funds (i.e. the capital
market) have shown a potential role in ensuring a healthy corporate governance
environment. Indeed, over the last two decades, the UK government and share-
holder activists (e.g. UK Institutional Investor Committee) have been encouraging
such role, leading the institutional shareholders to be among the main market con-
ditioning force in the UK (Mallin, Mullineux, and Wihlborg, 2005). In addition,
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BOFIs also contribute in assuring good corporate governance by creating compe-
tition for external funds among other firms. In their quest of seizing these limited
fund opportunities, firms tend to distinguish themselves by being more transparent
and governance codes- compliant.
Given the vital functions of the financial sector to the economy and the coun-
try’s corporate governance environment, the financial sector itself must therefore
be efficient (Mallin et al., 2005). Hence, it is not surprising to find the finan-
cial sector being a highly regulated sector and subjected to greater governmental
scrutiny. Directors of BOFIs have always been of central interest not only to reg-
ulators but also the public since they are effectively the ones who control strategic
resources for the entire economy and their decisions can considerably affect the
wider society welfare. In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, a series of
concerns regarding BOFIs’ boards and NEDs have arisen.
One aspect is related to how competent BOFIs’ boards are in executing their
roles. It has been highlighted that BOFIs’ poor performance pre- and during the
crisis was not only due to management’s opportunistic behaviour that boards failed
to control, but also management’s incompetence that board failed to compensate
by providing adequate advice. The unacceptable performance of boards during
the crisis is acknowledged as a failure of both control and advisory/service roles.
Thus, there has since been calls for more empirical work on board capital; a
construct that is “recently coined. . . to capture the ability of the board to provide
resources to the firm (p.1145)” (Haynes and Hillman, 2010).2 Board capital refers
to both human (skills, qualifications and experience) and social (networks) capital
but most prior studies focus on either one of the capital. As argued by Tian,
Haleblian, and Rajagopalan (2011), “only limited empirical work has examined
board human and social capital simultaneously. Previous studies on board capital
2Board capital (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) is sometimes called the ‘board competitive capital’ or ‘board
competence’ (Huse, 2005). This usually includes the directors’ relational or social capacity, in addi-
tion to their general, functional, board-specific knowledge and skills. It is distinguished from board
characteristics which include “age, tenure, seniority, gender, race, individual behaviour, esteem, influ-
ence, independence, integrity and so on” (Huse, 2005: S69). This thesis tends to use the term ‘board
competitive capital’ as it better reflects the difference between board’s skills, which are sought in the
employment market, and other board characteristics.
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are also limited in the sense that they lack a systematic, task-relevant classification
scheme of board capital (p.732)”.
Another aspect of concern is the board incentives system, especially those re-
lated to NEDs. Research conducted in this area focuses on two main proxies for
board incentives i.e. board independence and compensation. In the case of board
independence, there have been many studies examining the association between
NEDs’ independence and performance. However, studies on the relationship be-
tween NEDs’ compensation and performance are under researched compared to
CEOs’ compensation. In countries like the US, NEDs’ compensation package
include bonus in the form of cash and equity depending on their performance.
However, in the UK, NEDs are rewarded fixed payments regardless of their per-
formance and this lack of incentives has been recognised by the Parliamentary
Commission on Banking Standards (2013) as among the main reasons behind the
financial crisis. Another emerging strand of research looks at incentive system
based on the directors’ employment market. Specifically, the consequences that
NEDs face in that employment market can be seen as an ex-post mechanism for
settling-up whereby NEDs can be penalised (rewarded) in the wake of a period of
poor (good) performance. Given the limited research in addressing this issue, this
thesis will focus on this aspect as explained further in the next section.
1.3. Research Objectives
The thesis explores two contemporary issues that have been suggested as main
contributors to boards’ poor performance during the financial crisis, i.e. boards’
deficits (ability) and NEDs’ incentives (motives). It aims to first explore holisti-
cally some of the main antecedents of board’s task performance. The second issue
is addressed by examining the role of directors’ employment market in penalising
and rewarding NEDs based on their perceived performance.
Specifically, Chapter 3 extends the literature discussion on board deficits both
before and after the crisis. Based on a large database that spans over fifteen
years (1999-2014), it reports on three main antecedents of board task performance
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(i.e. the diversity, capital, and commitment) in the UK public listed firms. By
doing so, the chapter aims to provide a timely review of the extent to which
post-crisis reforms affected boards’ diversity, capital, and commitment for UK
listed BOFIs and non-financial sectors. It also explores how these most targeted
boards’ characteristics vary across different UK FTSE Index Series and also the
extent to which they are related to firms’ financial performance. It is noteworthy
that Chapter 3 differentiates between two terms, board competitive capital and
board competitive diversity. The first is concerned with the aggregate number of
qualifications and skills present on the board. However, the second term, board
competitive diversity, captures how diverse these skills and qualifications are and
it is one of three main attributes of board diversity.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on NEDs’ incentive structure. While previous studies
extensively examine directors’ remuneration structure, this is limited in the UK
context which discourage equity-based compensations for NEDs. However, the
employment market can play a major role in a NED’s incentives by rewarding
NEDs capable of protecting shareholders’ interests. Hence, Chapters 4 and 5 ex-
plore how external market mechanism (i.e. NEDs’ number of directorships) and
internal market mechanism (i.e. NEDs’ turnover) are tied to NEDs’ perceived
performance in the UK market, respectively. As discussed in the following sec-
tion, NEDs’ perceived performance is expected to be based on the performance
of NEDs’ affiliated firm(s) and their individual set of qualifications and skills (i.e.
reputational capital).3
In short, the key research aims addressed in this thesis can be categorised into
two parts as follows:
3NED’s ‘reputational capital’ is a measure of director individual skills, knowledge, and qualifications.
Therefore, this measure is conceptually related to the board’s ‘competitive capital’ introduced earlier
which is an aggregate measure of the reputational capital of all directors sitting on that board. This
thesis uses the terms ‘competitive’ and ‘reputational’ capital to distinguish between the unit of interest.
The former term is used with boards reflecting the competitive advantage that a firm achieves by having
an overall competitive board, while the latter term is used with NEDs reflecting their attractiveness in
the employment market.
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Part I: To provide a timely review, over the last 15 years (2000-14), of boards’
characteristics of most concern to both regulators and scholars, in the UK’s plcs.
There are four specific research objectives related to this part of the thesis which
are addressed in Chapter 3:
1. Explore the extent of changes in the boards’ diversity attributes (i.e. statu-
tory, competitive, and demographic) of companies listed in the UK over the
last fifteen years as well as within the various UK FTSE Index Series in the
pre- and post- the financial crisis period.
2. Explore the extent of boards’ competitive capital (i.e. educational qualifica-
tions, social networking, and governance experiences) of the companies listed
in the UK over the last fifteen years as well as within the various UK FTSE
Index Series in the pre- and post- the financial crisis period.
3. Explore the extent of boards’ busyness of the companies listed in the UK over
the last fifteen years as well as within the various UK FTSE Index Series in
the pre- and post- the financial crisis period.
4. Determine if any relationship exists between the various boards’ character-
istics (i.e. diversity, competitive capital, and busyness) and the company’s
market-based financial performance.
Part II: Explore the efficiency of the UK directors’ employment market in
potentially creating incentives for NEDs to behave in the market players’ interests
(e.g. shareholders). There are three specific research objectives related to this
part of the thesis which are addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively:
5. Investigate to what extent NEDs in the UK market are subjected to an
external sanction system whereby NEDs are rewarded (penalised), based on
their affiliated firm’s performance and reputational capital, through gaining
(losing) an external board seat.
6. Investigate to what extent NEDs’ probability of turnover is associated with
the NEDs’ affiliated firm performance and their reputational capital.
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7. Considering the recent post-crisis governance reforms, determine to what
extent the internal and the external UK directors’ employment market have
been affected as incentives mechanism.
Table 1.1 presents a summary of the research objectives and specific research
questions as well as research methods adopted in addressing the two parts of the
study in this thesis.
1.4. Research Conceptual Framework
1.4.1 Firms’ Internal Control Mechanisms
The opportunistic behaviour and incompetence of the modern managements
are not a new phenomenon. However, the approach taken by different market
players (e.g. shareholders and regulators) in addressing such problems varied con-
siderably over the history of corporations; particularly since Berle and Means
(1932) identified the inherent problems of separating ownership and control. In
theory, external control mechanisms in the form of the markets for corporate con-
trol (e.g. hostile takeovers) were the most common reaction for such managerial
behaviour up until the 1980s after which corporations began to utilise various
anti-takeover strategies (e.g. poison pills, golden parachutes, and greenmail). At
that time, the markets also witnessed a movement of shareholder activism that
calls for an independent board of directors who are capable of controlling firms’
managements and challenging their decisions.
These calls were pillared on the agency theory that discusses solutions to
ownership-control separation dilemma (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency the-
ory depicts the executives of modern corporations as agents who have their own
self-interest to pursue and utility to maximise, even if it is at the expense of share-
holders’ interests.4 The divergence in interests results in a cost for the firm that
4Agency theory is built on the model of man which suggest that maximisation of individual economic
utility is the main driver of any rational actor (Bammens et al., 2011; Davis, 1997). Hence, rational
agents or principals will always seek the choice that increases their own personal utility.
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can only be curbed by having a proper internal control mechanism and hence, an
independent board of directors are elected by the firm’s shareholders to monitor
its executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Henceforth, regulators have been trying
to reinforce firms’ internal control through a series of reforms that encourage, for
instance, the separation of CEO and chairman positions, having a majority of
independent directors on the boards, and the complete independence of boards’
audit and remuneration committees.
In the 1990s, due to the unprecedented integration of markets and the boom in
information technology, capital markets around the globe witnessed an expansion
of multinational and multi-listed corporations, and a shift in the attention to
the market stock prices rather than dividends (Huse, 2005). Hence, boards’ role
was leaning away from behavioural control towards output control in financial
markets. Governance reforms were mirroring this trend by promoting increased
transparency and accountability to shareholders and relying more on equity-based
compensation for directors.5
However, in the early 2000s, the high-profile collapsed of large corporations
(e.g. Enron, and WorldCom) brought the issue of NEDs’ accountability to light
(e.g. the Higgs Review) (Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles, 2005). The accountability
of firms and NEDs were and still remains as a controversial topic among scholars
and commentators. Debates on the expectations of different stakeholders regarding
the role of firms and NEDs and ways to “align actual board task performance to
board role expectations” (Huse, 2005: p.S74) still continues. Research in this
area involves calls for adopting a broader perspective of corporate governance
where corporations are expected to include a corporate social responsibility (CSR)
agenda, and regulators are encouraged to regulate CSR reporting and include
stakeholder’s representations on boards (Kochan, 2003). At the director level, the
discussion of NEDs’ accountability includes the necessity of moving beyond the
narrow and external focus of the agency theory towards a theoretical pluralism
5In the US, directors’ remunerations, especially for executives, are more aligned with shareholders’
interests through using equity-based compensation.
Chapter 1. Introduction 12
approach that balance between the internal and external perspectives on NEDs’
accountability (Roberts et al., 2005).
1.4.2 Balancing the Perspectives on Boards’ Roles
While the external perspective of NEDs’ accountability relies solely on agency
theory (Bammens, Voordeckers, and Van Gils, 2011), the internal perspective
have a multi- theoretic basis such as stewardship theory (Davis, 1997), resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the resource-based view of
the firm (Barney, 1991). The stewardship theory, unlike the agency theory, sug-
gests that managers are not opportunistic individuals and can be trusted with
the resources they manage (Davis, 1997). It claims that there are “situations in
which managers are not motivated by individual goals, but rather are stewards
whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals (p.21)” (Davis,
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). Therefore, it basically shifts the main role of
boards from monitoring to mentoring (Bammens et al., 2011).6 The content of the
board service role is elaborated upon from the other two theoretical perspectives;
resource dependence theory, and the resource-based view of the firm.
Resource dependence theory suggests that firms, due to pressure from its sur-
rounding competition and uncertainty, would seek out linkages with its external
environment to get access to or control over valuable resources (Boyd, 1990). It
further emphasises on the role of boards of directors as a tool of forming these link-
ages with the environment, the co-called networking and lobbying task (Minichilli,
Zattoni, and Zona, 2009). This task involves, for instance, securing external fi-
nance, conveying information on competitors and industry, and enhancing firms’
legitimacy (Li, Parsa, Tang, and Xiao, 2012). On the other hand, resource-based
6NEDs’ roles have been categorised into several groups. The most common used categorisation is ser-
vice/mentoring/advisory and control/monitoring roles (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel,
2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Huse (2005) further splits each role into three main sub-
categories. That is, control role (external perspective on NED role) includes behavioural control,
output control and strategic control, whereas service role (internal perspective on NED role) is divided
into advice/council, networking/legitimacy and strategic participation. For a detailed discussion of how
board roles have evolved in the UK, see Machold and Farquhar, (2013). It is worth mentioning that a
line of studies argues against the categorisation of NEDs’ role into two distinctive separable roles. For
a detailed discussion on this issue, see e.g. Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) and Fisch (2010).
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view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991) highlights another subtask of boards’ ser-
vice role to advice and counsel. In this view, firms seek directors who could provide
valuable ‘resources’ that enhance decision-making process through their vocational
qualifications, competences, and network (Minichilli et al., 2009).
Creating accountability among NEDs starts with identifying different stake-
holders’ expectations regarding board roles (Huse, 2005; Li et al., 2012). Directors
are then encouraged to balance those role expectations and to accordingly match
them with their actual performance.
1.4.3 The Integrated Model of Board Roles, Antecedents and Firm Performance
Hillman’s and Dalziel’s (2003) integrated model of board functions, antecedents,
and firm performance (see Figure 1.1) is among the first attempts to link between
boards of directors and their firm performance by balancing between the two main
perspectives, i.e. internal and external roles of the boards. The model suggests
that board capital affects both the monitoring and service roles of the board; while
board’s incentives moderate this relationship.
Figure 1.1: Hillman’s and Dalziel’s (2003) Integrated Model of Board
Functions, Antecedents, and Firm Performance
Source: Hillman and Dalziel (2003)
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This integrated model reflects more accurate understanding of actual board
roles and overcomes unrealistic assumptions in the two most dominant perspectives
based on agency theory and stewardship theory.7 The agency theorists focus on
“incentives to monitor while excluding the board’s ability to monitor (i.e., board
capital) . . . [which in turn] prevents a more complete understanding of effective
monitoring” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003: 384). On the other hand, the inclusion
of board’s incentives in the model counts for the moderating role of incentives in
encouraging directors to actively engage in the mentoring and service role.
Previous studies expanded Hillman’s and Dalziel’s model by incorporating
other antecedents of board performance to their model’s main antecedents (e.g.
Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, and Labelle, 2013; Minichilli et al., 2009). Similarly,
in addition to board capital, this thesis focuses on other two antecedents of im-
portance to both regulators and academics especially in the wake of the financial
crisis, i.e. the board’s diversity (incl. statutory, demographic, competitive) – and
the board’s time commitment (see Figure 1.2). The new expanded conceptual
model is explored in the first empirical chapter (i.e. Chapter 3).
Chapters 4 and 5 further investigate directors’ incentives by going beyond
the directors’ independence and compensation which are the two most prominent
proxies for incentives in the literature. Specifically, they investigate the extent to
which the employment market for director can incentivise directors to act in the
shareholders’ interest (see Figure 1.3). Fama and Jensen (1983) conjecture that
“outside directors [NEDs] have incentives to develop reputations as experts in
decision control. . . . they use their directorships to signal to internal and external
markets for decision agents that they are experts” [p.315]. The employment market
has the potential to offer an efficient incentive system for directors, especially in
7Noteworthy, some authors argue that the views of agency and stewardship theories are irreconcilable.
For instance, stewardship theorists claim that directors’ control role in fact may lower managers’ in-
trinsic motivation to act in the shareholders’ interests and further increases the chance of opportunism
especially within those jurisdictions that are hard to control (Bammens et al., 2011). Furthermore,
proponents of stewardship theory believe that board of directors composed of a majority of executive
directors will deliver a better performance than those of a majority of NEDs (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).
In their view, inside executive directors work in line with shareholders’ objectives and have a better
understanding of their business compared to their outside counterparts (Davis et al., 1997)
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Figure 1.2: The Conceptual Model of the Relationships Between
Board Antecedents and Firm Performance
the UK market where equity-based compensation is a restricted tool for NEDs’
remunerations.
As depicted in Figure 1.3, the different market players, both internally (i.e. the
home firm) and externally (i.e. other firms), will build a perception about NEDs’
performance in their roles. Due to the difficulty in monitoring NEDs’ actual per-
formance in the boardroom, interested parties (e.g. shareholders and nomination
committees) will rely on observable signals regarding NEDs’ performance. Recent
research has indicated that directors in general provide a signalling role especially
“when stakeholders face significant information asymmetry. . . they [stakeholders]
tend to judge the firms by using observable secondary information sources, includ-
ing the demographic composition of board members” (Rhee and Lee, 2008: p.41;
Sanders and Boivie, 2004).
On the other hand, it is in the NEDs’ best interest to use these means to
establish a good reputation in the employment market. According to signalling
theory (Spence, 1973), signal observability, or how noticeable the signal is to the
outsiders, is a main attribute of efficacious signals (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, and
Reutzel, 2010) . Therefore, many researchers use NEDs’ actions during irregular
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Figure 1.3: NEDs’ Incentives: The Role of Directors’ Employment
Market
events faced by firms as an observable signal that shareholders and other inter-
ested parties may use to judge NEDs’ performance. However, since most firms
do not necessarily face such irregular circumstances, several authors (e.g. Fer-
ris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003; Yermack, 2004) suggest that the financial
performance of firms where NEDs’ serves is an observable signal. In addition,
NEDs’ reputational capital (e.g. educational qualifications, experience, and social
network) will be of a great importance to evaluate directors’ performance in both
their service and control roles. The latter signal, reputational capital, is excep-
tionally important when the market players perceive the main roles of NEDs as
advisory in nature, and/or when NEDs are not held accountable for the firms’
financial performance.
Based on all these signals, the interested parties in the market will build their
perceptions about each director’s performance which will affect their future career
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path in terms of number of directorships, probability of re-election or turnover,
and remuneration. The first two aspects are examined in Chapters 4 and 5, respec-
tively. Specifically, Chapter 4 is concerned with NEDs’ directorships and Chapter
5 examined NEDs’ probability of turnover. Existence of such employment con-
sequences on NEDs’ perceived performance will incentivise them to act in these
market players’ interests or risk losing their current board seat and having less
future directorships on other firms. The conceptual models are further elaborated
in the respective chapters. The next section briefly discusses the research design.
1.5. Research Method and Design
Descriptive research aims “to portray an accurate profile of persons, events
or situations” (Robson, 2002: 59). Descriptive research is usually an extension
of exploratory research or a precursor to explanatory research. In the case of the
later, the research is often termed ‘descripto-explanatory’ (Saunders, Lewis, and
Thornhill, 2009). Based on the research objectives related to the first part of the
study, the descripto-explanatory approach is more appropriate in exploring the
antecedents of board roles performance in the UK listed firms over the last fifteen
years. On the other hand, explanatory research was deemed most appropriate
for examining the association between directors’ firm financial performance and
reputational capital on one hand, and their number of directorships and probability
of turnover on the other hand.
1.5.1 Research Philosophy, and Approach
Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that “questions of method are secondary to
questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or world view
that guides the investigation, not only in choices of method but in ontologically
and epistemologically fundamental ways (p.105)”. Indeed, according to Saunders,
Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), the discussion of research philosophy and approach
comes before method in their research ‘onion’. Philosophy is defined by the Oxford
English Dictionary as a set or system of beliefs stemming from “the study of the
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fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence”, which affect the research
strategy and the choice of methods (Collis, J., and Hussey, 2013; Saunders et al.,
2009).
Considering the nature of this research, the philosophy adopted is that of
positivism. This study builds on previous studies and existing theories to develop
the research hypotheses and test them using statistical methods to support or
refute the developed hypotheses to further develop knowledge of the field. As far
as research approach is concerned, this research adopts the deductive approach.
1.5.2 Research Sampling, Data Collection and Analysis Methods
The research population comprises all the UK public listed firms. The re-
searcher uses large databases (i.e. BoardEx, Datastream) that cover firms listed
during the sample period (i.e. 2000 to 2014). In Chapter 3, the analysis is con-
ducted at the firms’ level and directors’ level. Hence, sampling units are the firms
listed on LSE for at least two successive years and all NEDs sitting on the boards
of these firms, mounting to 17,744 firm years and 66,368 NED years. In Chapters 4
and 5, the main unit of interest is specifically NEDs sitting on the UK listed banks
and other financial institutions (BOFIs) over the period 2000-2014. A sample of
11,386 and 14,762 unique NED-year observations were selected from the popu-
lation for the purpose of addressing research objectives five (Chapter 4) and six
(Chapter 5), respectively. In conducting this research, various statistical methods
have been used to analyse the data such as one-way ANOVAs, scheffe multiple
group comparisons, multiple regression, poisson count regression, ordered logit,
and logit regression. According to the research objectives and hypotheses, data
was analysed utilising the appropriate statistical techniques using the STATA R©
package.
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1.6. Thesis Contributions
1.6.1 Theory and Field
Firstly, since the separation between ownership and management (Berle and
Means, 1932), the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983) have dominated gover-
nance research and influenced scholars’ understanding of NEDs’ role. Over the last
decade, there have been several calls for adopting a theoretical ‘pluralism’ rather
than ‘substitutional’ in addressing the different roles of NEDs (Andrés-Alonso,
Azofra-Palenzuela, and Romero-Merino, 2010; Bammens et al., 2011; Daily, Dal-
ton, and Cannella, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Knockaert and Ucbasaran,
2013; Minichilli et al., 2009; Oh, Park, and Ghauri, 2013; Roberts et al., 2005;
Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2011; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). The theoretical frame-
work in this thesis adopts a pluralistic approach to NEDs’ roles by acknowledging
NEDs’ competences and incentives as prerequisites for effective execution of their
roles.
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the literature on antecedents of board
task performance (Minichilli et al., 2009). The framework responds to calls for
more empirical work on board capital (Tian et al., 2011) by examining not only
the board human (i.e. experiences and qualifications) and social capital simulta-
neously, but also by incorporating the effect of board diversity and board time
commitment. By doing so, this study, to the best knowledge of the researcher, is
the first to empirically adopt such a holistic approach in examining antecedents of
board effectiveness. It integrates studies in group dynamics, diversity, and board
busyness with those on board capital. Thirdly, over the last decade, corporate
governance literature witnessed publication of several important studies on board
diversity. Most of these studies, however, focus on one aspect of diversity, es-
pecially statutory diversity and its effect on firm performance (Ben-Amar et al.,
2013). In addition, the majority of research uses cross-sectional data, hence little
is known about how boards’ diversity has been affected over the years, especially
with the introduction of several governance reforms after the crisis. To the best
knowledge of the researcher, this is the first study to explore systematically the
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three different components of board diversity (i.e. statutory, competitive, and de-
mographic diversity) using a large dataset that covers the UK public listed firms
over fifteen years (1999-2014).
Finally, compared to CEOs’, the issue of NEDs’ incentives is a relatively
under-researched topic in corporate governance literature. This could be due to
the assumption that NEDs do not have incentive problem. That is, some agency
theorists believe that NEDs’ status of ‘independence’ ensure that they would act
in shareholders’ interest, while stewardship theorists assume that NEDs are dili-
gent stewards who actively work in shareholders’ interest (Sharad and Steven,
2010; Shen, 2005). Therefore, this study sheds the light on the important issue
of NEDs’ incentives by examining another way of motivating NEDs to act in the
market players’ interest. Furthermore, most previous studies on NEDs employ-
ment market examine the employment market internally (i.e. turnover) and/or
externally (i.e. directorships) following irregular or extraordinary business events,
such as a takeover, stipulation of new laws, financial distress, fraud, etc. (Har-
ford and Schonlau, 2013; Bugeja et al., 2009; Coles and Hoi, 2003; Gilson, 1990;
Harford, 2003) that may signal NEDs’ competency. Although most firms do not
face extraordinary circumstances, similar research that examine the market con-
sequences for NEDs’ perceived performance under general business conditions has
been scant and mostly in the US market (see for example, Ferris et al., 2003;
Yermack, 2004).This study contributes to the literature in this area by investigat-
ing the role of directors’ market in the UK, complementing the agency theory’s
perspective with other resource-based theories.
1.6.2 Practical Concerns
In the wake of the financial crisis, several commentators highlighted how the
issue of directors’ incompetence and their lack of expertise played a major role in
the financial crisis. Regulators address some of these concerns in their post-crisis
governance reforms (e.g. Walker Review, 2009; the Code, 2010; and Davis’ Report,
2011). However, given the flexible “comply or explain” approach, what the boards
of the UK firms practice (de facto) could be different than what the regulators
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expect them to do (de jure). This thesis shows the extent to which some of
those provisions have been adopted and how the targeted board’s attributes have
changed after the crisis. By doing so, this descriptive study could guide policy
makers’ future endeavours as they get an overall picture on how well the UK
listed BOFIs have responded to those post- crisis reforms.
Furthermore, the issue of NEDs’ incentives has often been neglected in corpo-
rate governance codes. In their review of the codes developed worldwide, Zattoni
and Cuomo (2010) found that NEDs’ “competencies and incentives are not con-
sidered a governance issue to be regulated in detail (p.64)”. While equity-based
compensation is used in the US to align the incentives of both EDs and NEDs with
the shareholders’, the UK regulators are sceptical on how effective this method
could be as the UK Code discourages using equity-based schemes for NEDs’ re-
muneration. In the absence of such regulations-based incentive system, the role of
directors’ employment market as market-based incentive system is very crucial.
Realising that directors’ lack of incentives was among the main reasons behind
the financial crisis (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2013), UK
policy makers have launched several reforms and amendments. Therefore, the
findings of this thesis are of particular interest to regulators as it indicates how
effective the UK market is in rewarding and disciplining NEDs. The existence of
employment market consequences based on NEDs’ perceived performance means
that UK reforms (e.g. Stewardship Code (2010) and amendments to the UK
Corporate Governance Code (2010) were in the right directions. On the other
hand, the absence of such consequences invites regulators to explore new ways
to increase shareholders activism, questions the suitability of reliance on NEDs,
and/or finding an alternative road for incentivising NEDs.
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1.7. Thesis Structure
The thesis comprises of six chapters. Figure 1.4 below provides a snapshot of
the structure of the thesis.
Figure 1.4: Structure of the Thesis
The next chapter provides a closer look at the UK institutional setting, fea-
turing the UK corporate governance codes and the UK financial sector. The third
chapter is a descripto-explanatory study to explore the antecedents of board roles
performance in the UK listed firms over a period of fifteen years. Chapters 4 and
5 explore the efficiency of the UK market in disciplining or rewarding directors.
Specifically, the fourth chapter examines the association between the number of
board seats held by NEDs in the UK financial sector, and the performance of
BOFIs that they are affiliated to and their reputational capital. Chapter 5 ex-
amines whether NEDs’ turnover probability is associated with the performance of
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their affiliated BOFIs, their reputational capital and their busyness. In addition to
the empirical analysis, each chapter presents its respective literature review, data
and research design, results, and discussion of the findings. The conclusion of the
studies conducted in this thesis, recommendations, limitations and comments for




This chapter explores the UK corporate governance environment as well as its
financial sector as the context for this study. It is important to do so as most of the
studies on employment market consequences for NEDs are in the US context which
is considerably different than the UK in terms of the law mechanism being used,
the provisions of the corporate governance codes promoted, and how active the
shareholders are. Hence, understanding the UK context is vital for this study to
ensure adequate customisation of some of the assumptions in previous literature.
The benefit of studying other jurisdictions is to leverage their unique character-
istics to add new insights and understandings based on the unique contextual
features. Therefore, the second section of this chapter discusses the evolution of
corporate governance codes in the UK, followed by a discussion of the current pro-
visions in the UK corporate governance code with an emphasis on key provisions
of particular interest for the purpose of this research.
Most studies hardly consider highly regulated industries such as the financial
sector due to their particularities at several levels (e.g. regulatory, governance,
boards’ tasks, and media coverage). Since the last two empirical chapters focus on
the financial sector in the UK, section four of this chapter discusses some of the
particularities of this sector, especially those pertaining to NEDs. Sections five
and six continue to discuss other aspects of the financial sector, highlighting how
24
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directors in this vital sector affected the global financial crisis. Finally, discussion
on the employment market for NEDs is presented in sections seven and eight.
2.2. The Evolution of Corporate Governance in the UK
Corporate governance is defined as “the system by which companies are di-
rected and controlled” (FRC, 2014). In this system, shareholders are responsible
for appointing the board of directors and the auditors of their companies. They
are also expected to monitor the appointed boards of directors, who are directly
responsible for the companies’ governance, in order to ensure that an overall ap-
propriate governance structure is in place (Cadbury, 1992).
The growing attention to corporate governance in the UK has been driven
by a number of relatively recent catalysts. According to Mallin, Mullineux, and
Wihlborg, (2005), there are three key drivers to the development of corporate
governance in the UK: scandals of prominent business in both the financial and
non-financial sectors (see Table 2.1); the development of global corporate gover-
nance practises driven by globalisation and cross-border investing, and the change
to a more concentrated share ownership structure in the UK.8
The UK governance provisions have been developed over the years within a
triangle-framework with the apexes being the recommendations of corporate gov-
ernance codes, the representative bodies of institutional investors, and the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) as the regulatory body (Mallin et al., 2005). Each one of
these three apexes plays a different but complementary role in a way that pro-
motes the endurance of corporate governance system in the UK. For instance, the
UK ‘comply or explain’ approach ensures that governance codes have a flexible
set of provisions and recommendations, which is based on both main and support-
ing principles. Since firms vary considerably, the board of directors may decide if
8The latest statistics on UK Share Ownership as at 31 December 2010 (2006), as produced by the
Office for National Statistics (2012), highlight that institutional investors own around 83% (85%) of
UK equity. That is, the insurance companies 9% (15%); pension funds 5% (13%); banks 2.5% (3%)
unit trusts, investment trusts and other financial institutions together holding some 25% (14%); and
overseas investors 41% (40%).
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their firm would be better off following an alternative to a particular provision.
In this case, the logic behind non-compliance have to be explained clearly in the
listed firms’ annual reports and accounts as required by the listing rules of LSE.
Furthermore, the listing rules emphasise that statement on how board of directors
complied with the code’s main principles should be made in a manner that will en-
able shareholders to evaluate firms’ compliance with these principles. Shareholders
may or may not challenge board of directors’ explanation for non-compliance after
careful consideration of the firm’s size, complexity, and its risks and challenges.
The next section discusses the latest UK corporate governance code and highlights
some of the main provisions that relates directly to the current research.
2.3. The Latest UK Corporate Governance Code
Since the publication of the first official governance code (i.e. Cadbury, 1992),
there had been a number of codes developed over the last two decades (see Table
2.1). In this section, the latest published corporate governance code, The UK
Corporate Governance Code (2014), discussed. Appendix A summarises all the
code main principles, supporting principles, and provisions. Of particular interest
for the purpose of the current study are the Code’s recommendations regarding
NEDs’ nomination and appointment, NEDs’ remunerations, and NEDs’ evaluation
(see Table 2.2).
2.3.1 NEDs’ Nomination, Appointment and Removal
NEDs’ appointment process is mainly managed by a nomination committee.
The majority of nomination committee members should be independent NEDs
and it can be chaired by the board chairman. The Code emphasises that two
issues should be carefully considered when the nomination committee make rec-
ommendations to the board regarding NEDs’ appointment, i.e., board diversity
and balance of experience and skills. The appointed NEDs are then subject to
election by shareholders at the first annual general meeting (AGM) after the ap-
pointment date. Before the AGM, sufficient biographical details should be given
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to the shareholders, along with a board statement showing why the proposed di-
rector was chosen. NEDs should be appointed for a specified term, subject to
re-election at intervals of no more than three years, and no more than one year for
those sitting on the FTSE 350 firms. When proposing re-election of a NED, the
chairman needs to show the shareholders how effective and committed the director
was, based on his/her formal performance evaluation.
NEDs are subject to statutory provisions related to the removal of a director.
Due to the need to progressively refresh the board, a NED should stay no longer
than six years on the boardroom. The decision to extend NED’s stay after six
years should be based on an annual rigorous review of his/her performance but
the NED will lose his/her ‘independence’ status after serving on the board for
more than nine years since the date of his or her first appointment.
2.3.2 NEDs’ Remunerations
Management and executive directors’ remuneration package should be de-
signed and managed by a remuneration committee of at least three independent
NEDs. Directors’ remunerations can also be designed by independent remunera-
tion consultants if the remuneration committee believes it is necessary to do so.
On the other hand, the NEDs’ remunerations should be decided by the board itself
but the board may delegate this responsibility to a committee.
Regardless of whether the remuneration is for executive or non-executive di-
rectors, the chairman should ensure that major shareholders are being contacted
and consulted. Although remuneration is a tool for attracting qualified directors
and positioning the firm among its counterparts, the UK Corporate Governance
Code encourages the remuneration committee to avoid high remuneration levels
with no corresponding improvement in performance.
Overall, the code highlights three main issues regarding the remuneration
level. Firstly, equality should be maintained in directors’ remuneration levels
meaning that it should be “sensitive to pay and employment conditions elsewhere
in the group”. Secondly and most importantly, NEDs’ remunerations should reflect
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the required time commitment and NEDs’ role responsibilities. Finally, NEDs’ re-
munerations package should not include performance-related elements (e.g. share
options) as this jeopardises NEDs’ independence, unless shareholders’ approval is
granted in advance.
2.3.3 NEDs’ Evaluation
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code, NEDs’ evaluation should
be the starting point for NEDs’ appointment, removal, and remuneration pro-
cesses. Evaluation process should be done at the individual (NED) level and
group (board of directors) level.
At the board level, the balance of skills, experience, independence and knowl-
edge of the company’s board need to be evaluated. In addition, the evaluation
process should also consider board diversity and the way the board works together
as a unit. However, the board level evaluation seems to be only linked to NEDs’
appointment and removal. For instance, evaluation is being conducted to figure
out the competencies that are redundant and the ones that should be acquired
through directors’ appointment. The Code, however, does not tie board level
evaluation to NED’s remuneration. Thus, NEDs’ relative individual importance
to the board in terms of their personal competencies is not associated with their
remuneration.
At the individual level, the evaluation of directors is suggested to be designed
in a way that shows the director’s contribution and commitment to the role, which
is operationalised in the provisions by the time devoted to the board (e.g. fre-
quency meetings’ attendance). Hence, NEDs’ individual evaluation in terms of
time commitment and responsibilities of the role is encouraged to be linked to
their remuneration and turnover.
The Code does not identify any specific role for shareholders regarding di-
rectors’ or boards’ performance evaluation. However, shareholders are expected
to approve directors’ remunerations as set by the board and also to participate
in NEDs’ annual re-election (or three years re-election for non – FTSE350) as
proposed by the board. Finally, the Code encourages firms to disclose how the
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“annual” and “internal” performance evaluation has been conducted in the annual
reports. For FTSE 350 firms, board’s performance evaluation process should be
carried out externally at least once every three years.
2.4. Directors in the UK Regulated Financial Sector
In the UK, firms in the financial sector are regulated by a body formerly
known as the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which has now become two
separate regulatory authorities: The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The FCA aims to secure the appropriate
degree of protection for consumers and to protect and enhance the integrity of the
UK financial system. The PRA, on the other hand, is part of the Bank of England
and is responsible for the prudential regulation supervision of financial institutions
at the individual level of the firm (Financial Services Authority, 2000).9 In 2000,
the Financial Services and Markets Act proposed a statutory regime known as the
Approved Persons Regime, that regulate and approve certain individuals, including
NEDs, who are working for authorised firms. In June 2013, a new regime, known
as the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR), has been introduced
to overcome the deficits in the old regime.
2.4.1 Approved Persons Regime
Under the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), PRA and FCA have
certain powers over financial firms’ NEDs because they fall under the category
of ‘approved persons’, who perform ‘controlled functions’ (e.g. for directors, gov-
erning functions) and have significant influence over the regulatory conduct of a
financial firm’s affairs.
NEDs in regulated firms must first get regulatory approval before performing
any of their governing functions. Specifically, they have to meet the rules of
9Specifically, the PRA’s general objective is to promote the safety and soundness of PRA authorised
persons.
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‘fit and proper test’, comply with the ‘Statements of Principle and the Code of
Practice’, and report anything that could affect their ongoing accountability to the
Authority and/or the regulated firm. PRA and FCA can take disciplinary actions
(e.g. fines, suspensions of approval, and imposing restriction) against NEDs who
do not comply with the rules for “controlled functions” and/or knowingly breach
their regulated firm’s rules.
2.4.2 The New Accountability Regime (Senior Managers and Certification Regime)
In 2013, the UK Parliament appointed the “Parliamentary Commission on
Banking Standards” (PCBS) to report on professional standards and culture of the
UK banking sector. In the report entitled “Changing banking for good”, the Com-
mission made several proposals aimed at restoring trust in banking. The proposal
covers five themes: improving personal responsibility, especially at senior levels,
through a new accountability regime (SM&CR); improving bank’s responsibility
for its own safety and soundness; empowering consumers and provide greater disci-
pline on banks; empowering regulators by reinforcing their responsibilities “in the
exercise of judgement in deploying their current and proposed new powers”; and
finally, specifying the responsibilities of the Government and Parliaments (Parlia-
mentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2013). Of particular interest for this
study is the new accountability regime. The Parliamentary Commission on Bank-
ing Standards (2013, p.8) described one of the major problems in the financial
sector is having too many bankers, especially at the most senior levels, operating
in an environment
“with insufficient personal responsibility. Top bankers dodged account-
ability for failings on their watch by claiming ignorance or hiding behind
collective decision-making. They then faced little realistic prospect of
financial penalties or more serious sanctions that commensurate with
the severity of the failures with which they were associated. Individ-
ual incentives have not been consistent with high collective standards,
often the opposite [. . . .] The Approved Persons Regime has created a
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largely illusory impression of regulatory control over individuals, while
meaningful responsibilities were not in practice attributed to anyone.”
To overcome the shortfalls of the Approved Persons Regime, the PCBS proposes
the ‘Senior Managers Regime’ alongside the ‘Certification Regime’. In addition,
PCBS suggests several amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act in
order to facilitate the enforcement action by the regulators if the rules of conduct,
as presented in Table 2.3, were breached.
Table 2.3
Rules of Conduct by FCA and PRA
Source: FCA’s Handbook of rules and guidance, the Code of Conduct sourcebook (COCON)
First tier — Individual conduct rules
Rule 1: You must act with integrity.




Rule 3: You must be open and cooperative with the FCA, the PRA and other
regulators.





Rule 5: You must observe proper standards of market conduct.
Second tier — Senior management conduct rules
SM1: You must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm
for which you are responsible is controlled effectively.
SM2: You must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm
for which you are responsible complies with relevant requirements and
standards of the regulatory system.
SM3: You must take reasonable steps to ensure that any delegation of your
responsibilities is to an appropriate person and that you oversee the discharge







SM4: You must disclose appropriately any information of which the FCA or
PRA would reasonably expect notice.
The purpose of the Senior Managers Regime is to ensure that individuals at
the senior level are fully aware and accountable for their assigned responsibilities as
proposed by PRA and FCA under ‘prescribed responsibilities’ (see Table 2.4 ). The
regime also applies to the previous ‘approved persons’ in the old regime. Hence,
it applies to all NEDs in regulated firms’ boards who are seen as ‘managers’.10 In
the new regime, NEDs may face potential criminal liability under a new offence for
decisions causing a financial firm to fail. The Licensing Regime or Certification
10In Financial Services and Markets Act, “managing” is defined as decision taking or participating in
the taking of decisions that affect the way a regulated firm is being run.
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Regime is proposed to apply to other regulated firms’ employees who perform
significant harm functions (i.e. certification functions) (Prudential Regulation
Authority, 2015). However, individuals falling under this category do not need
to get a direct approval by regulators. It is instead the firm’s responsibility to
ensure that certification functions are undertaken by individuals certified as fit
and proper. Firms must renew the certification annually (Prudential Regulation
Authority, 2015).
2.5. Evolution of the Financial Sector in the UK
The financial sector provides three essential services to the modern economy:
payment services, intermediation between savers and borrowers, and insurance
against risk. Payment services include the provision of bank accounts and services
that support settlement of payments between different parties. Intermediation
services involve pooling individual savings into deposit accounts, pension funds or
mutual funds, which in turn are used to fund different parties. Finally, risk trans-
ferring services are provided to hedge various types of risk (e.g., exchange rate risk,
liquidity risk) via financial instruments such as deposit accounts, securitisation,
derivatives and other insurance contracts (Davies and Richardson, 2010).
The UK financial sector underwent major structural changes over the last
few decades. Firstly, the increasing competition within the financial sector which
was triggered by the Competition and Credit Control introduced by the Bank of
England in 1971 and the Banking Act introduced in 1979 (Davies and Richardson,
2010; Drake, 2001).11 Secondly, the deregulation in 1986 and the ‘Big Bang’
encouraged clearing banks to diversify into new activities such as investment and
insurance, and to enter the mortgage market.12
11The deregulations include, for instance, the end collusion on interest rates, widening the scope of
banks’ activities, and relaxing the capital requirement.
12The “Big Bang” refers to a series of reforms aimed for the elimination of any anti-competitive practices
at the LSE and the internationalisation of London’s financial markets.
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Table 2.4
Prescribed Responsibilities by PRA and/or FCA
Source: Senior Managers Regime, Statement of Responsibilities as published by Bank of England.
Senior Managers Responsibilities
1
Performance by the firm of its obligations under the senior management regime,
including implementation and oversight
2 Performance by the firm of its obligations under the Certification Rules
3 Compliance with the rules relating to the firm’s management responsibilities map
4
The induction, training and professional development of all persons performing
senior management functions on behalf of the firm and all members of the firm’s
management body
5
Ensuring and overseeing the integrity and independence of the internal audit
function in accordance with SYSC 6.2 (Internal audit)
6
Ensuring and overseeing the integrity and independence of the compliance function
in accordance with SYSC 6.1 (Compliance)
7
Ensuring and overseeing the integrity and independence of the risk function in
accordance with SYSC 7.1.22 R (Risk control)
8
Ensuring and overseeing the integrity, independence and effectiveness of the firm’s
policies and procedures on whistleblowing and for ensuring staff who raise concerns
are protected from detrimental treatment
9 Allocation of all prescribed responsibilities
10
Leading the development of the firm’s culture and standards in relation to the
carrying on of its business and the behaviours of its staff
11
Embedding the firm’s culture and standards in relation to the carrying on of its
business and the behaviours of its staff in the day-to-day management of the firm
12 The development and maintenance of the firm’s business model
13 Management of the allocation and maintenance of capital, funding and liquidity
14 The firm’s treasury management functions
15
The production and integrity of the firm’s financial information and its regulatory
reporting in respect of its regulated activities
16
The firm’s recovery plan and resolution pack and overseeing the internal processes
regarding their governance
17 If the firm carries out proprietary trading, the firm’s proprietary trading activities
18
If the firm does not have an individual performing the Chief Risk function,
overseeing and demonstrating that the risk management policies and procedures
which the firm has adopted in accordance with SYSC 7.1.2 R to SYSC 7.1.5 R
satisfy the requirements of those rules and are consistently effective in accordance
with SYSC 4.1.1R
19
If the firm outsources its internal audit function, taking reasonable steps to ensure
that every person involved in the performance of the service is independent from the
persons who perform external audit, including (A) supervision and management of
the work of outsourced internal auditors and (B) management of potential conflicts
of interest between the provision of external audit and internal audit services
20
If the firm does not have a person who performs the Senior Independent Director
function, (A) carrying out oversight of the person who performs the Chairman
function; and (B) oversight of the adequacy and quality of the resources available to
the office of that person to enable the role to be fulfilled within the firm
Also, the UK market witnessed demutualisation of building societies and their
diversification into banking services, unsecured loans, credit cards, life and gen-
eral insurance, mutual funds, etc. (Davies and Richardson, 2010; Drake, 2001;
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Kosmidou and Pasiouras, 2006). Thirdly, the emergence of internationally agreed
prudential regulation (Basel I (1988) and Basel II (2004)) pushed banks to grow
even bigger by raising their fixed cost in meeting capital requirement and reporting
(Davies and Richardson, 2010).
Competition, deregulation, and globalisation enabled financial institutions to
pursue efficiencies through functional (economy of scope) and geographical expan-
sion (economy of scale) in order to remain competitive in international markets
(Kosmidou and Pasiouras, 2006). Unsurprisingly, despite having more than 300
licensed banks and building societies in the UK, the provision of banking services
is highly concentrated.13 Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show some of the financial sub-
sectors scaled by the size of their balance sheet and concentrations within these
sub-sectors, respectively. All firms in figure 2.1 provides all the main services of
financial system where different types of banks are grouped in the blue section of
the figure and other non-financial firms (NFFs) are grouped in the purple section.
Due to their central role in the financial system, Bank of England and central
counterparties (CCPs) are represented separately in the centre of the figure. Fig-
ure 2.2 illustrates the level of concentration in the UK different financial sectors
where the five darkest shades of black are used to represent the largest five entities
in each sectors based on the size of the balance sheets (e.g. the biggest five life
insurance companies account for half of that sector).
2.6. Performance of the Financial Sector During the Finan-
cial Crisis
2.6.1 Measuring Performance in the Financial Sector
Although there has been global convergence in financial sector’s regulations,
the regulatory and institutional systems still vary from country to country, which
in turn affects the performance measurement structure of banks in each country
13Six banks together account for almost 80% of the stock of UK customer lending and deposits (Davies
and Richardson, 2010).
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Figure 2.1: A Map of the UK Financial System
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (2015, p. 114)
Figure 2.2: Concentration Within Sectors: Highlighting the Size of
the Five Largest Firms
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (2015, p. 121)
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(Michael and Tobi, 2014). Performance of the banking industry can be assessed
using a wide range of interrelated tools such as financial ratios, economic value
added (EVA), performance dashboards, customer-based measures, risk measures,
and the balanced score card (Michael and Tobi, 2014). A recent survey of the UK
banks indicates financial ratios and the Balanced Score Card being the most com-
mon performance measurement systems, with no significant relationship between
adopted measures in the UK banks and their characteristics (e.g. age, ownership
structure, market position) (Michael and Tobi, 2014).
Academics’ attempts to investigate the efficiency characteristics of financial
institutions have been challenged by the difficulties arising from the intangible
nature of services/products provided in the financial sector. Hence, financial in-
stitutions’ outputs, costs, and performance are the most used measures of produc-
tivity in academic research.14 For instance, Kosmidou and Pasiouras (2006) used
thirteen financial ratios (e.g. equity/total assets; equity/liabilities; net interest
margin; other operating income/average assets; return on average assets) to cover
different aspects of banks’ performance operating in the UK (e.g. profitability;
liquidity; capital adequacy; and asset quality). They found that small banks in
the UK exhibit higher overall performance compared to large ones over the period
1998-2002. Similarly, Drake’s (2001) study found that increasing returns to scale
are evident for smaller banks compared to decreasing returns to scale in the “big
4” UK clearing banks throughout the sample period 1984 to 1995.
2.6.2 Corporate Governance and Performance of the Financial Sector in the Global
Financial Crisis
A number of macroeconomic factors have led to the freeze of the global credit
markets in 2007-2008 following the collapse of a large number of financial institu-
tions. The deregulation in the financial sector during the 20th century resulted
in a connected network of greatly leveraged and functionally expanded financial
institutions and intermediaries. Consequently, the financial market witnessed the
14For instance, interest margin, indexes of profitability, pricing of bank services and loan market share.
However, these measures are not necessary used for evaluation in the financial market.
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emergence of “too important to fail” institutions which are subject to less mar-
ket discipline, a status that may have altered their private incentives (Davies and
Richardson, 2010). However, macroeconomic factors were not the only drivers of
the financial crisis as some firms were affected much more than others. The varia-
tion in firms’ exposures to the financial crisis were referred to as firm-level factors
such as risk management and financing policies (Erkens et al., 2012). Several
recent studies have investigated how firms’ corporate governance affect their per-
formance during the financial crisis and Table 2.5 presents a summary of reviews
of such studies.
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) challenged the argument that CEOs’ lack of
interest was the fundamental cause for the crisis. Specifically, they questioned
the assumption that CEOs’ compensation should have been sufficiently linked to
long-term performance and for shareholders to be given more voice (e.g. via the
adoption of “say on pay”). Hence, they examined whether the alignment of inter-
est between CEOs and shareholders led to better performance during the financial
crisis. Neither short-term incentives nor equity incentives were found to have a
negative association with banks’ performance in the US during the financial cri-
sis.15 Furthermore, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) found some evidence suggesting
exactly the opposite, i.e. CEOs with better-aligned compensation structure per-
formed worse during the financial crisis. A possible explanation is that CEOs with
better incentives were actually trying to maximise shareholders’ wealth by taking
“excessive” risk. Ex-post, their choices may have ended up with unexpected poor
outcomes. Such poor outcomes do not necessarily mean that CEOs were not acting
in their shareholders’ interest as they themselves suffered huge losses.
Similarly, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) found that banks with more shareholder
friendly boards generally performed worse during the crisis. However, the ar-
gument that banks were actually pursuing investment opportunities which were
favoured by shareholder before the crisis, unexpectedly turned into great losses still
15Short-term incentives measured by the “Cash bonus/salary”, which is the dollar amount of the annual
bonus for 2006 performance paid in cash divided by the cash salary. Equity incentives are measured
by two measures; (1) the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio to change in the stock
price, (2) CEO’s ownership is (all shares + delta-weighted options held by the CEO)/ the total number
of shares outstanding ”.
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holds here as well. This argument is supported by the negative relation between
ex-ante and ex-post banks’ performance. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) explored other
hypotheses for banks’ poor performance during the global financial crisis as well.
Specifically, they found that banks financed by short-term funds, have less deposits
and more funding fragility tend to perform worse during the financial crisis period.
In addition, although results did not show that stronger regulation systematically
led to better performance during the crisis, some evidence indicated that banks
from more restricted countries did better during the crisis.
Erkens et al. (2012) found that banks with more independent boards and
greater institutional ownership (i.e. greater external monitoring) experienced
worse stock returns during the financial crisis. However, consistent with Bel-
tratti and Stulz (2012) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), their result showed
that only banks with greater institutional ownership and not independent boards,
took more risk before the financial crisis. Again, this supports the hypothesis that
banks were actually following investors’ interests when they took this risk ex-ante.
On the other hand, a possible explanation for the negative relation between in-
dependent boards and stock return during the crisis is that these boards raised
equity capital to avoid bankruptcy risk. Indeed, Erkens et al. (2012) found banks
that raised more equity capital had a greater chance to survive during the financial
crisis (i.e. less chance to be delisted). Regarding country-level governance, con-
sistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), no significant relation was found between
firm performance and legal institutions quality or the existence of shareholder-
protection rights. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, policy makers called for
increase in the financial expertise of board members.
Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2011) investigated if financial institutions
with financially experienced and more independent boards performed better dur-
ing the crisis. They found that although financial expertise of the board was pos-
itively related to ex-ante bank performance, it was negatively related to ex-post
performance in the crisis. According to Minton et al., (2011), directors with finan-
cial expertise recognise “ . . . that the residual nature of shareholders’ claim on a
bank’s highly leveraged balance sheet that is guaranteed by the government(p.6)”
engaged in excessive risk-taking activities before the financial crisis. Aebi, Sabato
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and Schmid (2012) analysed the effect of having ‘risk-governance’ on banks’ per-
formance during the financial crisis. The term ‘risk-governance’ captures several
internal governance mechanisms used to control risk in banks such as the pres-
ence of a chief risk officer (CRO) on the board, ensuring CRO reports directly to
the board of directors, and other risk management-related corporate governance
mechanisms. Results showed that banks with risk governance in general perform
significantly better during the crisis.16 They also found no significant relation be-
tween the ‘generally accepted good governance’ (e.g. CEO ownership, shareholder
rights using the G Index as a proxy) and a bank’s performance during the finan-
cial crisis. Furthermore, consistent with earlier studies, results indicate banks with
more independent board, higher percentage of directors with finance background,
and institutional shareholdings performed significantly worse during the financial
crisis.
Lastly, Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2010) explored if internal corporate
governance mechanisms in the US banking industry are related to banks’ perfor-
mance during the financial crisis. In contrast with other studies, results suggested
that the weakness of internal governance mechanisms before and during the finan-
cial crisis was significantly related to banks’ (especially large banks) market returns
in 2008. Namely, a less independent board, pay-for-performance insensitivity, a
decrease in insider ownership, CEO role duality, and CEO-friendly nominating
committees are all associated with a decline in the stock performance during the
financial crisis. Cornett et al. (2010) argued that banks, particularly the larger
ones, experienced decrease in internal monitoring despite effective corporate gov-
ernance being in place.
16Banks where CRO reports to the CEO perform significantly worse than other banks in their sample.
Noteworthy, although improving risk management function and governance would benefit banks during
crises, it may also come at the expense of firms’ performance in normal times (Aebi et al., 2012).
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2.7. Labour Market for Directors in the Financial Sector
Studies on labour market for directors usually exclude financial firms from
their samples due to their particularities (see for example, Yermack, 2004). How-
ever, there are a few studies that examined either directors’ compensation and/or
turnover in the financial sector. The most recent study to consider NEDs’ labour
market in the financial sector is the one conducted by Davidoff, Lund and Schonlau
(2014) in the US market. Although they found a significant relationship between
financial firms’ performance and NEDs’ turnover, the economic significance of this
relationship was weak.17 In addition, the financial crisis itself did not seem to
have an effect on NEDs’ turnover, which might be consistent with the literature
discussed earlier on financial sector’s performance during the financial crisis.
Regarding external directorships, no significant relation was found between
the performance of the focal financial firm, based on the prior two years, three
and four years, and the subsequent future board seats that a NED gained. Ac-
cording to Davidoff et al. (2014), this may suggest that other firms “. . . are not
basing their board appointment decisions on performance at an outside direc-
tors’ other firms, but rather on other characteristics (p.23)”. Finally, their results
indicate that NEDs’ remuneration had no significant correlation with their firm
performance regardless of the measurement or time span used. Instead, they found
firm size and years of service are the main determinants of directors’ pay. Simi-
larly, Doucouliagos, Haman, and Askary, (2007) found firm size to always have a
positive relationship with directors’ pay in the Australian banks. However, they
did find some evidence for links between directors’ total remunerations and firm
performance but only when long lagged return is used. Table 2.6 summarises key
studies related to labour market for directors.
17A large change of one SD in firm performance is associated with an only 1.22% change in the likeli-
hood of NED’s turnover. Since 2.2% change is considered modest, the 1.2% change is economically
insignificant.
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2.8. Chapter Summary
This chapter discusses the contextual setting of this thesis. The issues covered
in this chapter can be divided into two main parts. In the first part, the focus is
on the broad corporate governance framework that all public listed firms have to
accommodate. It starts with a general discussion of corporate governance in the
UK followed by the current recommendations of the Code while highlighting some
of its research-related provisions. The second part is devoted to the UK financial
sector. The specific governance recommendations that directors in regulated sector
need to comply with is elaborated. The discussion then moves to the UK financial
sector and most importantly its performance during the financial crisis. This
part attempts to present some corporate governance related explanations for the
BOFIs’ poor performance during the crisis. The chapter concludes with studies
examining the market consequences for directors working in the financial sector.
The next chapter presents the first empirical study of this thesis which explored





Busyness of UK Boards
3.1. Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis consists of three empirical chapters
addressing three interrelated issues regarding boards’ ability and incentives. This
chapter presents the first empirical work to explore the abilities of UK listed firms’
boards. The main aim of this chapter is to provide a timely review of boards’ char-
acteristics of most concern to both regulators and scholars regarding the UK listed
companies. This includes boards’ diversity attributes (i.e. statutory, competitive,
and demographic), boards’ competitive capital (i.e. educational qualifications, so-
cial networking, and governance experiences), and boards’ busyness. This chapter
also shows the extent to which previous boards’ characteristics were affected by
the post-financial crisis regulations.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section
presents an overview of the chapter, highlighting its importance and objectives.
Section three presents the relevant literature review to address the research ques-
tions for this part of empirical work. This is followed by the research design in
49
Chapter 3. Insights on Diversity, Competitive Capital & Busyness of UK Boards 50
section four. Finally, the findings and chapter summary are discussed in sections
five and six, respectively.
3.2. Chapter Overview
The role and performance of boards in general, and the NEDs in particular,
lie at the centre of commentators’ discussion in the wake of any corporate failure.
Earlier corporate governance research, dominated by the agency theory perspective
(Roberts et al., 2005), has largely seen corporate failures as a self-seeking problem
on the part of the firms’ management or executives. Corporate governance codes,
therefore, focused on structural remedies for overseeing and controlling the ‘op-
portunistic’ behaviour of management (Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2011; Zattoni and
Cuomo, 2010). These ‘structural’ remedies or so-called board statutory diversity
(BSD) are aimed at empowering the NEDs through recommendations related to
the board leadership structure, the proportion of NEDs on the boards, and the
independence of board committees (Ben-Amar et al., 2013).18 However, over the
last two decades, the link between various BSD recommendations and expected
outcomes has been empirically challenged (see Musteen et al., 2010, for a review,
see Daily et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Huse et al., 2009; Siebels and
Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012).
Given the mixed results in BSD-performance research, another line of research
highlights the need for theoretical ‘pluralism’ to overcome agency theory’s narrow
view of management as opportunistic individuals but who are ‘perfectly competent’
(Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; Minichilli et al., 2009; Oh et al., 2013; Roberts
et al., 2005; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). In reality, corporate failures due to
directors’ ‘honest’ incompetence are as common as self-seeking behaviour failures
(Hendry, 2005). Therefore, proponents of the resource-based view (RBV) suggest
that NEDs who possess a range of skills and qualifications can play an important
18The statutory diversity – sometimes called statutory independence, refers to “the diversity of incen-
tives between outsiders and insiders represented on the board should help them meet their fiduciary
obligations and keep managerial discretion within proper bounds”(Ben-Amar et al., 2013: 86).
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role in addressing the issue of managements’ incompetence by offering advice and
counsel (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009).
The service role that NEDs offer may not only ensure firms’ survival but also
enhance their competitive position especially if the skills held by board members
and NEDs are scarce relative to their competitors (Bammens et al., 2011). Man-
agement scholars also suggest that board’s service role depends on the extent to
which the right mix of knowledge and expertise is present on the board (Carpenter
and Westphal, 2001; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). There-
fore, two main related aspects of board’s qualifications are often addressed in the
literature, i.e. board competitive capital (BCC) and board competitive diversity
(BCD). The former i.e. BCC, which is a measure of occupational-related plural-
ism (e.g. skills, experience and qualifications) in the composition of boards, are
expected to contribute to both monitoring and service roles of the board (Hillman
and Dalziel, 2003). The latter i.e. BCD, is a measure of how diverse these collec-
tive skills, experience and qualifications are. The presence of skills and knowledge
per se may not result in good execution of board’s roles unless it is accompanied
by diverse backgrounds. Hence, the literature in group dynamics highlights the
importance of board diversity as an antecedent for the organisational workgroup’s
performance. Through its influence on affective, cognitive, communication, and
symbolic processes, BCD as well as board demographic diversity (BDD) are ex-
pected to improve board’s roles, boost creativity, and enhance the quality of the
decision making (Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003;
Milliken and Martins, 1996).19
As far as regulations are concerned, among the different attributes of diversity,
i.e. BSD, BCD, and BDD, the first attribute has been the main target for most
regulators around the globe, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. Furthermore,
Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) in their review of the corporate governance codes de-
veloped worldwide at the end of 2005, conclude that the codes tend to focus only
19However, the empirical evidence on such hypothesis is still mixed (Anderson et al., 2011; Ben-Amar
et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2014).
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on BSD and that NEDs’ “competencies and incentives are not considered a gov-
ernance issue to be regulated in detail” (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010: 64). However,
the recent global financial crisis redirected the attention of both regulators and
governance scholars towards the dysfunctionality of NEDs as a group in exercising
their roles. Since NEDs have the ‘power’ to discipline and/or replace inefficient
management in the pre- crisis period, their failure to do so may be attributed to
their insufficient experience (ability aspect) and lack of commitment and incentives
(motives aspect) which led to their poor governance performance (Fisch, 2010).
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, regulators attempt to tackle
those potential deficits in their post-crisis governance reforms. In the UK, the
market has witnessed the launch of several reforms (e.g. the Walker Review,
2009; the Code, 2010; and the Davis’ Report, 2011) including those specifically
addressing NEDs’ deficits. Firstly, there is greater emphasis on the importance of
both board diversity and board competitive capital (i.e. the board overall balance
of skills and experience). Secondly, NEDs’ lack of commitment was also addressed
in the post-crisis reforms by encouraging more restrictions on the overall number
of directorships that a director can hold (i.e. board busyness).20 Finally, the
introduction of the Senior Management Regime (2013), which promotes directors’
individual rather than collective legal accountability for the board’s decisions, is
expected to some extent help rectify NEDs’ lack of incentives and passivity.
Although board’s diversity has been extensively studied, most of these studies
focus on one aspect of diversity, i.e. statutory diversity, and its effect on firm
performance (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). However, little is known about how boards’
diversity has been affected over the years by different stakeholders’ pressures (e.g.
media, regulators, and shareholders). Therefore, this study systematically explores
the three different components of board diversity (i.e. statutory, competitive, and
demographic diversity) using a large dataset that covers the UK public listed firms
over the last fifteen years (1999-2014). In addition to board’s diversity, this study
contributes to the literature on antecedents of board’s performance (Minichilli et
20For instance, the issue of NEDs’ busyness and chairmen’s busyness were among the Walker Review’s
(2009) thirty-nine main recommendations for banks and other financial institutions (BOFIs).
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al., 2009) by examining another two prerequisites for board efficiency, namely,
board competitive capital and board time commitment. In other words, besides
board diversity, this study also explores how the UK boards’ competitive capital
have developed overtime. Furthermore, the issue of board busyness and the extent
to which these firms have responded to the regulatory and shareholders’ pressure
to increase the board’s overall time commitment are also considered. Hence, this
study further extends the literature on multiple directorships and board busyness
(see, for example, Kiel and Nicholson, 2006).
In short, this part of the study firstly provides insights on the extent to which
the regulators’ endeavours was successful over the years in increasing the diversity,
competitive capital, and commitment of boards, especially in the UK where the
‘comply or explain’ approach is adopted. Secondly, it will demonstrate if there
has been variation in the board’s diversity, capital, and commitment and whether
they are dependent on any particular equity market indices and sectors they serve.
Thirdly, since the data set spans the period between 1999- 2014, this study will
trace any changes in the different components of board diversity (BSD, BCD, and
BDD), board capital and board busyness in the wake of the financial crisis and its
related reforms in the business and regulatory environments.
3.3. Research Questions
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the general objective of this part of the study is to
provide a timely review over the last 15 years (2000-14) of boards’ characteristics of
most concern to both regulators and scholars in the UK listed companies. In doing
so, this chapter aims to answer the following questions covering three main groups
of boards’ characteristics, i.e. boards’ diversity attributes, boards’ competitive
capital, and boards’ busyness. Section 3.6.2 will provide answers to each of those
questions in a separate subheading.
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Objective 1: Board Diversity
Q1a. Are there significant changes on the diversity attributes (i.e. statutory, com-
petitive, and demographic) of boards of companies listed in the UK over the
last fifteen years?
Q1b. Are there significant differences in the boards’ diversity attributes across
various FTSE Indices?
Q1c. Are there significant changes in the extent of board-level diversity attributes
before and after the financial crisis?
Objective 2: Board Competitive Capital
Q2a. Are there significant changes in the competitive capital of boards of compa-
nies listed in the UK over the last fifteen years?
Q2b. Are there significant differences in the boards’ competitive capital across
various FTSE Indices?
Q2c. Are there significant changes in the boards’ competitive capital before and
after the financial crisis?
Objective 3: Board Busyness
Q3a. Are there significant changes in the level of boards’ busyness of companies
listed in the UK over the last fifteen years?
Q3b. Are there significant differences in the level of boards’ busyness across various
FTSE Indices?
Q3c. Are there significant differences in the level of boards’ busyness before and
after the financial crisis?
Objective 4: Board Characteristics and Financial Performance
Q4. Are there significant relationships between boards’ characteristics (i.e. diver-
sity, competitive capital, and busyness) and market-based financial perfor-
mance of companies listed in the UK?
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3.4. Literature Review
3.4.1 Conceptual Framework
The literature describes board of directors as an episodic work-group com-
posed of elite, and mostly outside individuals, who make complex, multifaceted
and strategic decisions (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) that may considerably affect
the corporate’s performance. The distinctive nature of this governance work-
group attracts the attention of scholars from different disciplines, viz., finance,
economics, sociology and management. Specifically, the attributes of the board
of directors (e.g. board composition and competence) that could lead to an opti-
mal corporate performance is among the most frequently asked questions in the
literature.21 However, results of studies on these attributes are mixed (Chen, Dy-
ball and Wright, 2009), partly due to the different approach adopted by different
disciplines in understanding how board composition and competence affect cor-
porate outcomes (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Figure 3.1 presents the conceptual
framework on the antecedents of board task performance.
The most dominant perspective in the economics and finance literature is
related to the agency theory. According to this view, monitoring is perceived
as the main role of boards and if executed diligently, will reduce agency cost
and indirectly affects firm performance. It contends that effective monitoring is
a function of board independence. Consequently, finance scholars examine the
association between board composition as a construct for board independence and
a wide range of other board- and firm- levels outcomes. In the conceptual model
presented in Figure 3.1 , this association is hypothesised in a line connecting the
BSD to its control role.22 The indirect relationship between board control role and
the firm-level outcome is illustrated in Figure 3.1 by the dotted arrow.
21Board composition refers to “the number of board members and the configuration of competence and
characteristics among them” (Huse, 2005: S68).
22However, empirical evidence on the relationship between the different BSD’s recommendations and cor-
porate performance is not conclusive (Bhagat and Black, 2001; Dalton, Daily, Certo, and Roengpitya,
2003; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).
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Figure 3.1: The Conceptual Model: Antecedents of Board Task Per-
formance
The second hypothetical perspective, which is relatively less explored, is usu-
ally adopted by sociologists and management scholars (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
It builds on both the resource based view (Barney, 1991) and resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) in arguing that directors through their voca-
tional and personal qualifications and network provide valuable ‘resources’ to the
firm.23 In addition, they contribute to firm performance by reducing the firm’s
dependency on external environment and enabling access to external important
resources. Thus, board competitive capital in providing advice and counselling
is directly associated with the firms outcomes (Daily et al., 2003; Hillman and
Dalziel, 2003).24
23Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) contend that “when an organization appoints an individual to a board, it
expects the individual will come to support the organization, will concern himself with its problems,
will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it” (1978: 163).
24Board Competitive Capital is sometimes called ‘Board Capital’ (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) or ‘Board
Competence’ (Huse, 2005). This usually includes the directors’ relational or social capacity, in addi-
tion to their general, functional, board-specific knowledge and skills. It is distinguished from board
characteristics which include “age, tenure, seniority, gender, race, individual behaviour, esteem, influ-
ence, independence, integrity and so on” (Huse, 2005: S69). This thesis tends to use the term ‘board
competitive capital’ as it better reflects the difference between board’s skills, which are sought in the
employment market, and other board characteristics.
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Although effective execution of board service roles (e.g. counselling and
boundary spanner) is a function of the presence of board capital (Hillman and
Dalziel, 2003), the board’s monitoring role is also likely to be reinforced by the
presence of such resources. For instance, board members who have governance ex-
perience can contribute to both roles by proposing a new governance technique to
a firm, having witnessed its success on another firm’s board (Kiel and Nicholson,
2006). Two lines in the conceptual model illustrate the association between the
presence of board competitive capital on one hand and the two roles of the boards
on the other hand. In addition, the model shows the connection between board
service role and firm-level outcomes through a direct arrow from the first to the
latter.
The final approach to the study of board composition is the behavioural per-
spective which has its roots in psychology and sociology literature in general,
and group dynamics in particular (Cohen and Bailey, 1997). Unlike the previous
‘board role’ theories (e.g. agency and resource dependency theories), the focus
is not on the board’s role but rather on the board’s culture as a decision-making
group, which in turn affects the board’s task performance. Committed and cre-
ative workgroups who are able to engage in critical discussions and attend to task
conflicts are expected to perform both their service and monitoring roles better
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005).25 The empirical work in this field is
usually centred on examining the association between boards’ diversity as a pre-
requisite for enriching board’s culture and their task and firm performances (see
Table 3.1).
The conceptual model differentiates between three distinct aspects of board
diversity (i.e. BSD, BCD, and BDD). In the first attribute of diversity i.e. board
statutory diversity (BSD), the board’s independence can be seen through not
only agency theory perspective but also through the diversity lens. The presence
of independent outsiders on the board can stimulate task conflict and creative
thinking which eventually enhance the quality of the decisions taken by the group
25Task conflict is defined as “disagreements about the content of the tasks being performed, including
differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions” (Jehn, 1995: 258).
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(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). As such, board independence can contribute to board
service role as well as controlling role. Secondly, several group dynamics and
governance studies suggest that “diversity in the composition of organizational
groups affects outcomes” (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Erhardt et al., 2003; Hillman
and Dalziel, 2003; Milliken and Martins, 1996). The model acknowledges such
association by including the other two main types of ‘non-statutory’ diversity,
i.e. board demographic diversity (BDD), and board competitive diversity (BCD)
or job-related diversity. The connection between the three attributes of board
diversity and board task performance is represented in the model by multiple
straight lines between board’s diversity and its roles.
Finally, contemporary board of directors has a few features that distinguish
it from other organizational workgroups. This includes the dominant presence
of independent ‘outsider’ directors, the part-time nature of the directorship post,
and the board’s episodic functionality (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Due to these
distinctive features, the behaviour of some boards has been described as purely
ornamental ‘rubber stamping’.26 Therefore, researchers have been interested in
finding what render certain boards passive (Machold and Farquhar, 2013). One
line of studies focus on directors’ lack of incentives as the main driver for their
passivity, suggesting compensation-related reforms (Shen, 2005; Tosi, Shen, and
Gentry, 2003).27 Another line of studies suggest that board’s passivity is a func-
tion of directors’ busyness (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Busy boards may lead
to ‘entrenched management’ since ‘busy’ directors may not perform their moni-
toring role diligently (Devos, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal, 2009). Furthermore,
the effectiveness of independent directors suffer from their lack of knowledge of
firm’s affairs and reliance on management as a source of information, a problem-
atic issue known as ‘the independence paradox’ (Hooghiemstra and van Manen,
2004). The independence paradox is seen as a “product of the limited amount
26Mace (1971) was the first to observe the phenomenon of “rubber stamps”, which he believed to be the
statues of many boards. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the board rubber stamping
behaviour described by Mace (1971), and Lorsch and MacIver (1989) to be a phenomenon of the past
(Adams et al., 2010).
27Equity-based compensation for NEDs is discouraged in the UK. Hence, board busyness is the main
focus in this thesis.
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of time that independent directors devote to the corporation” (Chen et al., 2009:
209). Consequently, independent directors who possess unique abilities should
not be ‘overburdened’ to be able to acquire firm-related knowledge and do their
roles diligently without relying on management. The model addresses directors’
time commitment toward the firm as another determinant for board tasks’ perfor-
mance. In the following three subsections, a review the relevant literature followed
by the UK regulators’ recommendations regarding each antecedent of board task
performance (i.e. board’s diversity, competitive capital, and commitment) are
presented.
3.4.2 Board Diversity (BSD, BCD and BDD)
3.4.2.1 Studies on Board Diversity
This study differentiates between three main attributes of board diversity:
BSD, BCD, and BDD. Among these different diversity’s attributes, the BSD stands
out in the literature and corporate governance codes as being of the greatest in-
terest.28 Over the last two decades, regulators have been promoting board struc-
tures that ensure the dominance of independent directors who are presumed to
be protecting the shareholders’ interests over boards’ different functions. These
recommendations include the separation between the role of CEO and Chairman
and a majority representation of NEDs on the board and its various committees.
The BSD recommendations, whether regulatory enforced or widely acknowledged
as governance ‘best practices’, are based on the assumption that a significant
presence of independent NEDs on the boardroom would enhance the monitoring
process, decrease the management opportunistic tendency, and eventually pro-
tect shareholders’ value (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, over the last two
decades, this assumption has been empirically challenged by many studies exam-
ining the link between BSD’s recommendations and expected outcomes (Musteen
28The statutory diversity, sometimes called statutory independence, refers to “the diversity of incen-
tives between outsiders and insiders represented on the board should help them meet their fiduciary
obligations and keep managerial discretion within proper bounds”(Ben-Amar et al., 2013: 86).
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et al., 2010, for a review, see Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998; Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003; Huse et al., 2009; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012).
In light of these findings, governance scholars are increasingly drawing on the
sociology literature in getting more insights into how other classes of board’s di-
versity may influence outcomes (Daily et al., 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
Milliken and Martins (1996) categorise workgroup’s diversity into two main types,
observable diversity and less visible diversity. BDD is classified as an observable di-
versity that includes readily detectable attributes such as ethnic background, age,
or gender while on the other hand, BCD is less visible and includes underlying at-
tributes such as education, tenure in the organization, and functional background
(Kang et al., 2007; Milliken and Martins, 1996).
Table 3.1 (see page 58) shows different attempts in the literature to explain
firm performance by considering the interactions among board’s attributes that
make up both independence and diversity (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). The work of
Molz’s (1995) was perhaps the first to do so, yet he did not distinguish between
BSD and BDD. In his paper, he discussed two main types of boards, managerial
dominated board and social/pluralistic board, which represent two extremes of
the spectrum. Managerial dominated boards are captive of management and are
less committed, while social/pluralistic boards are more committed and are more
diversified. The former type of boards, according to Molz (1995), describe the
state of governance at that time, while the latter are expected to be associated
with better task performance and hence firm performance. However, Molz (1995)
found no evidence that social/pluralistic boards are associated with better social
or financial corporate performance. One possible reason for these findings is the
measurement Molz (1995) used to identify social boards whereby the different
types of diversity (i.e. BDD and BSD) are limped together with a narrow focus
on gender diversity. In their study of Canadian board’s diversity, Ben-Amar et
al., (2013) overcome this limitation by distinguishing between BSD and BDD,
and their potential diverse effect on board decisions. They found BDD to have
a significant influence on merger and acquisition decision, while BSD has limited
impact.
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The current study extends the Ben-Amar et al.’s (2013) diversity-performance
framework by including another board diversity aspect, i.e. BCD. It is important
to consider all board’s diversity aspects as different attributes could have diverse
effect on board effectiveness and firm performance (Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay,
and Zhao, 2011). Indeed, some scholars argue that calls for less uniformity in
the boardroom may be based on social or ethical merits rather than wealth max-
imisation (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). Furthermore, firm’s profitability can be
affected by board’s heterogeneity due to greater communication, coordination, and
social barriers that heterogeneous boards suffer from (Anderson et al., 2011).
3.4.2.2 Regulatory Requirements for Board Independence and Diversity
The boards’ overall diversity, including its different attributes, i.e. BSD, BCD,
and BDD, is generally encouraged under the UK Combined Code on Corporate
Governance (FRC, 2008). Under section B of ‘board effectiveness’, regulators
urge the UK listed firms to keep an “appropriate balance of skills, experience,
independence and knowledge of the company” on their boards to ensure effective
discharge of board’s responsibilities. However, only board independence is regu-
lated in detail. For instance, UK listed firms’ board should comprise independent
NEDs and the company’s annual report should show the ‘independence’ status
for each NED.29 Small listed firms’ boards are excluded from this provision but
should have at least two independent NEDs. On the other hand, other diversity
attributes (i.e. BDD and BCD) are left at the discretion of the firms’ board with
a great emphasis on maintaining board diversity and balance of skills and experi-
ence when appointment decisions are made. Post-crisis, board diversity attracted
more attention from policy makers and the media. For instance, in the UK, the
29Director should not be regarded as independent if (1) he/she “has been an employee of the company
or group within the last five years”. (2) If he/she “has, or has had within the last three years, a
material business relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director
or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company”. In addition, (3) if
he/she has “received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s
fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance- related pay scheme, or is a member of
the company’s pension scheme; (4) has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors
or senior employees”. Finally, (5) if the director “holds cross-directorships or has significant links
with other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies; (6) represents a significant
shareholder; or (7) has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first
election” (FRC, 2014).
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Davies Report (2011) suggests increasing representation of women on the FTSE
100 boards to at least 25% by 2015 (Mulcahy and Linehan, 2014). With regard to
the financial sector, the Walker Review encourages regulators (i.e. FSA) to
“give closer attention to the overall balance of the board in relation to
the risk strategy of the business, taking into account the experience,
behavioural and other qualities of individual directors and their access
to fully adequate induction and development programmes” (Walker,
2009, p.50).
3.4.3 Board Competitive Capital
3.4.3.1 Studies on Board Competitive Capital
Boards of directors are usually distinguished in the literature based on their
composition, competence, characteristics and compensation (Huse, 2005). The
previous section (3.4.2) discusses the literature on board composition, the configu-
ration of their competence and their characteristics. This section focuses on board
competence which includes directors’ functional, knowledge, skills, and relational
or social capital (i.e. competitive capital). A growing body of research investi-
gate how board’s competitive capital may be linked to board-level (e.g. strategic
decisions) and firm-level (e.g. financial performance) outcomes. The substantive
contributions to firm performance can be made not only through board decision
control but also through provision of resources and advice by board members in
general and NEDs in particular (Daily et al., 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).30
Table 3.2 summarises some of the main studies that focus on board different com-
petitive capital, as a dependent variable, published over the last decade.
Among the different aspects of board’s competitive capital, directors’ occu-
pational experience (Giannetti, Liao, and Yu, 2015; Haynes and Hillman, 2010;
30As with both agency and stewardship theories, by concentrating only on links to the external en-
vironment, resource dependence theory ignores alternative activities of the board such as providing
advice (Westphal, 1999; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989), monitoring (Johnson et al., 1996; Bainbridge,
1993; Fama, 1980) and strategising (Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989)
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Rhee and Lee, 2008; Tian et al., 2011) and directors’ social networking (Chen,
2014; Dalziel, Gentry, and Bowerman, 2011; Tian et al., 2011) received the most
attention. Scholars often acknowledge the interdependent nature, theoretically
and empirically, between the previous two aspects of board’s competitive capital,
occupational experience and social networking, and the difficulty in isolating the
effects of one form over the other (Haynes and Hillman, 2010), especially when
the latter is measured based on the interlocking directorate ties (i.e. total number
of board directorships) (e.g. Chen, 2014).31 Board’s educational background also
has been considerably examined in related literature, ranging from general educa-
tional background (Chen, 2014) to more specific one such as experience of study-
ing abroad (Giannetti et al., 2015; Rhee and Lee, 2008), having master and/or
doctoral-level degree (Dalziel et al., 2011; Rhee and Lee, 2008), and educated in
the Ivy League (Dalziel et al., 2011).
As noted by Tian et al. (2011), “only limited empirical work has examined
board human and social capital simultaneously. Previous studies on board capital
are also limited in the sense that they lack a systematic, task-relevant classification
scheme of board capital (p.732)”. In addition, very few researchers studied board
competitive capital and board diversity simultaneously rather than focusing on
only one of them (see for example, Giannetti et al., 2015; Tian et al., 2011). That
is, literature on managerial teams suggests that not only the level of team’s capabil-
ities affects firm outcomes but also how diverse these capabilities are. Therefore,
this thesis explores both antecedents; board competitive capabilities and board
diversity simultaneously.
31This study partially isolates the effects of these two interrelated aspects by measuring directors’ social
network based on the time a director spent serving with other directors on the past. Then the variables
are aggregated from the individual to the board level.
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3.4.3.2 Regulatory Requirements for Board Competitive Capital
The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2008) highlights the
importance of competencies for individual directors. For instance, the competencies-
related criteria for appointing a director need to be shown in a proper manner to
the shareholders at the first AGM after the appointment date (see § B.2 and B.7).
Although competencies of individual directors are not considered a governance
issue to be regulated in detail and is usually left for the market forces to regulate
(Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010), there is an increasing demand on equipping directors
with a specific type of knowledge such as risk management and financial expertise
(Dodd-Frank-Act, 2010).32 As far as the UK financial sector is concerned, the
Walker Review (2009) sheds the light on the importance of governance or board
experience per se. That is, the FSA’s interview process is suggested to be assessed
by “senior advisers with relevant industry experience at or close to board level of
a similarly large and complex entity”.
3.4.4 Board Busyness
3.4.4.1 Studies on Board Busyness
Multiple directorships occur when a director simultaneously serves on at least
two firms’ boards. The incidence of multiple directorships have been a controversial
issue among researchers, shareholders activists and policy makers since the publi-
cation of Berle and Means’s seminal work in 1932 (Ong, Wan, and Ong, 2003).33
On the one hand, opponents of multiple directorships build their criticisms on
how serving on multiple boards can be a source of distraction that undermines
directors’ due diligence (i.e. busyness hypothesis, see Ferris, Jagannathan, and
Pritchard, 2003). As mentioned earlier, independent NEDs also need to invest
32Dodd-Frank-Act (2010) suggests that director should have “a bachelor’s degree or higher from an
accredited college or university in risk management, business administration, finance, economics [...]
to demonstrate minimum competence in risk management (p.415)”.
33Multiple directorships or interlocking directorates are sometimes used interchangeably in literature
(see Appendix B). However, others differentiate between the two terms where interlocking refers only
to directors who are sitting on each other companies
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sufficient time learning about their firms to avoid over-reliance on management
(i.e. the independence paradox, see Chen et al., 2009).
The negative effect of multiple directorships or busyness on firm-level out-
comes has been supported by a number of studies in the literature. Fich and
Shivdasani (2006), using Forbes 500 lists of largest corporations, found firms
with interlocked directorate have significantly lower financial performance, mea-
sured by market-to-book ratios and other accounting measures, compared to other
firms with less interlocking occurrence. In addition, there was evidence for sig-
nificantly positive abnormal returns for the departure announcements of busy
NEDs. Similarly, Devos, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2009), using US data
(2001-03), reported negative reaction by shareholders to the announcement of di-
rectors’ appointment who created the interlock.34 In a more recent study, Falato,
Kadyrzhanova and Lel (2014) examine the effect of multiple directorships on firm
performance in a different methodological setting. They use the deaths of direc-
tors to create exogenous “variation in the time and resources available to NEDs
at interlocked firms (p.404)”. According to the authors, boards that experience
‘attention shocks’ i.e. the death of one of its own members, will find themselves
having a sudden increase in the workload. Among these directors are those who
were already busy before the death of the board co-member (i.e. the treatment
group). They found that market react negatively to such attention shocks but
only for treated director-interlocked firms.35
On the other hand, other researchers believe that the ‘acceptable’ number of
external board seats should be left to the individuals themselves and the boards
to determine (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006). In this view, directors are considered
as good stewards (Davis, 1997) and can be trusted to find the right balance of
responsibilities. Moreover, a director who has multiple directorships could be
beneficial to the firm if his/her external board seats are perceived as enhancing
‘social capital’(Johansen and Pettersson, 2013). Indeed, several studies examine
34However, interlock-financial performance relationship was subject to the performance measurement
used. That is, presence of interlocked directorates is negatively associated with firms’ ROA, but not
Tobin’s Q.
35Interestingly, the strength of this negative consequence is subject to the amount of created workload,
which varies according to the relative importance of directors’ roles and the number of NEDs.
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the potentially beneficial impact of multiple directorships on different aspects of
firm performance (Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye, 2014). Most of these studies are
built on the resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) that suggests
firms are constrained by their dependence on external relationships. In this view,
multiple directorships can be seen as a meaningful organisational mechanism that
benefit both the dependent and controlling firms (Hallock, 1997).36 While the
dependent firm reduces its external dependency and uncertainty by getting easier
access to the scarce resources (i.e. co-optation), the control firm will exercise
influence by having a representative on the dependent firm’s board (i.e. corporate
control) (Kaczmarek et al., 2014). For instance, using a sample of Australian firms
for the financial year ending in 2005, Chen, Dyball, and Wright (2009) found that
firms interlocked to other extra-industry firms have a higher level of diversification.
According to the authors, interlocks create an “information pathways between
corporations and influence corporate strategic choices”. Furthermore, Perry and
Peyer (2005) found shareholders react favourably when one of the executives on
their firm’s board is appointed as an NED on other firms as long as this executive
is deemed to have a strong motivation to enhance their value.37
Other theoretical frameworks have been used to complement the resource
approach to the interlocked directorate. Based on the RBV (Barney, 1991) per-
spective, interlocked firms through their cooperation can obtain competitively ad-
vantageous resources (e.g. markets access and capital) and exchange information
and knowledge resources (e.g. organisational learning and innovation). Indeed,
Harris and Shimizu (2004) found the presence of directors with multiple director-
ships enhance their firm acquisitions performance, as these directors are “impor-
tant sources of knowledge” and “represent an important complement” to other
types of directors. Mazzola, Perrone and Kamuriwo (2014) argue that interlock-
ing directorate (i.e. personnel network) can overcome certain drawbacks such as
36Hallock (1997) argues that interlock phenomenon is due to agency conflicts as “interlocking happens
far more often than can be explained by random chance (p.340)”.
37In their study, the executive is considered have a strong incentive to improve shareholders’ value if
he/she has high stock ownership or the firm has an independent board. Perry and Peyer (2005) found
negative returns for the announcement of executive appointment as a NED only when his/her firm
has high agency problems.
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information redundancy and lack of specialisation that happen when information
is exchanged at the firm level (inter-firm network). In a sample of global firms in
the bio-pharmaceutical industry, they found that interlocking directorates improve
the effect of firms’ alliances on the new product development.
Several other studies examined the effects of interlocking directorates on the
general economic and financial performance. Pombo and Gutiérrez (2011) exam-
ined the impact of multiple directorships on general firm performance in unregu-
lated environment using the voluntary framework of corporate governance. They
found that, in general, the presence of NEDs with multiple directorships had a
positive influence on Colombian firms’ performance as measured by ROA. In a
regulated corporate governance environment, Ferris et al. (2003), using a large
sample of American firms, found no correlation between interlock directorates on
one hand and lower firms’ financial performance (market-to-book ratio), and sub-
jectivity to securities fraud litigation on the other hand. Based on an event study,
they also found market players do not view the appointment of “busy” director as
a negative event. Furthermore, no evidence was found to support the hypothesis
that directors who are sitting on multiple firms’ board attend fewer committee
meetings compared to other directors who have one board seat.
The reported inconclusive relationship between multiple directorships and firm
financial performance over the different international studies is understandable
due to the differences in the country-level factors. Peng and Luo (2000) argue,
“In an environment where formal institutional constraints such as laws and reg-
ulations are weak, informal institutional constraints, such as those embodied in
the interpersonal ties cultivated by managers may play a more important role in
facilitating economic exchanges and hence assert a more significant impact on firm
performance (p.484)”.
However, inconclusive results on the relationship between multiple director-
ships and firm financial performance were also found for studies conducted in the
same country, which can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, the directorships-
performance relationship seems to be sensitive to the measurement used for both
multiple directorship and performance (Devos et al., 2009; Fich and Shivdasani,
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2006). For instance, the use of market-to-book ratio has been criticised as it does
not reflect only the added value by top-level managers, but also the value of other
intangible assets which is not usually controlled for (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).
Furthermore, market-based measurements have been criticised for being contam-
inated by the noise in the equity market. Secondly, the negative consequences of
NEDs’ busyness are not necessarily triggered by the presence of a busy NED on
the board but rather when most of the directors on that board are busy (i.e. board
busyness). Several studies documented how board busyness can be detrimental to
shareholders’ value and firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Kaczmarek
et al., 2014).
3.4.4.2 Regulatory Requirements on Multiple Directorships
Policymakers and shareholders’ associations are usually inclined to limit the
number of directorships a director can have. The Combined Code on Corporate
Governance (FRC, 2008) states that the boards of UK firms “should not agree to
a full-time executive director taking on more than one non-executive directorship
in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a company (see § A.4.5)”.38
Similarly, in the US, the Council of institutional investors suggests that directors
“with a full-time job should sit on no more than two other boards”. The UK
Institute of Directors also lists the average number of boards a director sits on as
one of the determinants of board effectiveness that could have a negative effect on
the quality of corporate governance.
Noteworthy, the UK regulatory limitations on number of directorships mainly
targets executive directors who hold ‘full time’ or demanding positions, and still
wailing to serve on other boards (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006). In the UK con-
text, O’Sullivan (2000) found that “executives are not a significant source of non-
executive directors in UK companies. . . only 22% of non-executives in [their]
38Although multiple directorships issue is generally regarded as a potential threat to directors’ commit-
ment, the UK Department of Trade and Industry Report in 2007 considered “the number of network
ties to other firms and external constituencies” as one of the major factors contributing to “good
corporate governance”.
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sample are serving executives in other companies (p.23)”. The current study fo-
cuses on board busyness rather than individual director busyness. This is in line
with the Walker Review’s recommendation regarding board busyness in the UK
financial sector. The report states that: “The overall time commitment of NEDs
as a group on a FTSE 100-listed bank or life assurance company board should be
greater than has been normal in the past (p.14)”.
3.5. Research Design
3.5.1 Sample
Our sample includes all directors (i.e. EDs and NEDs) sitting on the boards
of all the firms listed on the London stock exchange over the period 1999–2014.
Spanning over a period of 15 years, the data gives an opportunity to address the ob-
jective regarding the extent to which the market has changed including the period
after the global financial crisis. The construction of the dataset involved identify-
ing all public listed firms on LSE over the sample period and grouping them into
BOFIs and non-financial firms based on the UK standard industrial classification
of economic activities (2008). The BOFIs in the sample fall under section K of SIC
(Financial and insurance activities) which comprise banks, insurance, investment,
life assurance and other financial firms. Then, using the BoardEx database and
firms’ annual reports, the director years for those firms along with the directors’
competencies data and other director-characteristics were collected to construct
the board diversity indices.
3.5.2 Variables Construction
3.5.2.1 Board Diversity (BSD, BCD, and BDD) and Size
Board diversity is defined and measured differently in the literature. It can be
as narrow as one dimension of diversity (e.g. gender diversity) (Bao, Fainshmidt,
Nair, and Vracheva, 2014; Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin, 2009; Minichilli et
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al., 2009; Wilson, Wright, and Scholes, 2013) to a range of diversity aspects (Ben-
Amar et al., 2013; Kaczmarek et al., 2014). For instance, the broad approach
of Kaczmarek et al. (2014) to board diversity was reflected in combining all
dimensions of diversity (i.e. age, gender, nationality, education, board tenure
and financial background) into one index. As was pointed out earlier, however,
lumping different types of diversity into one index has its own limitation. Ben-
Amar et al., (2013) avoid this pitfall by distinguishing between different attributes
of board diversity by creating two indices; the first one is for BSD reflecting board
independence and board leadership duality, and the second index is designed to
capture BDD by examining the joint effect of gender, culture or nationality and
tenure of board members. Ben-Amar et al., (2013) created the diversity indices
by adding scores for each directors’ characteristic.
Similarly, an index for each diversity attribute (i.e. BSD, BCD, and BDD) is
also created for the purpose of the current study. With respect to BSD, i.e. board
statutory diversity, the focus was on board independence, committees’ indepen-
dence, and CEO role duality. Board independence is usually measured as the
proportion of the board represented by independent directors (Aebi et al., 2012;
Erkens et al., 2012; Lai and Chen, 2012; Melis, Gaia, and Carta, 2015; Minton
et al., 2011). Cornett et al. (2009) measure board independence as “the inverse
of board size times the ratio of the number of outside directors to the number
of affiliated and inside directors (p.8)”. Consistent with Chen et al. (2009) and
Kaczmarek et al. (2014), the measure of board independence in this study is the
proportion of independent NEDs (i.e. NEDs who are reported as independent in
a firm’s proxy statement) to the total board size.39 A board is classified as in-
dependent if the proportion of independent NEDs is equal to or more than fifty
percent. Similarly, committee independence is measured by the proportion of in-
dependent NEDs on each board committee. Again, three dummy variables were
39Independence of NEDs is measured as a binary variable, hence does not count for the possibility of
‘grey’ NEDs. Studies that distinguish between ‘grey’ and ‘independent’ directors usually collect the
data manually from annual reports provided that conflicts of interest are being disclosed (Borokhovich,
Boulton, Brunarski, and Harman, 2013; Yermack, 2004). Given the large dataset used, this study
strictly classifies a director as independent only if the firm clearly states in the annual report that
s(he) is independent, otherwise, the NED is classified as non-independent NED. It is acknowledged as
a limitation of this study that not all firms may have followed independence criteria stated in the UK
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2008) especially in the earlier sample years.
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used which equal to one if the nomination, remuneration, or audit committees
comprised of majority (i.e. 50% or more) independent NEDs. Finally, CEO role
duality is a dichotomous variable that equals to one if the CEO and Chairman roles
are performed by the same director. Consistent with the literature (Ben-Amar et
al., 2013; Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008), the board statutory
diversity for each firm is ranked based on a comparison to the entire sample.
As regards BCD, i.e. board competitive diversity, an index composed of di-
rectors’ education level, governance experience, and tenure was constructed. Con-
sistent with Anderson et al., (2011), the diversity of the directors’ educational
level was measured using Herfindahl index based on the number of educational
qualifications each director has relative to the rest of the board. The coefficient of
variation for directors’ governance experience and tenure capture board diversity
on these two dimensions.40 Again, each board is allocated a diversity score based
on the heterogeneity of the entire sample (Anderson et al., 2011). Similarly, BDD,
i.e. board demographic diversity, index combines all demographic dimensions of
diversity (i.e. directors’ gender, nationality (culture familiarity), and age).41 For
directors’ gender and nationality (culture familiarity), the Blau’s index (1977) was
used for these two categorical variables, while the coefficient of variation is used
for directors’ age.42
Finally, board size was measured by the number of directors on the board
(Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Mangena, Tauringana, and Chamisa, 2012; Minton
et al., 2011).
3.5.2.2 Board Competitive Capital
Compared to board’s diversity, board competitive capital received much less
systematic attention in prior literature (Anderson et al., 2011). The literature on
board composition and group dynamics areas provide some guidance on how board
40The coefficient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean (SD/l).
41Since nationality would not replace ethnic background when it comes to examining the effects of
cultural differences, the term culture familiarity is used here to capture the director familiarity with
the environment.
42Blau’s index is (1−
∑
p2i ), where pi is the proportion of group members in each of the (i) categories.
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competitive capital can be measured (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Sundaramurthy
and Lewis, 2003). For instance, Anderson et al. (2011) use use the aggregated
board of directors’ tenure and the number of corporate boards that the directors
serve, to measure what they called ‘board experience’.
Similarly, Wilson et al. (2013) measure governance experience as the average
number of days a typical director on the target firm’s board spent since the date of
appointment. Also, they measured the average number of days a director on that
board spent in the sector (i.e. sector experience). In addition, since witnessing
companies’ failure can be a unique experience that could prevent future failure,
they constructed a ratio of directors who failed in the past.43 Finally, the average
number of directorships per director is used as a proxy for skills, knowledge, and
relational capital. For the purpose of the current study, similar to Anderson et
al. (2011), board accumulated governance experience is measured by aggregating
the total number of boards that each director has worked for in year (t). To
account for different board size, the average governance experience per director
was calculated by dividing the board accumulated governance experience by its
size.
Board educational qualifications have been measured differently in the litera-
ture as well. Anderson et al. (2011) use the percentage of directors with no college
degree, a bachelor degree only, and masters or above degree. Chen (2014) mea-
sures board educational capital by “aggregating the number of years of schooling
for a board’s members and taking the mean (p .427)”. Some other studies focus
on a particular type of board knowledge. For instance, when the board financial
background is relatively important, financial educational qualifications or financial
work experiences are used as a proxy for this specific board knowledge (Minton et
al., 2011). Similarly, Aebi et al. (2012) use the percentage of directors with expe-
rience (present or past) as an executive officer in a bank or insurance company as a
proxy for board financial knowledge. In the current study, board accumulated ed-
ucational qualifications is measured as the aggregate number of professional and
43The number of directors who have witnessed a company failure in the past while they were serving on
that company board divided by the target firm board size.
Chapter 3. Insights on Diversity, Competitive Capital & Busyness of UK Boards 78
academic (i.e. undergraduate level and above) qualifications that each director
has achieved.44 The average educational qualifications per director is calculated
by dividing the board accumulated educational qualifications by its size.
Finally, board network is one of the most important competitive capital to
consider if one is to anticipate the effectiveness of boards.45 Eminet and Guedri
(2010), Mazzola et al. (2014), and Renneboog and Zhao (2011) measure the di-
rector network by mapping links between different directors who served together
on the same company board. Also, the board’s aggregate number of directorships
and interlocked board are sometimes used as a proxy for board networking com-
petencies (Devos et al., 2009). In the current study, similar to Renneboog and
Zhao (2011), board network size is calculated by the total number of people that
a director connects with as a proxy for network size. The network size of each
director on the target firm’s board is aggregated to get the accumulated board
network. Then it was divided by the board size to get the average network size
per director.
3.5.2.3 Board Busyness
Researchers used different proxies for the busyness of directors (CEOs, EDs,
and NEDs) and boards, which yield different results on the firms’ or boards’ per-
formance. While there is no consensus on the number of directorships that may
affect directors’ due diligence (i.e. threshold of busyness), most of the studies
consider director with three board seats or more to be busy (Fich and Shivdasani,
2006).
The beneficial consequences of having directors with multiple directorships
on firms’ board, as highlighted by resource-based theories, have refocused the
attention toward the busyness of board as a group rather than individuals. That
44Given the large dataset and reliance on BoardEx for information, the identification of more specific
industry qualifications such as banking, risk management, economics, etc was not feasible. This is
only possible if data is collected manually.
45Board network capability, sometimes called relational or social capital, refers to “the sum of actual and
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships
possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998)
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is, the harmful consequences of busyness are not triggered by the presence of a
busy director on the board but rather when the majority of directors on that board
are busy to exercise their duties diligently. Therefore, the current study focuses
on firms’ board busyness rather than individual director busyness.
The literature suggests that the effect that board busyness might have on firm
performance seems to be sensitive to how busy directors are identified. Hence, four
different measurements are used in the current study to assess board busyness.
Firstly, the average number of directorships held by all the directors of a given
firm is calculated, and then the board of that firm is considered busy if the mean
is equal to or more than three directorships (Board Busyness 1), similar to the
approach by Ferris et al., (2003). The second measure (Board Busyness 2) does the
same but it limits the board busyness to only NEDs by taking the average number
of NEDs’ directorships, also similar to Ferris et al., (2003). The third and fourth
measures (Board Busyness 3 4) follow the study of Fich and Shivdasani (2006) by
considering the firm’s board to be busy if the majority of the board’s directors
and NEDs are busy respectively.46 Appendix C provides an illustrative example
of how each measurement of director’s and board’s busyness is constructed. Table
3.3 provides a summary of the operationalisation of the various measures used in
this study.
3.6. Data Analysis and Findings
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.4 (see page 83) presents descriptive statistics for the characteristics of
all directors’ sitting on boards of UK plcs between 1999 to 2014. The table further
compares the characteristics of EDs to those of NEDs.
46In sum, the difference between the first two and the second two measurements is that the later consider
boards busy if 50% or more of NEDs have three or more directorships instead of using their average
number of board seats to judge boards busyness.
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Data in Table 3.4 shows an overall compliance with corporate governance
codes at the directors’ level. Both t-test and Wilcoxon test indicates the charac-
teristics of executives and non-executives based on various aspects to be signifi-
cantly differently (at the p = 0.01 level). Firstly, the clear majority of executives
do not hold other board seats on other quoted firms (see average for ED is 1.13)
in compliance with the UK governance code (see the Code (2010) § A.4.5), while
NEDs hold, on average (1.83), two non-executive posts on UK quoted firms. Due
to the demanding requirements of their posts, one may expect that executives will
have less time available for other directorships. Noteworthy, a closer look at the
nature of these NEDs’ additional board seats showed that around 93% of their
external seats are non-executive posts. Consistent with the study of O’Sullivan
(2000)47, our sample indicates that EDs are not a significant source of NEDs in
the UK PLCs.48
Secondly, between 4% to 10% of executives in the sample have a membership
in one of the three board committees, compared to a range of 53% to 69% for
NEDs. This indicates that NEDs are the main source for different board commit-
tees’ membership as encouraged in the governance practice (see the Code (2010) §
C.3). In addition, 68% of NEDs are classified as independent by the firms and they
keep their seats for less than six years (see the Code (2010) § A.7.2).49 Executives’
tenure on average is close to 6 years. Finally, chairmanship position is more com-
mon among NEDs (21%) compared to executives (9%) which may indicate a good
level of independence in UK firms’ leadership. In terms of directors’ individual
competencies, NEDs are significantly more skilled based on various measures (i.e.
governance experience, number of educational qualifications, and social network-
ing). This could be due to several reasons. For instance, as mentioned earlier,
NEDs are sitting on more board seats, hence they accumulate more experience
47Using a relatively small sample of 175 UK quoted companies on the 1995 financial year, O’Sullivan
(2000) reported that only 22% of non-executives in his sample are serving executives in other compa-
nies.
48To facilitate comparison, these observations were dropped - where a director is working as an executive
in one company and as non-executive in another company - from Table 3.4. The total number of the
dropped observations is 7,583 director-years.
49Any term beyond six years (e.g. two three-year terms) for a non-executive director should be subject
to particularly rigorous review.
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and build a bigger network (e.g. NEDs on average is connected to 521 other di-
rector, compared to only 351 for EDs). In addition, NEDs are significantly (at the
p = 0.01 level) older, on average, than executives. The average NED (EDs) is 58
(49) years old indicating that most NEDs are in the later stage of their careers,
hence it is unsurprising for NEDs to be more experienced. NEDs also seem to
be more diverse with 8% and 19% of directors in the sample are females and of
foreign nationality, respectively.
Table 3.5 presents corporate governance characteristics and financial perfor-
mance of the UK financial and non-financial listed firms in the sample. BOFIs are
usually distinguished in corporate governance literature due to their particularities
(e.g. heavy regulation and governmental intervention), hence a distinct analysis
of their corporate governance issues may be required (Aebi et al., 2012). Overall,
BOFIs show more compliance with corporate governance ‘best practices’. Over the
last fourteen years (1999-2014), the Wilcoxon tests indicate significant differences
between the two groups in terms of the various aspects of corporate governance.
Compared to non-financial firms (NFFs), BOFIs have lower incidence of role du-
ality (mean of 19% as opposed to 27% for NFFs) and remuneration committee
independence (mean of 52% as opposed to 67% for NFFs). However, BOFIs have
higher board independence (mean of 55% as opposed to 34% for NFFs), audit
committee independence (mean of 79% as opposed to 68% for NFFs) and nomi-
nation committee independence (mean of 57% as opposed to 42% for NFFs). The
skewness, as shown by the difference between mean and median, of CEO role du-
ality and boards committees’ independence indicates that certain boards tend to
be more compliant with corporate governance codes.50
50Using skewness/kurtosis tests for normality, the skewness of CEO role duality and boards committees’
independence is not driven by the sub-sectors’ difference.
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3.6.2 Univariate Analysis
3.6.2.1 Change in Board Diversity Attributes (BSD, BCD, and BDD)
This section will cover the first research question (RQ1a) for the first research
objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will answer this ques-
tion:
Are there significant changes on the diversity attributes (i.e.
statutory, competitive, and demographic) of boards of com-
panies listed in the UK over the last fifteen years?
Table 3.6 (see page 88) provides an overview of the extent to which boards of
the UK listed firms are diversified based on three diversity attributes (i.e. BSD,
BCD, and BDD) over a period of 15 years (1999-2014). Panel A presents the
descriptive statistics for individual diversity criteria on the board level, while panel
B presents the three main aggregate indices of diversity.
In panel A, the audit committee have the highest independence average per-
centage of 70%, while the average size of the audit committee is three. This is
consistent with the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2008) that suggests that the audit
committee need to be composed of at least three independent NEDs.51 Similarly,
the average size of the remuneration committee is three as recommended by the
UK Combined Code (FRC, 2008). However, it does not specify a certain number
of directors for the composition of nomination committee which may explain why
the nomination committee has a relatively higher average of directors. Also, the
independence of nomination committees is lower compared to the other two com-
mittees which may reflect the regulators’ relative emphasis on the independence
of these two committees compared to the nomination committee over the years.
Overall, the median board size is six directors. Figure 3.2 reveals that there
has been a steady fall in the board size over the last fifteen years. The median
51Noteworthy, the independence of audit committee has been emphasised since Smith Report on 2003
(Smith, 2003).
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percentage of independent directors on the firm board is 40%, which seems to
be less than the recommended guidelines by regulators and corporate governance
codes. However, there is an increasing trend of the percentage of independent
directors on UK boards since 2007 (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: The Average Percentage of INED and Board Size of the
UK PLC Between 2000-2014
On average, around 47% of directors on each board hold two or more edu-
cational qualifications. However, the percentage of directors with past financial
expertise is much less with only 6%. Directors usually spend around five years
on the firms’ board. However, the average and median for directors’ tenure must
be interpreted with caution as it involves the tenure for both executive and non-
executive directors. That is, according to the Combined Code (FRC, 2008) NEDs
are expected to spend less than nine years on the firm board to be categorised as
independent which is not the case for executive directors.
As Table 3.6 shows, it is apparent that the average age of directors is 54 years
old which is not surprising as such role is often offered to more senior individuals.
In addition, on a typical UK-listed board, female directors represent 6.2% with
95th percentile equals to 25%, while the percentage of non-British directors is
much higher with a mean of 13.7% (see Figure 3.3). However, consistent with the
literature (Davidoff et al., 2014), the difference between the median and mean for
both gender and nationality (culture familiarity) dimensions suggests that some
firms tend to hire more females and international directors than others.
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Table 3.6











e Audit Committee Size 16,466 3 3 1.1 2 5
Remuneration Committee Size 15,653 3 3 1.1 2 5
Nomination Committee Size 10,508 4 4 1.5 2 7






Percentage of INEDs on Audit
Committee
16,662 70.0% 100.0% 40.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Percentage of INEDs on
Remuneration Committee
16,662 64.0% 83.3% 42.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Percentage of INEDs on
Nomination Committee
16,662 44.7% 50.0% 41.5% 0.0% 100.0%
Percentage of INEDs on firms’
board
17,744 37.7% 40.0% 27.3% 0.0% 83.3%
Percentage of directors holding
two or more educational
qualifications
17,027 46.6% 50.0% 25.7% 0.0% 87.5%
Percentage of directors with
past financial experience
17,744 5.9% 0.0% 9.5% 0.0% 25.0%
Average number of years a
director spends on the firm
board
17,098 5.3 4.7 3.5 0.9 11.8
Average age of directors 17,098 54.4 54.6 4.9 46 62
Percentage of female directors 17,098 6.2% 0.0% 10.1% 0.0% 25.0%
Percentage of non-British
directors
17,069 13.7% 0.0% 21.7% 0.0% 60.0%






es Statutory Diversity 17,744 2.1 2 1.2 0 4
Competitive Diversity 17,031 5.3 5 2.3 2 9
Demographic Diversity 17,058 3.4 3 2.2 0 7
Figure 3.3: The Average Percentage of Female and Non-British Di-
rectors on the UK PLC Boards Between 2000-2014
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The three main diversity indices (i.e. BSD, BCD, and BDD) are presented
in panel B of Table 3.6. As mentioned earlier, the first index is BSD and it has
two criteria (i.e. duality and independence) and ranges between zero to four.
The median score for BSD in the sample is two. The second index is BCD which
reflects four job-related diversity criteria (i.e. education level, financial knowledge,
governance experience, tenure). The index takes a value between zero to twelve
and the median score for the boards in the sample is five. BDD is the last index
considered and the value ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum value of
nine. BDD measures board’s diversity regarding age, gender, and culture. The
median value for that index is three while the average is 3.4. Table 3.7 presents
the distribution of scores including the mean scores for each of the three indices.
The mean for BCD is 5.3, BDD is 3.4 and BSD is 2.1.
Table 3.7
Distribution of Observations by Score of the Three Diversity Indices
Competitive Diversity Demographic Diversity Statutory Diversity
Score N % Score N % Score N %
0 139 0.82 0 1,845 10.82 0 1,631 9.19
1 543 3.19 1 1,716 10.06 1 4,670 26.32
2 1,115 6.55 2 2,283 13.38 2 4,212 23.74
3 2,006 11.78 3 3,822 22.41 3 4,048 22.81
4 2,598 15.25 4 1,886 11.06 4 3,183 17.94
5 2,736 16.06 5 2,142 12.56
6 2,798 16.43 6 2,158 12.65
7 2,088 12.26 7 645 3.78
8 1,471 8.64 8 376 2.2




Total 17,031 17,058 17,744
Mean 5.3 3.4 2.1
Median 5.0 3.0 2.0
Std. 2.3 2.2 1.2
3.6.2.2 Board Diversity Attributes Across FTSE Indices
This section will cover the second research question (RQ1b) related to the first
research objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will answer
this question:
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Are there significant differences in the board diversity at-
tributes across various FTSE indices?
FTSE100 index comprises the 100 largest firms whose shares are listed on the
LSE, while FTSE250 index (15% of UK market capitalisation) comprises the 250
largest, mid-capitalised, firms listed on the LSE after the FTSE100. FTSE350
index is simply combining the previous two indices; the FTSE100 and FTSE250.
FTSE SMALLCAP index comprises small-capitalised firms that consist of the
351st to the 619th largest-listed firms. FTSE All-Share combines all three indices,
FTSE 100, 250 and SMALLCAP and represents 98-99% of UK market capitalisa-
tion. Finally, FTSE Fledgling Index comprises 200 listed firms which is considered
to be smaller than their counterparts on the FTSE All-Share.
Analysing and comparing board structure across different indices are impor-
tant due to the inherent different requirements and responsibilities expected from
each index. For instance, the UK corporate governance codes require FTSE100
and FTSE250 indices to disclose the ‘independence’ status for each NED, while
FTSE SMALLCAP are excluded from this provision. Also it states that the boards
of UK firms “should not agree to a full-time executive director taking on more than
one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of
such a company (see § A.4.5)”. Walker Review also states that; “the overall time
commitment of NEDs as a group on a FTSE 100-listed bank or life assurance
company board should be greater than has been normal in the past (p.14)”. In
addition to all differences in regulatory requirements, not all FTSE indices receive
the same pressure from media and shareholder. Hence, it is imperative to dis-
tinguish between UK different indices when analysing and comparing corporate
governance issues.
In the following two tables, we explore the differences in terms of board size
and diversity across FTSE indices . Table 3.8 presents the descriptive statistics for
board size for the five FTSE indices while Table 3.9 is related to board diversity.
It is apparent from Table 3.8 that, consistent with the previous literature,
the size of firms’ boards and their committees’ size increase with the firms’ size.
Boards of large firms normally deal with more complex decisions, hence they may
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Table 3.8
Board Size across the FTSE UK Index Series over 1999-14











Audit Committee Size 1,088 4.1 4.0 1.2 3.0 6.0
Remuneration Committee Size 1,088 4.3 4.0 1.2 3.0 6.0
Nomination Committee Size 1,071 5.2 5.0 1.9 3.0 9.0








Audit Committee Size 2,159 3.6 3.0 0.9 2.0 5.0
Remuneration Committee Size 2,029 3.7 4.0 1.0 2.0 6.0
Nomination Committee Size 2,026 4.6 5.0 1.4 3.0 7.0













Audit Committee Size 2,238 3.6 3.0 1.0 2.0 5.0
Remuneration Committee Size 1,715 3.5 3.0 1.0 2.0 5.0
Nomination Committee Size 1,992 4.3 4.0 1.2 3.0 6.0













G Audit Committee Size 609 2.9 3.0 0.9 2.0 4.0
Remuneration Committee Size 524 3.1 3.0 0.9 2.0 5.0
Nomination Committee Size 471 3.7 4.0 1.1 2.0 5.0












E Audit Committee Size 5,281 2.5 2.0 0.8 1.0 4.0
Remuneration Committee Size 5,278 2.5 2.0 0.8 1.0 4.0
Nomination Committee Size 2,157 3.1 3.0 1.1 2.0 5.0
Firm Board Size 5,834 5.4 5.0 1.7 3.0 8.0
need bigger boards. The average board size for FTSE100 is 11 compared to only 6
directors in the case of FTSE FLEDGLING, while the board size for FTSE250 falls
between these two indices with an average of 8 directors. Similarly, the size of the
three board major committees (i.e. audit, remuneration, nomination) decreases as
firms get smaller. For instance, the average size of remuneration committee form
firms in FTSE100 is 4.3, which is considerably larger than the average size of 3.5
and 3.1 for firms in the FTSESMALL and FTSE FLEDGLING, respectively.
Table 3.9 illustrates how the various board diversity vary from firm to firm
according to the stock market indices. Regarding board’s and its committees’ inde-
pendence, it is apparent that different committees get less independent as firms get
smaller. For instance, the average percentage of independent directors on FTSE
100 firms’ nomination and remuneration committees are 77.7% and 94.5%,respec-
tively which is unsurprisingly higher than FTSE Fledgling firms that have an
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average of 60% and 72.7%. Indeed, FTSE100 firms are expected to be more com-
pliant to the corporate governance codes as they are subject to greater monitoring
by regulators, media, and shareholders, compared to firms in the other indices.
Overall, the average (median) percentage of independent directors on the
boards of FTSEs’ firms are around 41% (43%) over a period of fifteen years (i.e.
1999-2014) with the board composition of independent directors steadily increasing
over the years (see Figure 3.2). FTSE100 firms have a higher average represen-
tation of independent directors (56%) than most other indices, except for FTSE
SMALL CAP firms which have the highest percentage of INEDs on firms’ board
(62%). Noteworthy, the average percentage of independent directors on firms’
board are influenced by the board size which is considerably higher for FTSE100
firms (i.e. 11 directors) compared to FTSE SMALL CAP (i.e. 6 directors). Hence,
the average percentage of independent boards across firms’ years is also calculated
by classifying a board to be only independent if the INEDs represent more than
50% of that board. It is found that among FTSE100 firms the average percentage
of independent boards is 60% which is slightly higher than FTSE SMALL CAP
firms that have 58% independent board on average.
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With regard to directors’ knowledge, an average, board of FTSE100 excels
with about 70% (11%) of its directors have two or more educational qualifications
(past financial expertise). In addition, it can be seen that these percentages de-
crease when moving down to other indices. For instance, the median percentage
for directors with two or more educational qualifications in FTSE FLEDGLING
boards is thirty percent less, while the median of directors with past financial
expertise is 0.0% for both FTSE SMALL CAP and FTSE FLEDGLING. One
possible explanation is that boards of firms at top indices need to deal with com-
plex decisions and financial requirements which require the strong presence of such
directors.
Interestingly, the average number of years a typical director spends on board
seems to be considerably less for large firms (e.g. FTSE 100) compared to small
firms (e.g. FTSE FLEDGLING). This reflects the Combined Code recommenda-
tions regarding re-election interval which is one year for FTSE100 firms and three
years for other firms. It also reflects the restriction on FTSE100 firms when it
comes to governance polices which recommend that independent directors should
serve no more than six years. Also, governance codes urge firms to consider the
need for progressive refreshing of the board. On the other hand, the average age
(i.e. 56) for directors does not seem to vary much across the UK different FTSE
indices.
The table also shows that female and non-British directors are more repre-
sented (i.e. 12% and 23%, respectively) in FTSE100 boards than other indices’.
The minority representation seems to decline from top indices to medium and
smaller ones. A possible explanation is that large firms (e.g. FTSE100 firms) have
greater media exposure, hence directors from minority groups are more represented
for marketing purposes. Another possible explanation is large firms in LSE tends
to be globe leading international companies with board of directors with different
nationalities. Finally, the average age for directors does not seem to vary much
across the UK different FTSE indices.
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Table 3.10 (see page 97) presents the distribution of all three diversity in-
dices (i.e. BSD, BCD, and BDD) by the FTSE UK Index Series in panels A, B,
and C, respectively, based on aggregate. Panel A suggests that FTSE100 firms
utilise the highest level of BSD (mean 3) among the FTSE UK Index Series, fol-
lowed by FTSE250 firms (mean 2.8), FTSE SMALL firms (mean 2.3), and FTSE
FLEDGLING firms (mean of 2.4). The table also indicates that the difference
between BSD scores among these groups of firms is statistically significant at level
1%. However, one exception is the difference between firms of FTSE SMALL and
firms of FLEDGLING, which is not significant. Overall, results shown in panel A
suggest that top firms are more committed to the statutory diversity criteria as
promoted by corporate governance codes.Panel B shows the level of BCD among
the FTSE UK Index Series. Again, FTSE100 firms exhibit the highest BCD mean
with a score of 6.2. However, it is not statistically different than the level of BCD
of FTSE250 or FTSE SMALL firms. In contrast, the BCD mean of firms in FTSE
FLEDGLING is significantly less than all other FTSE Series (at the 1% level).
Panel D combines firms of FTSE100 with firms of FTSE250 (i.e. FTSE350) and
compare to another group of firms composed of FTSE SMALL and FLEDLING.
Results show that BCD level are significantly less in the latter group of firms.
Finally, panel C presents the BDD level between these different groups of firms.
Similar to BSD and BCD levels, FTSE100 firms utilise the highest level of DD
(mean 4.8) compared to other groups; FTSE250 firms have a mean level of 3.6 and
FTSE FLEDGLING firms have a mean level of 2.8. The differences in the BDD
mean scores between these groups of firms are statistically significant at the 1%
level.
In summary, these results show that the FTSE UK Index Series has a sig-
nificant association with the extent to which a firm’s board is diversified. The
board’s diversity seems to gradually decrease as firms get smaller. Again, that
might reflect the association between firm size, media exposure, legitimacy seek-
ing behaviour on one hand and the board openness and diversity on the other
hand.
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Table 3.10
Descriptive Statistics of Board Diversity Indices and Comparisons of Group Means by the FTSE
UK Index Series over 1999-14
One-way ANOVA
Scheffe multiple group comparisons: row













Panel A: Statutory Diversity
FTSE100 3.0 0.9 1,089
FTSE 2.8 1.1 2,185 -0.183
250 0.001***
FTSE 2.3 1.1 2,256 -0.649 -0.466
SMALL 0.000*** 0.000***
FTSE 2.4 1.0 629 -0.546 -0.364 0.102
FLEDGLING 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.429
FTSE 1.8 1.2 5,834 -1.194 -1.012 -0.546 -0.648
ALL SHARES 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Source Between df F Prob >F
Groups 4 469.060 0.000
Panel B: Competitive Diversity
FTSE100 6.2 1.9 1,088
FTSE 6.2 2.1 2,178 -0.068
250 0.947
FTSE 6.1 2.2 2,253 -0.128 -0.060
SMALL 0.623 0.930
FTSE 5.6 2.4 629 -0.577 -0.509 -0.449
FLEDGLING 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
FTSE 4.6 2.1 5,800 -1.603 -1.535 -1.475 -1.026
ALL SHARES 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Source Between df F Prob >F
Groups 4 361.890 0.000
Panel C: Demographic Diversity
FTSE100 4.8 1.9 1,089
FTSE 3. 2.0 2,185 -1.135
250 0.000***
FTSE 3.2 2.3 2,25 -1.595 -0.460
SMALL 0.000*** 0.000***
FTSE 2.8 2.0 627 -1.960 -0.826 -0.35
FLEDGLING 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005***
FTSE 3.2 2.1 5,824 -1.553 -0.418 0.042 0.407
ALL SHARES 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.957 0.000***
Source Between df F Prob >F
Groups 4 154.00 0.000
Panel D: T-test for the difference between FTSE350 and FTSE SMALL & FLEG
D. Indices FTSE 350 FTSE SMALL & FLED T-Test
N Mean Median N Mean Median Sig.
Statutory Diversity 3,274 2.9 3.0 2,885 2.4 2.0 **
Competitive Diversity 3,266 6.3 6.0 2,882 6.0 6.0 **
Demographic Diversity 3,274 4.0 4.0 2,883 3.1 3.0 **
Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
3.6.2.3 Board Diversity Attributes Before and After the Financial Crisis
This section will cover the third research question (RQ1c) for the first re-
search objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will answer this
question:
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Are there significant differences in the board diversity at-
tributes before and after the financial crisis?
In Table 3.11 to Table 3.13, the effect of the financial crisis, if any, on the
UK listed firms’ board regarding their size and diversity is explored. Since BOFIs
were at the heart of the financial crisis and they were the target of several post-
crisis regulations, hence the sample is further split into two subsamples: UK non-
financial firms in panel (A) and UK BOFIs in panel (B).
Table 3.11 compares the average board size and its main committees’ size
pre- and post the financial crisis. On the one hand, post-crisis, all three board’s
committees of UK non-financial firms witnessed a decrease in the number of di-
rectors, mirroring a general trend of decrease in the average board size. On the
other hand, while the average boards size of BOFIs also decreased after the crisis,
its three committees did not witness any significant change in size. In fact, the
average size of both audit and remuneration committees in BOFIs increased but
the difference is not statistically significant. One possible explanation for the dis-
crepancy between non-financial firms and BOFIs with respect to audit committee’
size is the increased responsibilities (e.g. risk management) for members of audit
committees in the financial sector post- crisis.
Table 3.12 (see page 100) addresses the possible effect of post-crisis’s regula-
tions on board’s diversity. As far as board’s independence is concerned, there is a
statistically significant increase in the average percentage of independent directors
on the boards of both non-financial and financial firms over post-crisis period. In-
deed, BOFIs’ board witnessed a considerable increase in the average percentage of
independent directors from 48% to 61%. In addition, the data shows that in the
wake of the crisis those boards also utilise a higher presence of INEDs on audit
committee. In contrast, the audit committees of non-financial firms exhibit less
independence following the financial crisis. Again, the media exposure and regu-
latory pressure on BOFIs may have sharpen their commitment to best practices
in the governance guidelines.
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Table 3.11
Board size and its Committees Pre- and Post- the Financial Crisis
Variables Global Financial Crisis Mean Differences
Pre-Crisis Post- Crisis




Panel A: UK Non-financial PLCs
Audit
Committee Size
6,328 2.94 3.00 5,873 2.80 3.00 De*** De***
Remuneration
Committee Size
6,328 3.01 3.00 5,868 2.95 3.00 De** De***
Nomination
Committee Size
3,854 3.91 4.00 3,749 3.83 4.00 De** De***
Firm Board
Size
6,966 6.73 6.00 6,201 6.29 6.00 De*** De***
Panel B: UK Public Listed BOFIs
Audit
Committee Size
1,178 3.50 3.00 1,578 3.53 4.00 In In
Remuneration
Committee Size
934 3.36 3.00 1,100 3.39 3.00 In In
Nomination
Committee Size
813 4.44 4.00 1,180 4.41 4.00 De De
Firm Board
Size
1,306 7.18 6.00 1,654 5.99 5.00 De*** De***
† De:the mean decreased in the wake of the global financial crisis. In:the mean increased in the
wake of the global financial crisis.
‡ Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
Unsurprisingly, the percentage of directors with past financial experience raised
considerably for both non-financial and financial firms after the crisis. Finally,
responding to calls for increased diversity on the boardroom, the percentage of
female directors on firms’ boards has almost doubled over the post-crisis years,
especially in BOFIs’. Similarly, 17% of directors on non-financial firms are non-
British compared to only 12% for the pre-crisis period. However, the percentage
of non-British directors on BOFIs’ board increased by only 1%.
Taken together, these results suggest that, in the wake of the crisis, the boards
of all UK listed firms (i.e. non-financial and financial) seem to be more diverse, as
can be seen in Table 3.13 (see page 101). However, this change was only significant
for BSD and BDD mean scores of boards in the non-financial sector. In contrast,
the financial crisis appears to have a significant effect only on BCD’s mean score
of BOFIs’ boards.
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Table 3.12
Board’s Diversity Pre- and Post- the Financial Crisis
Variables Global Financial Crisis Mean Differences
Pre-Crisis Post- Crisis




Panel A: UK Non-financial PLCs
Percentage of INEDs on Audit
Committee
6,395 70.91% 5,939 65.73% De*** De***
Percentage of INEDs on
Remuneration Committee
6,395 70.67% 5,939 63.76% De*** De***
Percentage of INEDs on
Nomination Committee
6,395 41.59% 5,939 42.88% In* In**
Percentage of INEDs on firm’s
board
6,966 33.30% 6,201 34.70% In*** In***
Percentage of directors holding two
or more educational qualifications
6,894 45.80% 5,798 48.71% In*** In***
Percentage of directors with past
financial experience
6,966 4.95% 6,201 7.02% In*** In***
Average number of years a director
spends on the firm board
6,902 4.92 5,835 5.52 In*** In***
Average age of directors 6,902 52.79 5,835 55.26 In*** In***
Percentage of female directors 6,902 4.51% 5,835 7.37% In*** In***
Percentage of non-British directors 6,884 12.09% 5,830 16.79% In*** In***
Panel B: UK Public Listed BOFIs
Percentage of INEDs on Audit
Committee
1,205 77.29% 1,592 80.89% In** In***
Percentage of INEDs on
Remuneration Committee
1,205 55.58% 1,592 49.68% De*** De***
Percentage of INEDs on
Nomination Committee
1,205 51.29% 1,592 61.97% In*** In***
Percentage of INEDs on firm’s
board
1,306 48.41% 1,654 60.55% In*** In***
Percentage of directors holding two
or more educational qualifications
1,301 44.52% 1,592 44.34% - -
Percentage of directors with past
financial experience
1,306 4.68% 1,654 7.40% In*** In***
Average number of years a director
spends on the firm board
1,301 5.37 1,604 6.54 In*** In***
Average age of directors 1,301 54.44 1,604 57.77 In*** In***
Percentage of female directors 1,301 5.57% 1,604 10.24% In*** In***
Percentage of non-British directors 1,300 10.50% 1,604 11.23% - -
† De:the mean decreased in the wake of the global financial crisis. In:the mean increased in the
wake of the global financial crisis.
‡ Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
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Table 3.13
Board’s Diversity Indices Pre- and Post- Crisis
Variables Global Financial Crisis Mean Differences
Pre-Crisis Post- Crisis




Panel A: UK Non-financial PLCs
Statutory Diversity 6,966 2.15 6,201 2.26 In*** In***
Competitive Diversity 6,883 5.25 5,803 5.32 - -
Demographic Diversity 6,882 3.28 5,823 3.67 In*** In***
Panel B: UK Public Listed BOFIs
Statutory Diversity 1,306 1.86 1,654 1.82 - -
Competitive Diversity 1,293 5.35 1,601 5.71 In*** In***
Demographic Diversity 1,300 3.17 1,603 3.27 - -
† De:the mean decreased in the wake of the global financial crisis. In:the mean increased in the
wake of the global financial crisis.
‡ Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
3.6.2.4 Changes in Board Competitive Capital
This section will cover the first research question (RQ2a) for the second re-
search objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will answer this
question:
Are there significant changes in the competitive capital of
boards of companies listed in the UK over the last fifteen
years?
Table 3.14 presents the board capital for the UK plcs over 15 years regarding
the board governance experience, educational qualifications, and their social net-
work, while Figure 3.4 depicts the progress of these boards’ competitive capital
between 2000-14. On average, a UK plc’s director has a working experience on
three different quoted firms’ boards. In unreported tests, it is found that this
average number increases to ten board seats per director when all types of firms a
director worked for (i.e. private and quoted) are considered. Also, it is found that
those boards who exhibit high leadership duality seem to have less than average
governance experience per director. This could be attributed to the association
between the board’s adoption of governance best practices and the governance
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experience of its board members. Another possible explanation is that firms with
CEO role duality are usually small firms which have small size boards and less
experienced directors.
Table 3.14
Boards Capital of the UK PLC over 1999-2014
Statistics




The Board’s Governance Experience on
Quoted Firms (Number of board seats)
17,744 19.53 17.00 13.97 4.00 46.0
The Average Governance Experience on
Quoted Firms Per Director (Number of
board seats)
17,098 3.09 2.75 1.69 1.17 6.0
The Board’s Number of Educational
Qualification (Number of qualifications)
17,744 9.85 8.00 7.04 1.00 23.0
The Average Number of Educational
Qualification Per Director (Number of
qualifications)
17,098 1.50 1.50 0.65 0.50 2.6
The Board Network (Number of connection
with other directors)
17,744 3170.51 2172.00 3669.51 164.00 9606.0
The Average Network Per Director (Number
of connection with other directors)
17,744 435.94 352.56 353.29 37.00 1121.2
Figure 3.4: Boards’ Capital of UK PLC Over 1999-2014
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Secondly, a typical director in UK plc has, on average, 1.5 professional and
academic qualifications. Again, it is found the average number of professional and
academic qualifications to be significantly and negatively correlated to firms that
show high level of board’s leadership duality. This could be attributed to the firm
size whereby small firms may face difficulty in attracting highly educated direc-
tors. Lastly, director in the UK plc, on average, appears to be connected to 436
other directors. However, the considerable difference between the average network
per director (435.94) and the median network per director (352.56) indicates that
directors in some firms tend to be more connected than others. Similar to other
board capital dimensions, the average network per director was found to be sig-
nificantly and negatively correlated to board’s leadership role duality, which again
may be attributed to firm size (i.e. well-connected directors tend to end up in
large firms).
3.6.2.5 Competitive Capital Across FTSE Indices
This section will cover the second research question (RQ2b) related to the
second research objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will
answer this question:
Are there significant differences in the boards’ competitive
capital across various FTSE Indices?
In Table 3.15, the aim is to explore how these board competitive capital differ
due to the firms’ size and indices. Indeed, panel (A) shows that the most experi-
enced directors in the market works on FTSE100 firms with the other firms’ boards
seeming to have less governance experience as they decrease in size. Similarly, in
panel (B), FTSE100 boards’ collective number of educational qualifications is al-
most double compared to firms in the other FTSEs’ indices. For instance, the
average director on FTSE100 firms has at least two educational qualifications,
while it is 1.28 for an average director on FTSE FLEDGLING firms. This again
suggests that larger companies tend to have more ‘qualified’ directors than SMEs
as it may require managerial talent to lead their large operations.
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Therefore, directors appear to be less ‘qualified’ as firms get smaller. Finally,
panel (C) indicates that the FTSE100 firms are significantly more connected, and
their directors have larger networks. This is consistent with the literature that
found UK directors on large firms are better connected than the average directors
in terms of direct links (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011).
Table 3.16 tests the statistical significance of the difference between different
groups of firms’ boards as categorised by FTSE Index Series. Panel (A) indeed
indicates that the difference among these groups regarding board’s governance
cumulative experience is statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that top
firms’ boards are more experienced. Similarly, with respect to boards’ collective
number of educational qualifications and network size, both panels (B) and (C)
also reveal that there is significant difference among the boards of FTSE Index
Series. The final panel (D) combines firms of FTSE100 with firms of FTSE250
(i.e. FTSE350) and compare to another group of firms composed of FTSE SMALL
and FLEDLING. Results show that all board’s competitive capital criteria are
significantly less in the latter group of firms. In summary, these results suggest
that the FTSE UK Index Series are significantly associated with the board’s level
of competitive capital which gradually decreases as firms get smaller. This reflects
the association between firm size and complexity on the one hand, and the board’s
requirement of competitive capital on the other hand. In addition, considering the
competition for highly talented directors on labour markets, it could also reflect
top firms’ ability to attract such talents.
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Table 3.16
Comparisons of Group Means for Boards’ Competitive Capital by the FTSE UK Index
Series
Panel A: Board’s Governance Experience
Scheffe multiple group comparisons: row mean – column mean (p value)











-28.77 -13.24 -6.89 -3.44
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
One-way ANOVA df F Prob >F
Source Between Groups 4 1915.11 0.0000
Panel B: Board’s Educational Qualifications
Scheffe multiple group comparisons: row mean – column mean (p value)











-15.33 -6.27 -2.15 -0.45
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.387
One-way ANOVA df F Prob >F
Source Between Groups 4 2205.21 0.0000
Panel C: Board’s Social Network
Scheffe multiple group comparisons: row mean – column mean (p value)











-8.74 -2.74 -1.13 -0.42
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.010**
One-way ANOVA df F Prob >F
Source Between Groups 4 2424.62 0.0000
Panel D: T-test for the difference between FTSE350 and FTSE SMALL & FLEG
FTSE 350 FTSE SMALL & FLED T-Test
N Mean N Mean Sig.
Board’s Governance Experience 3,274 33.34 2,885 21.08 ***
Board’s Educational Qualifications 3,274 16.93 2,885 9.43 ***
Board’s Social Network 3,274 6.68 2,885 2.92 ***
Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
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3.6.2.6 Board Competitive Capital Before and After the Financial Crisis
This section will cover the third research question (RQ2c) for the second
research objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will answer
this question:
Are there significant changes in the board competitive capital
before and after the financial crisis?
Table 3.17 investigates if the UK plcs’ boards have witnessed change regarding
board competitive capital over the pre-crisis period. The increasing responsibili-
ties, the serious legal consequences and the media pressure on directors after the
financial crisis may have led to highly qualified individuals to withdraw from the
market. Hence, that may have led to an overall decrease of boards’ competitive
capital in the market. However, the increased level of required skills and knowledge
in the post-crisis corporate governance codes might have pushed firms to attract
more qualified directors or train their existing directors. In that case, the overall
board capital of the UK listed firms would gradually increase over the post-crisis
period.
Indeed, Table 3.17 shows that firms’ board competitive capital significantly
increased after the financial crisis. Both non-financial listed firms and BOFIs have
witnessed an increase in their board capital (see, panel A and B, respectively),
with boards of the latter having considerably more qualified boards than the aver-
age firms in the entire UK market. In term of how significant the effect of financial
crisis is, the increase in board’s competitive capital across the entire market is sta-
tistically significant. However, one exception is the BOFIs’ boards that witnessed
an increase in the boards’ average number of educational qualifications, yet that
increase is not statistically significant.
Noteworthy, panel (B) suggests that post-crisis, while the average competen-
cies per director have increased, the aggregate board capital have decreased. This
mirrors the decline in the BOFIs’ boards’ size which may suggest a withdrawal of
less qualified directors rather than qualified ones as a way of complying with the
new governance codes.
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Table 3.17
Board Capital Across the UK Listed Firms Over Pre- and Post- the Financial Crisis
Variables Global Financial Crisis Mean Differences
Pre-Crisis Post- Crisis













6,966 18.33 6,201 19.28
Average Board Governance
Experience (per director)





Total board’s number of Educ.
qualifications
6,966 10.36 6,201 9.51
The average board’s Educ.
Qualifications (per director)





rk Total board social network 6,966 2938.39 6,201 3262.53
Average board social network
(per director)
6,966 390.28 6,201 468.61 In*** In***









1,306 25.31 1,654 22.71
Average Board Governance
Experience (per director)





Total board’s number of Educ.
qualifications
1,306 11.36 1,654 9.00
The average board’s Educ.
Qualifications (per director)





rk Total board social network 1,306 3859.70 1,654 3542.93
Average board social network
(per director)
1,306 448.38 1,654 516.86 In*** In***
† De:the mean decreased in the wake of the global financial crisis. In:the mean increased in the
wake of the global financial crisis.
‡ Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
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3.6.2.7 Changes in Board Busyness
This section covers the first research question (RQ3a) for the third research
objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will answer this ques-
tion:
Are there significant changes in the level of boards’ busyness
of companies listed in the UK over the last fifteen years?
As discussed earlier, consistent with previous studies on directors’ busyness, a
director is considered busy if s(he) simultaneously serves on three or more boards.
Besides, this cut-off reflects the limitation on the executives’ number of director-
ships imposed by the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2008).
Table 3.18 explores the issue of director’s multiple directorships and work-
loads. The unit of analysis in panel (A) is directors whereas panel (B) reports
the incidence of board’s busyness in all UK listed firms (i.e. board level). As can
be seen in panel (A), the average director holds 1.5 board seats with a median of
only one board seat in quoted firms. However, when the workload of directorships
is taken into consideration, the average number of board seats increases to 2.3
seats.52 Consequently, roughly 13% and 37% of directors sitting on the UK listed
firms are considered busy based on the number of board seats and directorships’
workload, respectively. Since the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2008) restricts the
number of board seats for executives only, the sample is further broken into NEDs
and EDs. Indeed, in compliance with the UK best practices, only 3.4 % of the EDs
sample (i.e. 45,072 ED-years) have three or more directorships in listed boards,
compared to 21.3% for NEDs.
52The workload of directorships is operationalised by counting chairmanship equal to three directorships
and a deputy chairmanship equal to two directorships.
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Table 3.18
Busyness of Directors and Boards of the UK PLCs Over 1999-2014
Variables N Mean Median
Std.
Dev.
Panel A: Busyness at Directors’ Level
Average number of board seats per director 96,175 1.54 1.00 1.12
Average number of directorships’ workload 96,175 2.36 1.00 1.74
Percentage of busy directors (based on number of
board seats)
96,175 12.92% 0.00% 33.54%
Percentage of busy directors (based on
directorships’ workload)
96,175 37.21% 0.00% 48.34%
Percentage of busy NEDs 51,103 21.29% 0.00% 40.94%
Percentage of busy EDs 45,072 3.43% 0.00% 18.19%
Panel B: Busyness at Boards’ Level
Average number of board seats per director on
Firm Board
17,098 1.79 1.67 0.73
Average number of board seats per NED on Firm
Board
12,297 2.24 2.00 1.00
Board Busyness 1 (based on the average number of
board seats per director)
17,098 7.06% 0.00% 25.62%
Board Busyness 2 (based on the average number of
board seats per NED)
16,933 18.47% 0.00% 38.80%
Board Busyness 3 (based on the percentage of busy
directors)
17,098 9.34% 0.00% 29.10%
Board Busyness 4 (based on the percentage of busy
NEDs)
16,933 28.18% 0.00% 44.99%
Board Busyness 5 (based on the directors’
directorships’ workload)
17,098 40.43% 0.00% 49.08%
Panel (B) indicates that the incidence of board’s busyness among UK listed
firms range from as low as 7% to as high as 40% based on the measurements
used. As mentioned earlier, two groups of measurements that are frequently used
in the literature are deployed; the first is based on the average number of board
seats a board holds, and the second is based on the percentage of busy directors
sitting on a board (see Appendix C for an illustrative example). Each group of
busyness measurements has two sub-measurements; one assumes that all directors,
both EDs and NEDs, are equally responsible, and the second focuses on NEDs
only and hold them ultimately responsible for board’s effectiveness. Therefore,
while the first measures board’s busyness based on the number of board seats that
both EDs and NEDs hold, the second measures board’s busyness based on NEDs’
number of board seats. The table presents the extent of board’s busyness which
varies significantly according to the measurement used, which may explain the
inconsistency among the findings of studies reporting on board’s busyness.
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Overall, regardless of the measurements used, the incidence of board’s busy-
ness among UK listed firms seems to be decreasing over the last fifteen years
(see Figure 3.5). This decreasing trend may reflect the regulatory pressure and
shareholders’ campaigns to limit the occurrence of overburdened boards.
Figure 3.5: Board’s Busyness of UK Listed Firms Between (2000-
2014)
3.6.2.8 Board Busyness Across FTSE Indices
This section addresses the second research question (RQ3b) related to the
third research objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will
answer this question:
Are there significant differences in the level of boards’ busy-
ness across various FTSE Indices?
Table 3.19 explores the extent of board’s busyness of firms listed in the UK
FTSE Index Series. Consistent with Ferris et al., (2003), who find multiple di-
rectorships are more frequent in big firms, the data suggests that the percentage
of busy boards increase parallel to firms’ size. Specifically, FTSE100 firms has
the highest average number of board seats per NED (2.5) among the FTSE UK
Index Series, followed by FTSE250 firms with an average of 2.4 board seats. In
addition, FTSE100 exhibits the highest level of board busyness (39%) compared
to FTSE250, which comes in the second place with an average of 33%. FTSE
FLEDGLING firms show the lowest level of board’s busyness (20%).
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Table 3.19
Board’s Busyness Across the FTSE UK Index Series Over 1999-14










0 Average # of board seats per
NED on Firm Board
800 2.51 2.43 0.63 1.67 3.70
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
1,089 12.40% 0.00% 32.97% 0.00% 100.0%
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)







0 Average # of board seats per
NED on Firm Board
1,768 2.40 2.25 0.81 1.33 4.00
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
2,185 11.17% 0.00% 31.50% 0.00% 100.0%
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)









L Average # of board seats per
NED on Firm Board
1,759 2.38 2.25 0.79 1.25 3.80
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
2,256 16.36% 0.00% 37.00% 0.00% 100.0%
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)












G Average # of board seats per
NED on Firm Board
437 2.34 2.00 1.37 1.00 5.25
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
629 14.15% 0.00% 34.88% 0.00% 100.0%
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)













Average # of board seats per
NED on Firm Board
4,017 2.07 1.88 1.07 1.00 4.00
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
5,834 6.77% 0.00% 25.13% 0.00% 100.0%
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)
5,759 25.13% 0.00% 43.38% 0.00% 100.0%
One possible explanation for the above observations discussed in the litera-
ture is the “selection effects” of holding multiple board seats (Adams, Hermalin,
and Weisbach, 2010) . This concept suggests that the most reputable or qualified
NEDs are more likely to hold more board seats, and eventually are classified as
busy directors. Since large firms attract the most qualified directors on the market,
they tend to have busier boards. Furthermore, NEDs who work on FTSE100 firms
might be perceived as ‘good’ directors in the market, hence attract even more di-
rectorships compared to their counterparts, which explains the high percentage of
board busyness among FTSE100 firms. Interestingly, when board busyness based
on the third measurement is used, FTSE100 and FTSE250 boards show a lower
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level of busyness than FTSE SMALL’s and FLEDGLING’s. Due to regulators’
restrictions on the number of seats an executive on FTSE350 can hold, the total
board’s level of busyness decreases if executives’ busyness is included in the cal-
culation of board’s busyness. Overall, the difference between the level of board’s
busyness among UK FTSE Index Series is statistically significant (see Table 3.20
on page 114).
3.6.2.9 Board Busyness Before and After the Financial Crisis
This section will cover the third research question (RQ3c) for the third re-
search objective (see introduction of this chapter). Specifically, it will answer this
question:
Are there significant differences in the level of boards’ busy-
ness before and after the financial crisis?
We further investigate the effect of the financial crisis and its accompanying
corporate governance reforms on the busyness of UK listed firms’ boards in Table
3.21 (see page 115). Indeed, it is found that post-crisis years witnessed a significant
decrease in the percentage of busy boards among UK listed firms, reflecting the
increasing demand for directors to devote more time to their boards (Walker,
2009). Figure 3.6 further provides evidence of the trend.
Figure 3.6: Average Directorships Per NEDs & Board Busyness
Across UK Public Listed BOFIs & Non-Financial Firms (2000-2014)
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Table 3.20
Comparisons of Group Means for Boards’ Busyness by the FTSE UK Index Series
Panel A: Average # of board seats per NED on Firm Board
Scheffe multiple group comparisons: row mean – column mean (p value)





FTSE -0.170 -0.056 -0.036
FLEDG 0.062* 0.875 0.973
FTSE -0.443 -0.330 -0.310 -0.274
ALL SHARS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
One-way ANOVA df F Prob >F
Source Between Groups 4 71.23 0.000***
Panel B: Board Busyness 3 (based on the percentage of busy directors)
Scheffe multiple group comparisons: row mean – column mean (p value)





FTSE 0.018 0.030 -0.022
FLEDG 0.853 0.310 0.620
FTSE -0.056 -0.044 -0.096 -0.074
ALL SHARS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
One-way ANOVA df F Prob >F
Source Between Groups 4 47.13 0.000***
Panel C: Board Busyness 4 (based on the percentage of busy NEDs)
Scheffe multiple group comparisons: row mean – column mean (p value)





FTSE -0.189 -0.132 -0.121
FLEDG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
FTSE -0.138 -0.081 -0.070 0.051
ALL SHARS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.124
One-way ANOVA df F Prob >F
Source Between Groups 4 37.47 0.000***
Panel D: T-test for the difference between FTSE350 and FTSE SMALL & FLEG
FTSE 350 FTSE SMALL & FLED T-Test
N Mean N Mean Sig.
Average # of board seats per NED
on Firm Board
2,568 2.43 2,196 2.37 ***
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
3,274 11.58% 2,885 15.88% ***
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)
3,274 35.09% 2,863 29.51% ***
Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
In addition, according to bank control theory, directors employed in the fi-
nancial sectors might be actively sought in the labour market, compared to other
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sectors. Indeed, Table 3.21 shows that financial firms’ boards are busier than non-
financial firms’ board, and their NEDs hold on average more directorships. This
position seems to hold even after the global financial crisis with financial firms’
NEDs holding on average 2.4 board seats compared to 2.1 for non-financial firms’
NEDs.
Table 3.21
Board’s Busyness Across the UK Listed Firms Over Pre- and Post- the Financial Crisis
Variables Global Financial Crisis Mean Differences
Pre-Crisis Post- Crisis




Panel A: UK Non-financial PLCs
Average number of board seats per
NED on Firm Board
4,612 2.26 4,281 2.06 De*** De***
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
6,902 0.07 5,835 0.06 De** De**
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)
6,847 0.30 5,774 0.22 De*** De***
Panel B: UK Public Listed BOFIs
Average number of board seats per
NED on Firm Board
987 2.67 1,339 2.35 De*** De***
Board Busyness 3 (based on the
percentage of busy directors)
1,301 0.22 1,604 0.23 - -
Board Busyness 4 (based on the
percentage of busy NEDs)
1,284 0.39 1,585 0.32 De*** De***
† De:the mean decreased in the wake of the global financial crisis. In:the mean increased in the
wake of the global financial crisis.
‡ Level of significance for mean differences are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
Taken together, these results suggest that the boards of the largest UK plcs
(i.e. FTSE100) in the UK are busier than the relatively smaller ones. Also,
the average number of board seats per NEDs is also significantly higher in those
large firms. This seems to be consistent with resource-based theories that suggest
directors who are in possession of unique experience and a wide network will be
actively sought in the labour market.
Secondly, NEDs at BOFIs hold significantly more directorships compared to
their counterparts in non-financial plcs. Bank control theory suggests financial
firms, due to their control of external funding, arguably have “the upper hand”
over the other market sectors. Consequently, directors in these financial firms are
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more likely to hold multiple directorships either to represent their banks on other
firms’ board or to facilitate access to external funding (Kaczmarek et al., 2014).
Furthermore, the importance of directors’ financial background and experience
are increasingly emphasised on corporate governance codes which make financial
firms’ directors to be much more attractive. Finally, the percentage of firms with
busy boards are decreasing over the years especially after the financial crisis, which
is understandable in the light of the increasing pressure on directors to be more
committed to their boards (Walker, 2009).
3.6.3 Board’s Diversity, Competitive Capital and Busyness, and Firms’ Performance
The fourth objective of this study was to observe if there is any relationship
between the board’s characteristics of interest, i.e. board’s diversity, competitive
capital and busyness, and firm performance. Specifically, it seeks to answer the
following research question (RQ4):
Are there significant relationships between boards’ character-
istics (i.e. diversity, competitive capital, and busyness) and
market-based financial performance of companies listed in
the UK?
Two measures of financial performance are used here; average market ad-
justed stock return and average return on equity (ROE), covering both market
and accounting performance from an investor’s perspective.
Table 3.22 presents the correlation between the boards’ characteristics and
firm performance. At a simple correlation level of analysis, there is a significant
positive relationship between the various diversity indices based on both measures
of firm performance. Similarly, board’s competitive capital is correlated to firm
performance measures and is significant at the 1% level. Consistent with some
studies in directors’ diversity literature (Anderson et al., 2011; Erhardt et al.,
2003), this suggests that firms with better performance, as measured by ROE and
stock return, on average have more diversified and competitive boards.
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Overall, the analysis shows no significant relation between board’s busyness
and firm performance, consistent with other studies (see, Kiel and Nicholson,
2003). However, only when using a measure of board’s busyness that take the
workload of directorships into consideration, there is a negative and significant
relationship between board’s busyness and market-based measure of firm perfor-
mance. Finally, consistent with Kiel and Nicholson (2003), the presence of CEO
duality is significantly and negatively correlated with firm performance. Not sur-
prisingly, there are significant positive correlations between firm’s size and board
size, and its financial performance.
Table 3.22
Board’s Characteristics of Interest and Performance – Correlation Matrix
Antecedents to board’s Average ROE Average Market
task performances Adj Stock Return










Statutory Diversity 14,309 0.0293*** 14,839 0.0235***
0.0005 0.0042
Competitive Diversity 14,296 0.0291*** 14,856 0.0390***
0.0005 0.0000















Board’s Governance 14,490 0.0548*** 15,106 0.1305***
Experience 0.0000 0.0000
Board’s Educational 14,490 0.0487*** 15,106 0.1359***
Qualifications 0.0000 0.0000















Board Busyness (percentage 14,330 0.0014 14,866 0.0084
of busy directors) 0.8626 0.3062
Board Busyness (percentage 14,214 0.0092 14,725 0.0014
of busy NEDs) 0.2715 0.8648






Firm Size 14,408 0.1302*** 14,776 0.2435***
0.0000 0.0000
Board Size 14,490 0.0722*** 15,106 0.1837***
0.0000 0.0000
Duality 14,490 -0.0179** 15,106 -0.0298***
0.0309 0.0002
‡ Level of significance for correlations are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
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3.7. Chapter Summary
The board of directors is considered to be the most important internal gov-
ernance mechanism on the modern corporate governance practices. It plays an
important role in controlling ‘opportunistic’ management, providing counsel and
advice, and eventually protecting shareholders’ interests. However, the poor per-
formance of board of directors during the global financial crisis (2007-08) pointed
the attention of both regulators and scholars toward board’s ‘fixable’ deficits.
Among the most significant directors’ deficits are those relating to boards’ ho-
mogeneity, insufficient experience, and lack of commitment and incentives. While
board diversity has been researched extensively over the last two decades, most
empirical studies focus on only one dimension of board diversity, namely, statutory
diversity or independence. In light of the inconclusive results of board’s statutory
diversity on outcomes, there is a need to systematically explore different layers of
diversity such as competitive and demographic diversity. In addition, the gener-
alisability of findings of previous studies is questionable as most of these studies
used US data, were conducted pre-millennium, and/or were cross-sectional data.
This study contributes to boards literature by exploring three main antecedents
of board task performance, namely, board diversity (including statutory, compet-
itive, and demographic diversity), board’s competitive capital, and board’s time
commitment. Specifically, this study reports on the extent of diversity, competi-
tive capital, and busyness of the board of the UK public listed firms, over a period
of fifteen years (1999-2014). In the wake of the global financial crisis, the UK
market witnessed the launch of several governance codes that would potentially
change the UK listed firms’ board composition and commitment. There are in-
creasing calls to evaluate the corporate governance of UK firms in the post-crisis
period as far as board composition, competitive capital, and busyness are con-
cerned. This study responds to such calls by providing a timely review of the
extent to which regulators’ endeavours in addressing board diversity, competitive
capital, and busyness in the UK context.
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With respect to board diversity, results show that statutory diversity (SD)
is the most common diversity attribute among UK plcs’ boards, while the other
two diversity attributes, the competitive (CD) and the demographic (DD), were
found to be significantly less common. That is, findings indicate that only 9%
and 7% of firms in the sample can be classified to have high level of competitive
and demographic diversity, respectively. However, the analysis shows that over
the last fifteen years, firms were increasingly diversifying their boards based on
other attributes, i.e. BCD and BDD. Findings also reveal that the FTSE UK
Index Series had a significant association with the extent of boards’ diversity.
Specifically, board’s of FTSE100 & FTSE250 being the most diverse, while boards
low-capitalised firms, i.e. FTSE SMALLCAP & FTSE Fledgling, are associated
with lower level of board’s diversity. In addition, post-crisis regulations seem to
have some impact on the level of board diversity in all UK listed firms’ (i.e. non-
financial and financial). Interestingly, while diversity level for all firms’ increased
after the crisis, the significance of that impact seems to differ between non-financial
and financial sectors. The increase was significant for statutory and demographic
attributes but not the competitive attribute in the case of the non-financial sector.
In contrast, the financial crisis appears to have a significant effect only on the
competitive diversity of BOFIs’ boards.
Regarding board’s competitive capital and busyness, FTSE100 firms was
found to have the most experienced, educated, and socially connected boards,
with a general trend of boards getting significantly less ‘competitive’ as firm size
decreases. These results suggest that the FTSE UK Index Series are significantly
associated with the board’s level of competitive capital which seems to gradually
decrease as firms get smaller and the level of complexity lessened. It was also found
that the extent of board’s busyness varies considerably according to the measure-
ment used. Specifically, based on number of directorships held only by NEDs, the
incidence of board’s busyness ranges from 18% to 40%. However, regardless of the
measurement used, the incidence of board’s busyness seems to be decreasing over
the last fifteen years in the UK. At the directors’ level, consistent with the related
literature, large firms seem to have more busy NEDs. At the board’s level, when
firms were grouped into two main categories based on their index (i.e. FTSE350,
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and FTSE SMALL & FLED), it was found that small firms have significantly more
busy boards than larger firms. In contrast, using the proxy of busyness based on
NEDs only instead of all directors indicates large firms have significantly more
busy boards than small firms. The findings to some extent suggest that the post-
crisis attempts to limit the occurrence of board busyness were successful. It was
found that post-crisis years witnessed a significant decrease in the percentage of
busy boards among UK listed firms. Finally, findings show a significant positive
relationship between the various diversity indices and board’s competitive capi-
tal, and both market-based measures of financial performance. This suggests that
firms with better performance, as measured by ROE and stock return, on average
have more diversified and competitive boards. Although the analysis shows no
significant relation between most measures of board’s busyness and firm perfor-
mance, there is a negative and significant relationship between board’s workload
and market-based measure of firm performance.
Chapter 4
External Market for Directors:
NEDs’ Board Seats
4.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the second empirical study to explore the efficiency
of the UK directors’ employment market in creating incentives for NEDs to be-
have in the market players’ interests (e.g. shareholders). Specifically, the aim of
this chapter is to answer one of the main research questions of this thesis - to
what extent NEDs in the UK market are subjected to an external sanction system
whereby NEDs are rewarded (penalised), based on their firm performance and rep-
utational capital, through gaining (losing) an external board seat.53 This chapter
also addresses if the external employment market has been affected as incentives
mechanism following changes in the UK regulatory environment after the financial
crisis.
53NED’s ‘reputational capital’ is a measure of director individual skills, knowledge, and qualifications.
Therefore, this measure is conceptually related to the board’s ‘competitive capital’ introduced on
chapter 3 which is an aggregate measure of the reputational capital of all directors sitting on that
board. On other words, this thesis uses the terms ‘competitive’ and ‘reputational’ capital to distinguish
between the unit of interest. The former term is used with boards reflecting the competitive advantage
that a firm achieves by having an overall competitive board, while the latter term is used with NEDs
reflecting their attractiveness in the employment market.
121
Chapter 4. External Market for Directors: NEDs’ Board Seats 122
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section pro-
vides an overview of the chapter, highlighting its importance and objectives. Sec-
tion three addresses the research questions for this part of the study. Section four
presents the literature review and development of hypotheses. This is followed by
the research design in section five. Finally, the findings and the chapter summary
are presented in sections six and seven, respectively.
4.2. Chapter Overview
NEDs have been recognised in the various corporate governance codes in the
UK as mechanisms for strengthening firm governance. It is assumed that greater
representation from and independence of NEDs on boards and sub-committees
will help align management and shareholders’ interests and reduce management’s
opportunistic behaviour (Li et al., 2012; Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2011). NEDs
do not only monitor the performances of top management but also the firms’
risks and financial integrity through their roles in risk and audit committees and
also in determining the remunerations and nominations of executive directors. In
addition, NEDs possess certain resources that firms need (Machold and Farquhar,
2013; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) such as abilities, skills and expertise that may
contribute to the management’s strategic decision making processes (Knockaert
and Ucbasaran, 2013) as well as help connect the business and boards with a
network of potentially useful people and organisations . Hence, it is not surprising
to find the market for directorships favouring some NEDs more than others leading
to multiple board seats.
One strand of the literature has considered the association between firm out-
comes and NEDs’ board seats. Most such studies examine this association follow-
ing irregular or extraordinary business events, such as a takeover, stipulation of
new laws, financial distress, fraud, etc. (Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Bugeja et al.,
2009; Coles and Hoi, 2003; Gilson, 1990; Harford, 2003), which may signal NEDs’
competence. However, most firms do not face extraordinary circumstances, so
other studies examine this under general circumstances on the premise that firms’
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performance signal directors’ effectiveness (Davidoff et al., 2014; Yermack, 2004;
Ferris et al., 2003) and consequently, the number of board seats they hold.
Unfortunately, these studies have yielded mixed results suggesting that per-
formance of NEDs’ firms is not the only criteria on which board seats are allocated
in the directorship market (Davidoff et al., 2014). This chapter examines whether
the chance of NEDs getting external board seats in the UK is sensitive to their rep-
utational capital as well as to their firm(s) financial performance. Hence, it better
embraces the different stakeholders’ perspectives on NEDs’ roles and accountabil-
ity (Huse, 2005). Unlike agency theory, the ‘internal’ perspective of accountability
focuses on the role that NEDs of the right calibre can play in connecting the
corporation with its environment (resource dependence theory) and contributing
to competitive advantage of corporation through their reputational capital (the
resource-based view) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2005; Machold and Far-
quhar, 2013). This would reflect in a higher demand for NEDs who possess these
resources in the directorship market.
This chapter uses a large panel dataset of NEDs sitting on UK listed banks
and other financial institutions (BOFIs) for a period of fifteen years (1999-2014).
This offers a number of unique setting in which to investigate the effectiveness of
directorship market as incentive mechanism. First, compared to other jurisdic-
tions, shareholders in the UK are well protected and enjoy more rights (e.g. say
on pay, one share-one vote standard, AGM nomination). Furthermore, in contrast
to the US, making changes to companies’ boards in the UK is fairly easier due
to its soft law approach (comply or explain) (Zaman et al., 2011), the absence of
any restrictions on hiring and firing directors (e.g. no staggered boards) (Mira
et al., 2018) and the dominance of institutional investors who have the resources
to discipline directors (Office for National Statistics, 2012b). Second, due to their
unique governance structure, most studies hardly consider highly regulated indus-
tries such as the financial sector (White et al., 2014; Yermack, 2004). Focusing
on financial sector is important as the stakeholders’ understanding of NEDs’ role
might be different; for instance, Minichilli et al. (2009) suggest that boards’ tasks
(e.g. advice, strategic participation and output control) in regulated industries are
more demanding which may affect the way board seats are allocated in directorship
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market. In addition, the greater responsibility and expectations of NEDs in these
sectors by shareholders, regulators and depositors may attract more attention on
their appointments in the directorship market.
Third, the recent financial crisis provides an ideal natural setting for studying
the market for directors in which BOFIs’ boards are greatly scrutinised by dif-
ferent stakeholders. Even more importantly, the period of study coincides with
the launch of several governance reforms that expected to directly affect the UK
directorship market (e.g. Walker Review, 2009; UK Corporate Governance Codes,
2010, 2012, 2014; Stewardship Code, 2010; Davies Review, 2011 and Senior Man-
agers Regime, 2012). Regulators’ attempts in these post-crisis reforms to boost
the level of boards’ competency and shareholders’ involvement may strength the
sensitivity of NEDs’ board seats to their reputational capital and firm(s) financial
performance. The chapter therefore provides partial evidence on how successful
the post-crisis reforms are in increasing the effectiveness of employment market as
incentive mechanism.
4.3. Research Questions
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the general objective of this part of the study
is to investigate to what extent NEDs in the UK market are subjected to an
external sanction system whereby NEDs are rewarded (penalised), based on their
firm performance and reputational capital, through gaining (losing) an external
board seat. Thus, it contributes to the literature on market for directorships by
specifically seeking answers to the following research questions:
Q5a. Is there a significant relationship between the number of board seats and
performance of firms affiliated to the NEDs?
Q5b. Is there a significant relationship between the number of board seats and
NEDs’ reputational capital (i.e. educational qualifications, social network
and governance experience)?
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Q5c. Is there a significant change in the relationship between number of board
seats and the NEDs’ affiliated firms’ performance and NEDs’ reputational
capital in the post-crisis period?
To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first to provide
empirical evidence specifically in the UK financial sector based on a large dataset
(i.e. 11,386 unique NED-year observations) of NEDs serving on boards of 366
BOFIs covering a 15-year period (i.e. 2000–2014 inclusive).
4.4. Institutional Background, Literature Review and Hy-
potheses Development
4.4.1 Regulatory Aspects of Directorships in the UK Financial Sector
Directors’ nomination, appointment and remuneration have received substan-
tial attention, particularly following the financial crisis. The Walker Review (2009)
attributed the crisis not only to serious deficiencies in prudential oversight and fi-
nancial regulation but also major governance failures. The UK Combined Code on
Corporate Governance (FRC, 2003, 2008), the UK Corporate Governance Code
(FRC, 2010a) and the Walker Review (2009) made a number of recommendations
regarding NEDs’ appointment particularly in BOFIs, in the case of the latter. The
Combined Code highlights the importance of board diversity and members having
a balance of experience and skills (see §A.4.2 of the Code).54 Similarly, NEDs’
qualities, experience and abilities, including having an independent mind and get-
ting the right mix of financial industry capability and critical perspectives from
high-level experience in other major businesses, are among the Walker Review’s
(2009) thirty-nine recommendations for the sector. Thus, there have been higher
expectations for boards of BOFIs to appoint NEDs with the right kind of skills
and experience following the financial crisis.
54The amended code in 2010 (the Code), which was described by FRC as “limited but significant”,
emphasised on the benefits of board diversity including gender when considering new appointments.
It also encouraged the chairmen to personally report in their annual statements “how the principles
relating to the role and effectiveness of the board have been applied” and recommended that the
evaluation of the boards of FTSE 350 firms should be conducted externally at least every three years.
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The Combined Code (FRC, 2008) constrains executive directors from taking
on more than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE100 company or the chair-
manship of such a company (see §B.3.3 of the Code). It also requires the board
to clearly state in the letter of appointment the expected time for a NED’s in-
volvement on the board (see §B.3.2 of the Code). Likewise, NEDs must disclose
any other significant commitments (specifying the time involved) to the board
before the appointment and inform the board of any subsequent changes to these
(see §B.3.2 of the Code). Following the financial crisis, NEDs of FTSE 100-listed
banks and comparable unlisted entities are advised to increase the board overall
time commitment within the firm (Walker, 2009). Once appointed, NEDs are
subject to re-election at intervals of no more than three years (every year for
FTSE 350 firms) and can only serve no more than nine years to be considered
as independent (see §A.3.1 and §A.7.2 of the Code).55 The Combined Code fur-
ther identified seven criteria for NEDs to be classified as independent (see §A.3 of
the Code). These recommendations are all aimed at preventing NEDs, especially
those serving on BOFIs’ boards, from accumulating board seats and not giving
their full commitments to the expected responsibilities. Although the Combined
Code discourages NEDs from taking on too many directorships and to consider
expected time commitments before undertaking the role, there is no optimal limit
as a result of its ‘comply or explain’ approach.
Given the significant impact of BOFIs on the economy, NEDs serving on
such boards must also comply with any other rules issued by the FCA and the
PRA, as outlined in Chapter 2. Under the Financial Services and Markets Act
(2000), NEDs in regulated firms require approval before they are being allowed
to exercise any governing functions (known as the Approved Persons Regime).
Specifically, they must pass a ‘fit and proper’ test, comply with the ‘Statements
of Principle and the Code of Practice’ and report anything that could impair
their accountability. More recently, the UK PCBS (2013) emphasises that senior
level individuals (including NEDs) must be fully aware of and accountable for
their assigned responsibilities. Under the new regime known as Senior Managers
55One of the most controversial changes made to the Code in 2010 is related to enhancing accountability
whereby all directors of FTSE 350 firms are recommended to be subjected to re-election every year.
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and Certification Regime (SM&CR), NEDs may face potential criminal liability
for decisions leading to the firm’s failure (Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards, 2013). This may have repercussions on board seats as NEDs may be
more cautious in accepting appointments to serve on BOFIs’ boards which may
consequently shrink the market for NEDs in this sector. The following sections
review relevant studies related to board seats and develop the hypotheses for this
study accordingly.
4.4.2 Board Seats and Affiliated BOFIs’ Performance
Assessing an individual NED’s effectiveness is challenging partly because of
difficulties in observing actual board room actions (Perkins and Hendry, 2005), and
also due to board decisions being usually made jointly. Researchers, therefore, seek
observable and unique signals such as NEDs’ actions during extraordinary events.
Numerous researchers of these extraordinary events noticed how directors often
lose directorships if the outcome reduces shareholders’ wealth (see, Brochet and
Srinivasan, 2014; Bugeja et al., 2009; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Coles and Hoi,
2003). In contrast, albeit using pre-millennium US data, Ferris et al. (2003)
and Yermack (2004) were among the first to examine the market for director-
ships under non-extraordinary or general conditions by looking at the financial
performance of firms where NEDs serve. They found mixed results regarding the
associations between financial performance and the number of NEDs’ current and
future directorships (i.e. board seats).
For NEDs in the financial sector, corporate failure of their affiliated BOFIs
may cause regulators to presume them guilty of negligence while shareholders and
depositors may lose confidence in their credibility, possibly causing them to lose
board seats. In contrast, good performance by such BOFIs may signal that they
have successfully exercised proper checks and balances in ensuring that manage-
ment has not taken excessive risks or embarked on possible detrimental strategies
for shareholders, depositors and policyholders. This may increase demand for their
services, and in turn, increase their board seats. Therefore, using both accounting
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and market-based measures of performance of BOFIs affiliated to NEDs, the first
hypothesis, is stated as follows:
H1: There is a significant positive association between the financial
performance of BOFIs where the NED serves as a board member and
the NED’s total number of board seats.
4.4.3 Board Seats and Reputational Capital
The inconclusive results in prior studies on the associations between firms’ per-
formance and number of board seats suggest that NEDs’ appointments are possibly
based on other criteria than their affiliated firms’ performance. Hence, researchers
are increasingly redirecting their attention to NEDs’ other competencies (White
et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2011). As the financial sector is highly regulated
and competitive, BOFIs need NEDs with managerial, professional and technical
skills on their boards, echoing the recommendations in both the Combined Code
(see §A.4.3 of the Code) and the Walker Review (2009) calling for NEDs to have
a balance of experience and skills. NEDs’ with good networks are also desired
by BOFIs to help them exploit new market opportunities both domestically and
overseas as well as achieve strategic goals, stay competitive, and comply with rules
and regulations. Hence, the number of board seats held by BOFIs’ NEDs may be
highly dependent on the different forms of reputational capital that they may bring
to enhance board effectiveness. This study focuses on NEDs’ qualifications, social
network and governance experience as possible determinants of board seats.
NEDs’ educational backgrounds may influence their social status, professional
paths and networking (Useem and Karabel, 1986). Such important factors for
career development may consequently influence NEDs’ board seats (Acharya and
Pollock, 2012; Anderson et al., 2011). In the context of financial sector, NEDs
with educational background in risk management and/or finance are expected of
BOFIs’ boards (Dodd-Frank-Act, 2010; Walker, 2009).56
56In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) requires directors to have “... a bachelor’s degree or higher from
an accredited college or university in risk management, business administration, finance, economics...to
demonstrate minimum competence in risk management [p.415]”.
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The literature also highlights the role social network and connections play in
the market for directorships (Wilson et al., 2013; Anderson et al., 2011; Harford,
2003). Networking is valuable as connections with peer companies enable firms to
access important information, especially when a firm is planning strategic alliances,
mergers or acquisitions, or is expanding into new markets (Mazzola et al., 2014;
Renneboog and Zhao, 2011).57 White et al. (2014) suggest that directors with
extensive social network tend to have stronger geographic connections and multi-
ple board seats. Furthermore, NEDs who have made themselves reputable figures
within society often have access to politicians, government, employers’ organiza-
tions, regulators and other professional networks. Such connections are valuable,
particularly in highly regulated sectors such as the financial sector.
Another valuable resource that firms desire in NEDs is their board or gov-
ernance experience, which the literature has measured in different ways (Baran
and Forst, 2015). Coles and Hoi (2003) assessed governance experience based on
membership in the capital market’s top 100 firms, arguing that NEDs serving on
such boards with complex business operations will have more valuable experience.
In addition, sub-committee (i.e. audit, remuneration and nomination) experi-
ences enhance NEDs’ skills which may consequently increase demand for their
services and in turn their board seats. Harford and Schonlau (2013) and Lai and
Chen (2012) considered more specific experiences and found directors who have
participated in an acquisition’s decision making process and have foreign direct in-
vestment experiences, respectively are more likely to be rewarded with additional
board seats.
In short, NEDs’ reputational capital, based on their educational qualifications,
social network and governance experience, is an important determinant of their
board seats. Hence, the second hypothesis is as follows:
57The role of directors’ network has been discussed differently in the literature. On one hand, director
network can be a proxy for ‘cosy club’, whereby network is seen as contributing to agency problem
and perceived as negative. On the other hand, proponents of resource dependence theory perceive
directors’ network to be a valuable resource that would benefit firms through access to information,
politicians, and regulators. Most studies do not distinguish between these two views of network
except for Renneboog and Zhao (2011, 2014) who examined if CEO’s network are built for gathering
information or for managerial dominance.
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H2: There is a significant positive association between a NED’s reputa-
tional capital, based on the NED’s professional and educational qualifi-
cations, social network and governance experience, and the NED’s total
number of board seats.
4.4.4 Board Seats and the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis has partially been attributed to failure of the boards’ check
and balance mechanisms as well as negligence and naivety of NEDs in allowing
excessive risk-taking by management (Cornett et al., 2009). Regulators responded
by amending the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010a) (formerly the
Combined Code) in parallel with Sir David Walker’s review of corporate gover-
nance in the financial sector. In the same year, the FRC also launched its first
Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010b) for institutional investors, which aims to promote
better stewardship of investee firms and to “enhance value and accountability to
the ultimate beneficiaries”.58 Subsequently, capital market players and the media
have given more attention to who gets appointed to this highly regulated industry’s
boards.
Many studies have examined corporate governance issues pre- and post-crisis
to observe how the market has changed and to anticipate how successful regulators’
endeavours might be in preventing future crises (Gupta et al., 2013; Aebi et al.,
2012; Erkens et al., 2012). However, studies focusing on board structures are
mostly centred on remuneration and independence issues (Minton et al., 2011;
Cornett et al., 2009) and their effect on firms’ performance. The post-crisis reforms
in corporate governance and regulations which call for boards to consider the
skills and experience of and the time commitment expected from NEDs when
making appointments (see, FRC, 2010a; Walker, 2009) as well as holding NEDs
accountable under the new SM&CR (see, Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards, 2013), make it imperative to examine if there have been significant
changes in the relationship between board seats and the two determinants (i.e.
58For instance, the first principle of the Stewardship Code encourages institutional investors to exercise
proxy voting.
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performance of BOFIs where the NEDs serve and NEDs’ reputational capital) in
the post-crisis period. Thus, the next two hypotheses are as follows:
H3a: The positive association between the financial performance of
BOFI(s) where the NED serves as a board member and the NED’s total
number of board seats is more significant for the post- financial crisis
period than the pre-crisis period.
H3b: The positive association between the NED’s reputational capital,
based on the NED’s professional and educational qualifications, social
network and governance experience, and the NED’s total number of
board seats is more significant for the post-financial crisis period than
the pre-crisis period.
4.5. Research Design
4.5.1 Sample and Data Collection
The sample comprises all NEDs on the boards of all BOFIs listed on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2000 and 2014.59 Construction of the
dataset first involved identifying all listed firms falling under section K of the SIC
which includes bank, insurance, investment, life assurance and other financial firms
(BOFIs).60 This resulted in the identification of 366 BOFIs. Using the BoardEx
database, the next step involved extracting the names of NEDs from the list of
366 BOFIs identified earlier and finding the number of board seats they held each
year for the 15-year span, resulting in 11,386 unique NED-year observations.
Accounting and capital market performance information and other finan-
cial data for the control variables were then downloaded from the Datastream
59This study chose this 15-year period as it enables the capture of the developments in the corporate gov-
ernance environment such as increase in scrutiny by stakeholders through shareholders’ activism and
media surveillance, and regulatory changes like the Walker Review (2009) that focused on corporate
governance in the UK banking industry.
60Section K of the SIC is the UK standard industrial classification of economic activities in 2008.
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database.61 Other NEDs’ and board-related information were extracted from
BoardEx and annual reports. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the operationali-
sation of the variables used in this study.
4.5.2 Model Specification and Variable Construction
Since this study examines factors associated with the number of board seats
held by NEDs in the UK financial sector, the model’s two main independent
variables are the performance of BOFI(s) affiliated to the NEDs and a vector
of variables related to the NEDs’ reputational capital, while controlling for other
personal and firm-related variables. Given the ordinal nature of the dependent
variable (i.e. number of board seats), An ordered logit model (Harford and Schon-
lau, 2013; Brickley et al., 1999) was used to test the hypotheses.62 The model to
be tested is thus as follows:
Number of Board Seats i,t+1 = α0 + β1 NEDs
′ affiliated BOFI(s) performance
measures i,t−2 + β2 NEDs
′ Reputational Capital i,t + Control V ariables i,t + εi,t
(4.1)
4.5.2.1 Dependent Variable: NEDs’ Number of Board Seats in Quoted Firms
Consistent with the literature (Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Ferris et al.,
2003), the dependent variable is the total number of board seats a NED holds
each year over the sample period (15 years). Specifically, the dependent variable
in year t for each observation in this panel is the number of external directorships
held by the NEDs in year t+1. We refer to board seats held by the NEDs at other
firms as external directorships.
61The NED-year observations cover the period from 2000-15. However, stock market and accounting
data downloaded from Datastream are from 1998-2014 due to the inclusion of lagged variables. In
constructing the dataset, two large databases i.e. BoardEx and Datastream were mainly matched.
62Since the number of board seats is a discrete non-negative integer value, as a robustness check, Poisson
regression model was also used (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).
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4.5.2.2 Independent Variable: Performance of NEDs’ affiliated BOFIs
NEDs may concurrently hold multiple board seats and it is vital to identify
which firm(s) to be the focal firm for assessing performance.63 Since the interest is
on NEDs in the financial sector, the focal firm’s performance of interest will thus
be the BOFI affiliated to the NED. When there is more than one affiliated BOFI,
then the measure of performance will be based on the weighted average of those
BOFIs. Performance of BOFIs is assessed based on both market and accounting
measures.
Most studies on market for directorships tend to use only market-based mea-
sures as they reflect firms’ performance from shareholders’ perspective and are
deemed more future-oriented (Kennedy and Limmack, 1996). The common market-
based measures used include the firm’s annual stock return adjusted for either
market (Yermack, 2004), industry (Fischer et al., 2009; Mikkelson and Partch,
1997) or size (Dahya et al., 2002; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997).
However, using market-based measures has been criticised for possible con-
tamination by noise in the equity markets (Fischer et al., 2009). Therefore, others
have instead suggested using accounting-based measures such as return on assets
(Doucouliagos et al., 2007; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011) and its variations includ-
ing industry-adjusted ROA (Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Fischer et al., 2009)
and average ROA (Eminet and Guedri, 2010; Dahya et al., 2002), operating mar-
gin (Ferris et al., 2003; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997), sales growth (Colpan and
Yoshikawa, 2012), return on equity (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012; Doucouliagos
et al., 2007) and earnings per share (Doucouliagos et al., 2007). Performance of
BOFIs in this study is assessed based on both market and accounting measures.
Specifically, ROE and market adjusted annual stock return are used as proxies for
accounting and market measures, respectively.64
63The literature identifies the focal firm differently. Ferris et al. (2003) consider it to be where the NED
works as an executive director while Yermack (2004) treat it as the firm(s) where s(he) works as a
NED. This study adopts a similar approach to Yermack (2004), i.e. when the NED works in several
focal firms, then the weighted average of their financial performance was used.
64As a robustness check, other accounting measures (i.e. EPS, and ROA) were also considered instead
of ROE.
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The literature highlights that the associations between firms’ performance
and number of board seats are not necessarily contemporaneous (Mikkelson and
Partch, 1997) as it takes time for the market to observe and digest signals about
directors’ competence which may cause the association to persist (Doucouliagos
et al., 2007). Hence, many studies consider firm performance lagged for at least
two years in the case of other directors (including NEDs) and one year for CEOs.
Since the focus of this study is on NEDs, firms’ performance is lagged for two
years in all the regression models, which is a reasonable time in the UK context
as the Combined Code (FRC, 2003, 2008) specifies a period of no more than
three years for directors’ re-election. Most corporate governance literature also
recommends using lagged firm performance to overcome potential endogeneity
problems (Melis et al., 2015; Mura, 2007; Bozec, 2005). While strong performance
of BOFIs affiliated to NEDs may be linked to increase in the number of board
seats, having multiple board seats may also affect performance of BOFIs affiliated
to NEDs, giving rise to endogeneity problem. To overcome this problem, the
lagged measures of performance were used as the independent variable (Melis et
al., 2015; Aebi et al., 2012; Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012; Anderson et al., 2011;
Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-squared test for board
seats-performance regressions also confirmed the exogeneity of lagged performance.
4.5.2.3 Independent Variable: NEDs’ Reputational Capital
Three vectors were used to measure NEDs’ reputational capital: educational
qualifications, social network and governance experience. Directors’ educational
knowledge is usually measured either as a continuous variable where the NED’s
highest level of education is coded as PhD, postgraduate degree, undergraduate
degree or other (Zhu et al., 2014), or by examining the types of degrees a director
has (Anderson et al., 2011). This study considered NEDs’ educational qualifica-
tions based on number of their professional and academic (e.g. undergraduate
level and above) qualifications.65
65Given the large dataset and reliance on BoardEx for information, it was not feasible to identify more
specific industry qualifications such as banking, risk management, economics, etc. This is only possible
if data is collected manually. This is addressed as one of the limitations in the thesis.
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The literature identifies NEDs’ social network using different proxies such as
number of directorships (Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Yermack, 2004; Ferris et al.,
2003), proximity of directors’ home address to their firms’ headquarters (Wilson
et al., 2013; Anderson et al., 2011) and attendance at the same educational insti-
tution (Cohen et al., 2010). Renneboog and Zhao (2011) measure social network
based on director centrality. Similar to Goh and Gupta (2016), the size of social
network provided in the BoardEx database is used in the study as it reflects the
total number of other individuals that are connected with the NED from his/her
previous and current employment.
To capture NEDs’ governance experience, four different proxies were used: the
average time the NED spent at board level within the quoted companies (Anderson
et al., 2011; Coles and Hoi, 2003) and NEDs’ sub-committee memberships in the
audit, remuneration and nominations committees. Those three are the primary
sub-committee boards defined in the Combined Code (FRC, 2003, 2008) and the
UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010a).
4.5.2.4 Control variables
Several control variables related to NEDs’ other characteristics were also con-
sidered to avoid model misspecification. This included NEDs’ tenure in current
firm, chairmanship position, gender (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Yermack, 2004)
and independence.66 The model also control for NEDs’ age. It is worth mention-
ing that several studies considered director’s age as a proxy for experience (see
e.g. Wilson et al., 2013; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Eminet and Guedri, 2010;
Doucouliagos et al., 2007). Although age may capture a NED’s general experi-
ence, it may not be a good proxy for the different types and levels of experience
which are valued differently in the market for directorships; hence age was used
66Independence of NEDs is measured as a binary variable, hence does not count for the possibility of
“grey” NEDs. Studies that distinguish between “grey” and “independent” directors usually collect the
data manually from annual reports provided that conflicts of interest are being disclosed (Borokhovich
et al., 2013; Yermack, 2004). Given the large dataset, a director is strictly classified as independent
only if the firm clearly states in the annual report that s(he) is independent, otherwise the NED is
classified as non-independent NED.
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as a control variable in this thesis. Indeed, directors’ age in the sample was not
highly correlated to their qualities (see Table 4.5).
Since the likelihood of accepting additional board seats could be due to a
conscious decision by a NED who is approaching retirement, the variable age
squared is included in the model to control for this effect. In addition, ‘busy’ NEDs
and ‘busy’ chairman may be less inclined to accept seats, and they were included as
additional control variables in the model. The proxy for ‘busy’ NEDs is based on
the number of board seats the NEDs have (Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Yermack,
2004; Ferris et al., 2003) while for ‘busy’ chairman, it is based on the NED’s
chairmanship position in large firms.67 Control for firms’ characteristics include
firm size (Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Mikkelson and
Partch, 1997), BOFIs’ sub-sectors (banking, investment, life assurance, insurance
and other financial firms) and also year to capture all unobserved factors related
to each year.68
4.6. Data Analysis and Findings
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the performance of BOFIs
affiliated to the NEDs (Panel A), NEDs’ reputational capital (Panel B), NEDs’
other characteristics (Panel C) and BOFIs’ characteristic (Panel D). As Panel A
shows, the mean for ROE is 3.1%, while the mean for market-adjusted return is
-4.5%, and its median is 1%, indicating a left-skewed distribution.
Panel B indicates the NEDs’ educational qualifications to be on average two
and as many as four. Similar to Goh and Gupta (2016), a NED in the sample has
67Consistent with some studies in the literature (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Ferris et al., 2003), the
number of three board seats were used as a threshold for NEDs’ busyness. As a robustness check,
similar to Harris and Shimizu (2004), this study also used four board seats as another threshold of
director’s busyness.
68Due to the diverse nature of financial firms included in the sample, controlling for firms’ leverage is not
feasible. Consistent with literature, controlling for firm size is deemed sufficient to partiality control
for firm growth opportunities.
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on average 559 connections with other directors and as many as 2,157 connections
in general. The average governance experience of NEDs in quoted firms is almost
four years, with very few having more than 12 years. As for sub-committee mem-
berships, about 70% of NEDs has experience as members of the audit committee,
48% in the remuneration committee and 60% in the nomination committee.
As Panel C shows, the average tenure of NEDs serving on BOFIs’ boards is
about 6 years with a median of 4.5 years, suggesting that most NEDs do not serve
beyond 9 years as recommended in the Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010a).
The average (median) age of NEDs in BOFIs’ boards is 59 (60), which is not
surprising as such roles are often offered to more senior individuals. Reflecting the
regulatory demands for appointing NEDs who are independent of management,
77% of NEDs in BOFIs are independent. Similar to Brammer et al. (2009),
the average for women NEDs is 9.3%. Panel D presents performance and size of
BOFIs and as indicated, the mean and median size of BOFIs are £27b and £157m,
respectively.
Table 4.3 presents the number of board seats held by NEDs for the full period
(Panel A) and the pre- and post-financial crisis periods (Panel B). As Panel A
shows, for the 15-year span, 50.3% of NEDs held only one board seat in quoted
firms while only 13% held four or more seats, accounting for 25% and 33% of total
board seats, respectively. Based on Panel B, the percentage of NEDs holding one
board seat increased by 11% (accounting for 28%) while those holding four or more
decreased by 6% (accounting for 28.8%) in the post-crisis period. These figures
respectively suggest that NEDs serving on BOFIs has relinquished some of the
board seats possibly due to increased expected time commitment as recommended
in the Walker Review (2009) and the Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010a).
Table 4.4 reports the univariate characteristics of NEDs. Panels A and B cover
the number of board seats based on BOFIs’ index and sub-sector while Panels C
and D present NEDs’ reputational capital and other characteristics during the pre-
and post-financial crisis periods. The last two columns report significance levels
of the mean differences between the two periods based on T-tests and Wilcoxon
test.
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NEDs’ board seats, based on BOFIs’ index and sub-sectors (Panels A and B),
are significantly different at the 1% level for both periods (lower for the post-crisis
period). Panel C shows all the reputational capital variables to be significantly
different at the 1% significance level between the two periods (higher for the post-
crisis period except for educational qualifications and remuneration committee
membership). All other variables are also significantly different at the 1% level
(higher in the post-crisis period except for busy NEDs which is lower).
Table 4.4
Mean Board Seats, Reputational Capital and Personal Characteristics of NEDs Serving on










Panel A: Board seats in BOFIs by indices
FTSE 100 2.51 2.03 *** ***
FTSE 250 2.31 1.96 *** ***
FTSE SMALL CAP 2.18 1.95 *** ***
FTSE AIM All-Share 1.86 1.49 *** ***
FTSE FLEDGLING 2.49 1.96 *** ***
Total 2.28 1.89 *** ***
Panel B: Board seats in BOFIs by sub-sectors
Banks 2.20 2.04 *** **
Insurance 2.56 1.86 *** ***
Investment 2.28 2.00 *** ***
Life Assurance 2.57 1.83 *** ***
Private Equity 3.70 2.51 *** ***
Other Finance 1.98 1.71 *** ***
Total 2.25 1.91 *** ***
Panel C: NEDs’ reputational capital
Number of professional & educational
qualifications
1.67 1.59 *** ***
Social networks 0.54 0.58 *** ***
Governance experience in quoted firms 3.50 3.81 *** ***
Audit committee membership 0.63 0.71 *** ***
Remuneration committee membership 0.49 0.47 *** ***
Nomination committee membership 0.51 0.64 *** ***
Panel D: NEDs’ other characteristics
Tenure (years) 5.42 6.25 *** ***
Age (years) 57.32 59.56 *** ***
Gender(female) 0.07 0.11 *** ***
Independence 0.74 0.79 *** ***
Busy NEDs 0.17 0.11 *** ***
Chairmanship 0.19 0.19 - -
‡ Level of significance for correlations are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
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Table 4.5 presents the correlation matrix for all variables. It shows a signifi-
cant and positive relationship between number of board seats and performance of
BOFI(s) affiliated to the NEDs based only on the market adjusted stock return.
There is also a significant positive association between the number of board seats
and all of the NEDs’ reputational capital variables. Furthermore, the table shows
a significant positive relationship between number of board seats and age, gender,
independence, chairmanship, busy NEDs and busy chairman but negatively sig-
nificant for tenure in current firm. There is no multicollinearity problem between
the independent variables. In addition, using more advanced measure of multi-
collinearity, all values of the VIF (variance inflation factor) are found to be below
the critical level. Overall, the correlation matrix suggests the number of board
seats held by NEDs is significantly associated with their reputational capital and
only the market performance measure of their affiliated BOFIs.
4.6.2 Do BOFIs’ Performance and Reputational Capital Affect NEDs’ Number of Board
Seats?
This section will cover the first two research question (RQ5a and RQ5b).
Specifically, it will answer these questions:
- Is there a significant relationship between the number of
board seats and performance of firms affiliated to the NEDs?
- Is there a significant relationship between the number of
board seats and NEDs’reputational capital (i.e. educational
qualifications, social network and governance experience)?
Table 4.6 (see page 144) presents the results for two sets of models. Firstly,
models 1 and 2 examine the association between the number of board seats and
performance of BOFI(s) affiliated to the NEDs, while controlling for a wide range of
different NEDs’ and firms’ characteristics. The second set of models (i.e. models
3 and 4) replicates the first set but includes NEDs’ reputational capital. Each
model is reported based on market performance measure, then repeated based on
accounting performance measure.
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Table 4.6




Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4






























-0.029*** -0.027*** -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Age
0.313*** 0.341*** 0.329*** 0.363***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059)
Age2
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (Female NEDs)
0.165 0.180 0.244* 0.259**
(0.136) (0.136) (0.129) (0.129)
NED Independence
-0.012 -0.014 -0.016 -0.020
(0.111) (0.114) (0.116) (0.120)
Busy NEDs
5.484*** 5.491*** 5.397*** 5.402***
(0.113) (0.111) (0.117) (0.115)
Chairmanship
0.790** 0.844** 0.974*** 0.989***
(0.353) (0.366) (0.367) (0.380)
Busy Chairman
(Chairmanship× Firm Size)
-0.048* -0.051* -0.068** -0.069**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Firm Size (log TA)
0.083*** 0.091*** 0.030 0.039
(0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026)
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Sub-Sectors Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 9,875 9,979 9,753 9,856
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.291 0.311 0.313
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance for correlations coefficients are
***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
Shown here are ordered logit regressions in which the dependent variable in year t is the number
of board seats held by NEDs in year t+1 in quoted firms and ranges from one to four board
seats. Consistent with the literature, NEDs who have more than four directorships are coded
as having four. Also, in untabulated regressions, the busy NEDs variable was replaced with the
number of board seats a NED has in year t, and the results still hold. In untabulated regressions;
accounting measurement of financial performance EPS(t−2) is found to be mostly insignificant.
The standard errors are clustered by BOFIs’ ID.
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Regarding the association between board seats and performance of BOFIs
affiliated to NEDs, contrary to expectation, all models show insignificant relation-
ship, regardless of the measure used. This is consistent with a recent study in
the US market (Davidoff et al., 2013) that found no significant association be-
tween BOFIs’ stock return, lagged two years, and the NEDs’ future number of
board seats. Similarly, Yermack (2004) found no significant association between
two years’ lag of the market performance of non-financial firms and their NEDs’
future number of board seats.69 Yermack (2004) also reported insignificant asso-
ciation when accounting profits were used instead of stock returns as the proxy
for performance. Overall, results in the current study indicate that performance
of BOFI(s) affiliated to NEDs is not a significant determinant of board seats, thus
rejecting the first hypothesis.
When NEDs’ reputational capital variables (i.e. educational qualifications,
social networks, and governance experience) were introduced in models 3 and
4, the first two variables indicate a positive significant relationship at the 1%
level with number of board seats. For the governance experience variables, only
NEDs’ average years of experience on quoted boards and nomination committee
experience are positively and significantly associated with board seats at the 1%
and 5% levels, respectively.
However, experience in the other two sub-committee memberships (i.e. audit
and remuneration) are insignificant. Thus, the second set of hypotheses is fully
supported for only two vectors of reputational capital (i.e. qualifications and social
networks) and partially supported for governance experience variables.
The significant positive association between academic and professional qual-
ifications and number of board seats is unsurprising as NEDs’ competency make
them more attractive to the market. Similarly, the significant positive associa-
tion between social network and board seats is expected as who the NEDs know
may open up opportunities for appointments to other board seats. The significant
69Yermack (2004) found that only one year lag of performance was associated with board seats, at 5%
significance level. Non-lagged performance was not significantly associated with the NEDs’ future
number of board seats.
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positive association between board seats and the average years of experience in
quoted firms’ board is also not surprising as NEDs’ governing and operating expe-
rience and knowledge of complex firms make them more attractive to the market
for directorships. One possible explanation for the significant association between
experience in nomination committee and number of board seats is that members
of nomination committee could relatively have better access to the employment
market. Although not significant, experience in remuneration committees has a
positive effect on board seats while audit committee experience has a negative
effect. The latter may possibly be attributed to greater commitment expected
from such roles, thus causing NEDs themselves taking conscious decisions not to
accept additional seats or the market itself not wanting to appoint NEDs serving
on audit committees as they are often over-committed.
Other NED-specific characteristics (i.e. tenure, age, gender, independence
and chairmanship) were also incorporated in the models. Tenure is significant
but takes a negative coefficient with board seats as market may perceive NEDs as
having cosy relationships with management that may restrict effective monitoring
(Musteen et al., 2010).70 While age has a positive effect, age squared has a neg-
ative effect on board seats, suggesting that as the NED gets older, the likelihood
of getting new board seats declines.71 Interestingly, gender takes a positive coef-
ficient and is significant at the 10% and 5% levels in the expanded models (i.e.
3 and 4), suggesting that female NEDs are more likely to gain board seats. The
significant positive association between board seats and chairmanship experience
is not surprising as NEDs’ experience in managing the boards make them more
attractive to the market. NEDs’ independence is not significantly associated with
number of board seats.
All the models control for busy NEDs i.e. those who currently hold three
board seats or more, because they may be less inclined to accept more board
70In contrast, long tenured NEDs are argued to be more effective monitors as they would have developed
sufficient knowledge about the firm they oversee.
71Age-directorship relationship has been suggested in the literature as having an inverted U-shaped
function because the benefits gained from experienced older directors might be offset by their being
unenergetic as one grows older (Ferris, 2003). However, there was no strong correlation between
directors’ age and their qualities based on this study’s sample.
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seats. Contrary to expectations, the results suggest a positive and significant
association between busy NEDs and number of board seats. Despite increased
regulatory calls for limiting directors’ board seats, the market still values NEDs
with multiple directorships for their talent leading to more board seats – an obser-
vation called the “selection effects” (Falato et al., 2014). However, busy chairman
(i.e. chairmanship in big firms) is found to be negatively and significantly asso-
ciated with number of board seats possibly due to extensive time commitments
expected from chairmanship in big firms which deter them from taking on more
seats.
4.6.3 Did the Determinants of Board Seats Change After the Financial Crisis?
This section will cover the third research question mentioned in this chapter
(RQ5c). Specifically, it will answer this question:
- Is there a significant change in the relationship between
number of board seats and the NEDs’ affiliated firms’ per-
formance and NEDs’ reputational capital in the post-crisis
period?
Table 4.7 (see page 149) incorporates the financial crisis into the models by
splitting the sample into pre- and post-crisis periods: 2000–2007 and 2009-2014,
respectively (excluding 2008, the year of the crisis).
Models 1 to 4 show the relationships between number of board seats and
BOFIs’ market and accounting performance and reputational capital based on
ordered logit regression for the pre- and post-financial crisis periods, while con-
trolling for the other directors’ and firms’ characteristics. Models 1 and 3 indicate
insignificant association between BOFIs’ performance, using both market and ac-
counting measures, and board seats during the pre-crisis period. However, model
2 suggests that, post-crisis, the BOFIs’ market performance is significantly related
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to board seats at the 10% significance level but not for accounting performance,
thus hypothesis 3a is partially supported.72
The discrepancy in results of seats-performance relationship pre- and post-
crisis could be due to a number of reasons. For instance, the absence of relationship
in the pre-crisis period can be attributed to the lack of shareholders’ disciplinary
mechanisms and/or shareholders’ passivity. Also, pre-crisis, NEDs may not have
been held responsible for firm performance by shareholders (Beltratti and Stulz,
2012; Erkens et al., 2012).
On the other hand, the significant positive association between firm perfor-
mance and NEDs’ board seats after the crisis may be attributed to BOFIs’ direc-
tors being under the scrutiny of shareholders, regulators and other market players.
In fact, shareholders’ activism is said to have improved following the crisis, as in-
dicated by the steady increase in the voting turnout and ‘beyond expectation’
positive response by the investment community to the UK new Stewardship Code
(FRC, 2010b), with some companies reporting an increasing in investors’ engage-
ment (FRC, 2011).73 Furthermore, NEDs are increasingly held accountable for
BOFIs’ performance and risk post-crisis, partly due to the regulators efforts. For
instance, among the amendments in the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC,
2010a) was clarification that directors’ responsibility for risk extend beyond the
72Although both ROE and stock return of BOFIs post-crisis were positively associated with directors’
board seats, only the stock return was significant. Consistent with Harford and Schonlau (2013), the
results suggest that the market for directorships pays more attention to market rather than accounting
performance. This reflects the heterogeneity of market players’ perceptions of NEDs’ effectiveness in
terms of performance, as suggested by Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012). The results also support Fama
and Jensen’s (1983) hypothesis that outside directors [NEDs] can use performance as a signal of their
effectiveness to the market which may lead to board seat(s). Market performance may be considered
as a more “observable” signal, than an accounting measure.
73The average turnout in 2011 was 71% compared to 68% and 66% in 2010 and 2008, respectively
(Institutional Shareholder Services, 2011).
In eighteen months since its launch, over 230 asset managers, asset owners and service providers signed
up to the Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010b) and the momentum has continued ever since. Also, LSE
witnessed an influx of firms with concentrated ownership structures (FRC, 2011), which may have
spurred increased monitoring of directors in public listed companies. However, the UK market did not
reach its full potential in terms of activism of shareholders due to barriers to stewardship such as lack
of resources, limited influence due to holding size, difficulty in reaching a consensus among portfolio
managers and shareholders (IMA, 2011).
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Table 4.7
Ordered Logit Models for NEDs’ Board Seats in Quoted Firms Pre- and Post- the Financial
Crisis
Market - Performance Accounting - Performance
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis






Number of professional &
educational qualifications
0.109** 0.099** 0.102** 0.107**
(0.042) (0.047) (0.040) (0.047)
Social networks
0.241*** 0.346*** 0.260*** 0.328***
(0.092) (0.056) (0.091) (0.058)
Governance experience in
quoted firms (years)
0.098*** 0.119*** 0.101*** 0.121***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
Audit committee
membership experience
0.055 -0.046 0.027 -0.054
(0.111) (0.131) (0.111) (0.130)
Remuneration committee
membership experience
0.011 0.063 0.049 0.070
(0.114) (0.094) (0.116) (0.095)
Nomination committee
membership experience
0.158 0.261** 0.136 0.283**
(0.127) (0.110) (0.129) (0.111)
Tenure
-0.057*** -0.046*** -0.058*** -0.044***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Age
0.293*** 0.341*** 0.351*** 0.350***
(0.080) (0.079) (0.088) (0.078)
Age2
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (Female NEDs)
-0.272 0.484*** -0.265 0.498***
(0.194) (0.150) (0.191) (0.149)
NED Independence
-0.145 0.126 -0.145 0.126
(0.136) (0.157) (0.139) (0.163)
Busy NEDs
5.446*** 5.363*** 5.427*** 5.377***
(0.186) (0.149) (0.175) (0.147)
Chairman
0.525 1.378*** 0.593 1.257**
(0.508) (0.514) (0.497) (0.535)
Busy Chairman
(Chairmanship× Firm Size)
-0.030 -0.103** -0.037 -0.092**
(0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.041)
Firm Size (log TA)
0.047 0.026 0.067** 0.023
(0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031)
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Sub-Sectors Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,220 5,623 3,225 5,680
Pseudo R2 0.321 0.305 0.324 0.306
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance for correlations coefficients are
***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
Shown here are ordered logit regressions in which the dependent variable in year t is the number
of board seats held by NEDs in year t+1 in quoted firms and ranges from one to four board
seats. Constant with the literature, NEDs who have more than four directorships are coded as
having four. Also, in untabulated regressions, the busy NEDs variable was replaced with the
number of board seats a NED has in year t, and the results still hold. In untabulated regressions;
accounting measurement of financial performance EPS(t−2) is found to be mostly insignificant
pre- and post- the crisis. The standard errors are clustered by BOFIs’ ID.
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simple oversight of control system. Similarly, the introduction of the Senior Man-
agement and Certification Regime promotes individual, rather than collective,
accountability for the board’s decisions.
Regarding reputational capital variables, educational qualifications, social net-
works, and governance experience in quoted firms, are all positively and signifi-
cantly related to board seats in both pre-and post-crisis periods. As for other
governance experience vector, the nomination committee experience is positively
and significantly associated at the 5% significance level with board seats only
for the post-crisis period. The significance of nomination committee membership
could be mirroring the need for such experience in the post-crisis period which
witnessed high directors’ turnover. Unlike the other two board committees, audit
committee membership is negatively associated (although insignificant) with board
seats post-crisis, perhaps reflecting the criticisms on the role of audit committee
members during the crisis.74 Overall, hypothesis 3b is fully supported for edu-
cational qualifications and social network and partially supported for governance
experience.
Gender is positively and significantly associated at the 1% level with the num-
ber of board seats in the post-crisis models (i.e. 2 and 4), echoing the call in the
Davies Report (2011) for increased representation of women on FTSE 100 boards
to at least 25% by 2015 (Mulcahy and Linehan, 2014).75 Unsurprisingly, chair-
manship experience is positively associated with board seats but busy chairmen
are negatively associated with number of board seats in the post-crisis models at
the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. This is in line with the recommen-
dation in the Walker Review (2009) for chairmen of major banks to devote around
two-thirds of their time to the business entity, hence constraining additional board
seats opportunities. The results suggest a positive and significant association be-
tween busy NEDs and number of board seats in both pre- and post-crisis periods,
74A recent report by the FRC stated that audit committees’ reporting is often unenlightening where very
few audit committees disclose the key decisions taken by the committee. When restoring confidence in
audit was needed, audit committees fail to demonstrate that they are carrying out their role diligently.
75Within six months of the launch of the Davies Report, female directors represented 22% and 18% of
the directors appointed to FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms, respectively. Many of these female directors
had no previous experience on FTSE 350 boards (FRC, 2011).
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suggesting that the market still values such directors for their reputational capital.
The impact of the other control variables is the same as in Table 4.6 i.e. signif-
icantly positive for age but negative for tenure in quoted firms and age2 in both
periods.
4.7. Chapter Summary
NEDs play a vital role in corporate governance, but some are valued more than
others in the market for directorships leading to multiple board seats. However, lit-
tle is known about the collective nature and determinants of NEDs’ board seats,
particularly following the global financial crisis. This chapter explores whether
number of board seats held by NEDs in the UK financial sector is associated with
the performance of the BOFIs that they are affiliated to and(or) their reputa-
tional capital, assessed based on their educational qualifications, social networks,
and governance experience, while controlling for other personal and firm charac-
teristics. Using ordered logit regressions, results indicate that only reputational
capital variables were significantly associated with board seats in the pre-financial
crisis period. However, in the post-financial crisis period, market performance of
BOFIs where the NEDs serve as well as all three reputational capital variables,
were significantly associated with board seats. The results suggest that, post-
crisis, BOFIs may have held NEDs more responsible for their firms’ performance,
and responded to the call in the Walker Review and the UK Code to provide more
weight on skills, experience, and diversity when appointing NEDs in the financial
sector.
Chapter 5
Internal Market for Directors:
NEDs’ Turnover
5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the third empirical study to explore the efficiency of the
UK directors’ employment market in creating incentives for NEDs to behave in the
market players’ interests (e.g. shareholders). Specifically, the aim of this chapter
is to answer one of the main research questions of this thesis - to what extent
NEDs’ probability of turnover is associated with NEDs’ firm performance and their
reputational capital.76 This chapter also addresses if the internal employment
market has been affected as incentives mechanism following changes in the UK
regulatory environment after the financial crisis.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section pro-
vides an overview of the chapter, highlighting its importance and objectives. Sec-
tion three addresses the research questions of this part of the study. Section four
76NED’s ‘reputational capital’ is a measure of director individual skills, knowledge, and qualifications.
Therefore, this measure is conceptually related to the board’s ‘competitive capital’ introduced on
Chapter 3 which is an aggregate measure of the reputational capital of all directors sitting on that
board. On other words, this thesis uses the terms ‘competitive’ and ‘reputational’ capital to distinguish
between the unit of interest. The former term is used with boards reflecting the competitive advantage
that a firm achieves by having an overall competitive board, while the latter term is used with NEDs
reflecting their attractiveness in the employment market.
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presents the study’s institutional background, related literature, and hypotheses
development. This is followed by the research design in section five. Finally, re-
sults of the findings and the chapter summary are discussed in sections six and
seven, respectively.
5.2. Chapter Overview
NEDs play a crucial role in ensuring corporate accountability especially in
Anglo-Saxon countries. NEDs have been described as a “decision-making group
that faces complex tasks pertaining to strategic-issue processing” (Forbes and
Milliken, 1999). To successfully deal with these challenging tasks, NEDs need to
be equipped with a range of skills, knowledge, and experience (i.e. reputational
capital). The need for such reputational capital is even greater in regulated sectors
where NEDs’ tasks are more demanding (Minichilli et al., 2009). Indeed, corporate
failure due to directors’ genuine incompetence are as common as – or maybe even
more than – the ones resulting from directors’ self-seeking behaviour (Hendry,
2005). Therefore, having a good mix of directors’ reputational capital on the firm’s
board is deemed to be an important prerequisite for its effectiveness (Roberts et
al., 2005; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010).
As far as regulations are concerned, a review of the corporate governance
codes developed worldwide, before the global financial crisis, shows that compe-
tencies of individual NEDs are not considered a governance issue to be regulated
in detail and is usually left for the market forces to regulate (Zattoni and Cuomo,
2010). In the UK, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2003,
2008) emphasises on the board overall balance of skills and qualifications, rather
than merely determining the specific competencies individual NEDs should have.
Specifically, among the UK Combined Code’s main recommendations is the one
discussing the boards’ balance of skills and experience, and independence (see §
A.3 of the Code).77 In addition, NEDs’ replacements are suggested to be made in
77For instance, one of the provisions in the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2003,
2008) suggests that firms’ boards should be of “sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience
is appropriate for the requirements of the business”.
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a way that will “maintain an appropriate balance of skills and experience within
the company and on the board” (see § A.4 of the Code). Hence, the probability
of a NED’s turnover in the UK is expected to be related to his/her reputational
capital relative to the board.
Furthermore, management and accounting literature indicate that, for inde-
pendent NEDs to be effective, these aforementioned NEDs’ functional competen-
cies need to be complemented with firm-specific knowledge (Rechner, 1999; Small-
man, 2005; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). The latter knowledge is essential for over-
coming the problems that could arise from information asymmetry between man-
agement and independent NEDs (Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010; Linck et
al., 2008). However, gaining firm-specific knowledge demands independent NEDs
to invest a considerable amount of time and effort (Brickley and Zimmerman,
2010; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Shen, 2005). Therefore, one line of prior research
suggests that directors with multiple directorships (i.e. busy NEDs) might be less
effective as they are overburdened with too many other board responsibilities (Fer-
ris et al., 2003). This will cause them to spend less time on their firm’s boards,
know less about their firms, and fail to challenge the firm’s management. For the
same reasons, policymakers and shareholders’ associations are also inclined to limit
the number of external board seats a director can have.78 However, other research
calls for limiting the overall number of busy NEDs on the firm board instead of
limiting the number of external board seats that a NED is allowed to have. That
is, the negative consequences of having busy NED on the board are contingent
on how busy his/her board is (i.e. board busyness). In other words, distinction
should be made between individual NED busyness and board busyness. Based
on the above arguments, it is hypothesized that the turnover probability of busy
NEDs increases if they are sitting on a busy board, as their shareholders may be
less inclined to re-elect them.
78As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2008) states that
the boards of UK firms “should not agree to a full-time executive director taking on more than one
non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a company (A.4.5)”.
Similarly, in the US, the Council of institutional investors suggests that directors “with a full-time job
should sit on no more than two other boards”.
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Unfortunately, compared to CEOs, research on NEDs’ turnover is relatively
limited and lacked a systematic examination of NEDs’ reputational capital and
busyness relative to their board. Instead, they tend to focus on turnover sensitivity
to firm financial performance, especially following irregular events (e.g. takeover,
provision of new laws, financial distress, fraud) (see, Bugeja et al., 2009; Coles and
Hoi, 2003). This study sheds light into this important issue by examining NEDs’
turnover sensitivity not just to their firm financial performance but also to their
reputational capital and busyness individually, and relative to their boards. In
addition, since most firms do not face extraordinary circumstances, this research
extends the relatively few studies that examined the NEDs’ turnover-performance
association under general circumstances (e.g. Yermack, 2004).
Furthermore, to the best knowledge of the researcher, no study has considered
the impact of the financial crisis on NEDs’ turnover, particularly in the UK finan-
cial sector. As discussed later (see, section 5.4.6 ), the post-crisis regulations could
have a considerable impact on the association between NEDs’ turnover and their
reputational capital, busyness, and firm performance. Given that the used data
set spans the period between 1999- 2014, investigation was conducted for the full
sample as well as the pre- and post- crisis periods to test whether NEDs’ turnover
in BOFIs has been affected by changes that occurred in the business and regula-
tory environments following the financial crisis. The study focused only on NEDs
who are sitting on the boards of public-listed BOFIs and, for comparison purposes,
the non-financial firms in the UK for the period 1999-2014. This provided 66,368
NED years observations.
5.3. Research Questions
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the general objective of this part of the study
is to investigate to what extent NEDs’ probability of turnover is associated with
NEDs’ firm performance and their reputational capital. Thus, it contributes to
the literature on directors’ turnover and incentives by investigating the following
research questions:
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Q6a. Is there a significant relationship between performance of firms affiliated to
the NED and probability of NED’s turnover?
Q6b. Is there a significant relationship between a NED’s reputational capital rel-
ative to the board and probability of NED’s turnover?
Q6c. Is there a significant relationship between a NED’s commitment status (busy-
ness) relative to the board and probability of NED’s turnover?
Q6d. Is there a significant change in the relationship between NEDs’ affiliated
firms’ performance, relative reputational capital, relative busyness, and the
probability of NED’s turnover in the post-crisis period?
5.4. Institutional Background, Literature Review and Hy-
potheses Development
5.4.1 Corporate Governance in the UK Financial Sector
A hallmark of the UK corporate governance codes is its ‘comply or explain’
approach which provides flexibility to the boards to deviate from a particular
provision as long as they explain the reason (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). Hence,
what the boards of the UK firms practice (de facto) could be different than what
the regulators promote or expect them to do (de jure). However, the proponents
of institutional theory and legitimacy theory argue that the majority of firms
would be prone to adopt these “best practices” to avoid adverse attention from
its shareholders (Bender, 2004).
Of particular interest for the purpose of this study are the recommendations
of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2008) concerning NEDs’
tenure, evaluation, and removal. The UK Combined Code discusses the different
stages of the NEDs’ career path. Before the appointment of new NEDs, the
nomination committee is required to rigorously review the current board diversity,
experience and skills (see § B.2 of the Code) when drawing up a list of potential
non-executive nominee(s), who is subject to election at the first AGM after the
appointment date. Before the (re)election, shareholders must be provided with
sufficient biographical details of NED nominees, along with a board statement for
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their choice of candidate(s). NEDs should be appointed for specified terms and
subject to statutory provisions relating to the removal of a director (see § B.2 of
the Code). In addition, appointed NEDs are subject to re-election at intervals of
no more than three years (one year for FTSE 350 firms) (see § B.7 of the Code).
Due to the need for progressive refreshing of the board, a NED should nor-
mally stay no longer than six years on the boardroom. The Combined Code
suggests that the standing for the ‘annual’ re-election should be based on the per-
formance evaluation of individual directors (see § B.7 of the Code). Hence, the
annual evaluation of individual directors’ performance is expected to be available
to shareholders when a NED re-election proposal is being made by the board. In
addition, internal performance evaluation of the board, as a unit, is encouraged to
be carried out annually and the procedure to do so is expected to be disclosed in
the firms’ annual report (see § B.6 of the Code).
5.4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Compared to executive directors, primarily CEOs, studies that examine NEDs’
turnover are limited (Sharad and Steven, 2010) and are mostly in the US context.
A study of NEDs’ turnover based on the UK setting is important for several rea-
sons, as mentioned in Chapter 1. First, the nature of the US’s capital market is
different from the UK’s (Ben-Amar et al., 2013).79 Second, most studies hardly
consider highly regulated industries such as the financial sector and examining
NEDs turnover in the BOFIs may deliver different findings as the boards’ tasks
(e.g. advice, strategic participation, and output control) in this industry are more
demanding (Minichilli et al., 2009). In addition, since BOFIs’ directors are trusted
with the control of strategic resources for the economy, their re-election may at-
tract more attention. Third, the recent financial crisis provides a natural setting
to test if the market for NEDs in this sector has changed following the regulatory
79For instance, the US market is dominated by individual shareholders while in the UK by institutional
investors. In addition, the UK financial reporting environment is different from the US as it adopts
IFRS while the US follows the US GAAPs and its approach in enforcing corporate governance is
quasi-voluntary and follows the ‘comply or explain’ approach while in the US it is regulated by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Tricker, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011).
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and corporate governance reforms (e.g. Walker Review, 2009; the Code, 2010;
Stewardship Code, 2010; Davis’ Report, 2011 and SM&CR, 2012). Finally, most
NEDs’ turnover studies focused only on firm performance and failed to consider
the effects of NEDs’ reputational capital, social network and busyness on an indi-
vidual basis as well as relative to their boards and their turnover. In this section,
a review of prior literature on NEDs’ turnover helps in developing the hypotheses
for this study. Table 5.1 presents a summary of prior studies on NEDs’ turnover.
5.4.3 NEDs’ Turnover and Firm Performance
Prior literature suggests that if the directors’ turnover – including NEDs –
is significantly associated with the shareholders’ perception of their ‘on-the-job’
performance, then turnover can be an efficient market mechanism that align their
interests with the shareholders. As mentioned earlier, most studies that exam-
ined this hypothesis have focused on CEO’s turnover-performance association (see,
Dahya et al., 2002; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997), but similar research into NEDs’
turnover-performance association received much less attention (Sharad and Steven,
2010).
Moreover, studies exploring NEDs’ turnover-performance association tend to
examine this association in the wake of different irregular events faced by firms
(see Table 5.1, panel A) whereby NEDs’ actions during these events are used to
capture the shareholders’ perceptions of the performance of NEDs. For instance,
Coles and Hoi (2003) examined NEDs’ turnover following NEDs’ opt-out decision
toward Pennsylvania Senate Bill where opt-out decision is used as a lens for spot-
ting shareholders-friendly directors. They found little evidence of a relationship
between opt-out decision and NEDs’ chance of losing their board seat, yet prior
industry median adjusted accounting performance was found to significantly affect
the probability of NEDs’ turnover.
Since most firms do not face extraordinary circumstances, it is imperative to
examine NEDs’ turnover-performance under the general circumstances (see Table
5.1, panel B). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, Yermack’s study (2004) is
the first to do so by examining NEDs’ turnover as a function of firm performance at
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which the NED served. He found a negative and statistically significant association
between a NED’s turnover and firm performance in the departure year.
Similarly, this study examines the association between NEDs’ turnover prob-
ability and the financial performance of their affiliated BOFIs. Corporate failure
of firms affiliated to the NEDs may cause regulators to presume all board mem-
bers, including NEDs, guilty of negligence while shareholders and depositors may
lose confidence in the credibility of the NEDs, resulting in the possible loss of
their board seats. On the other hand, good performance by firms affiliated to the
NEDs may signal that they have successfully exercised proper checks and balances
in ensuring that management have not taken excessive risk or embark on strate-
gies that may be detrimental to shareholders and depositors, hence, increase their
chance to be re-elected. Therefore, the first hypothesis, using both accounting and
market-based measures of performance of the BOFIs that the NED is affiliated to,
is stated as follows:
H1: There is a significant negative association between the performance
of the BOFI at which the NED serves as a board member and the NED’s
turnover probability.
5.4.4 NEDs’ Turnover and Board Balance of Competitive Capital
As discussed earlier, the UK corporate governance codes highlight NEDs’ rep-
utational capital as one of the important criteria in the appointment and reten-
tion of board seat. Drawing upon the board composition literature, three different
forms of NEDs’ reputational capital have been suggested as highly valued by firms:
educational qualifications, social network and, governance experience. NEDs’ ed-
ucational backgrounds, even if unrelated to the firm’s industry, are valued in their
own right as they provide directors with different perspectives that would enrich
the discussion in the boardroom (Acharya and Pollock, 2012; Anderson et al.,
2011). In addition, specific educational qualifications such as risk management
and financial expertise can be a requirement for sitting on certain board commit-
tees. Moreover, NEDs’ educational backgrounds may influence their social status,
professional paths and networking (Useem and Karabel, 1986).
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Second, the literature also highlights the role that network and social con-
nections play in directors’ employment market (Anderson et al., 2011; Harford,
2003; Wilson et al., 2013). Networking is valuable as connections with peer com-
panies enable a firm to gain access to important information especially when a
firm is planning strategic alliances, mergers or acquisitions, or is expanding into
new markets (Mazzola et al., 2014; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). Furthermore, di-
rectors who developed themselves into reputable figures in the society often have
access to politicians, government, employers’ organizations, regulators and other
professional networks.80
Finally, board level experience is one of the valuable resources that firms look
for when hiring NEDs. Governance experience has been measured in different ways
in the literature. For instance, Coles and Hoi (2003) and Anderson et al., (2011)
assessed governance experience based on the number of board seats a director hold
on other firms. Serving on other boards is beneficial for firms as it equips directors
with valuable experience which eventually leads to superior advice and monitoring
(Baran and Forst, 2015).
In addition, more specific governance experience such as experience of working
on boards of listed, large and multinational firms, and the experience of leading
firms’ board are also valued. Indeed, the Higgs’ Report (2003) highlighted how
“previous PLC governance experience is often seen to be the main, and sometimes
only, competence demanded of potential candidates [p.42]”. Walker Review also
suggests that having NEDs with “high-level experience in other major business”
helps in creating an effective board’s environment (Walker, 2009). Coles and Hoi
(2003) capture such governance experience using directors’ membership in the
top 100 firms on the stock market. They proposed that given the complexity of
the business operations, NEDs serving on such boards may have gained valuable
80The role of directors’ network has been discussed differently in the literature. On one hand, director
network can be a proxy for ‘cosy club’, whereby network is seen as contributing to agency problem
and perceived as negative. On the other hand, proponents of resource dependence theory perceive
directors’ network to be a valuable resource that would benefit firms through access to information,
politicians, and regulators. Most studies do not distinguish between these two views of network
except for Renneboog and Zhao (2011, 2014) who examined if CEO’s network are built for gathering
information or for managerial dominance.
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experience in carrying out their roles and thus became an important asset to their
firms.
In short, NED’s reputational capital is an important consideration in the
NEDs’ appointment and retention decisions by the firm’s board and shareholders.
Thus, the second hypothesis, based on individual NED’s reputational capital, is
stated as follows:
H2a: There is a significant negative association between an individual
NED’s reputational capital, as captured by the NED’s educational qual-
ifications, social network, and board level experience, and the NED’s
turnover probability.
Besides the general calls for NEDs who are individually equipped with the
necessary qualification, the Combined Code (FRC, 2008), the Code (FRC, 2010a),
and the Walker Review (Walker, 2009) have all emphasised on considering the
board ‘overall balance’ of skills and qualification throughout the different stages
of NEDs’ career (i.e. appointment, and re-election). Consequently, while the
individual NEDs’ various competencies may be deemed attractive to the general
employment market in their own right, it may be less so if such competencies are
already sufficiently reflected in the board or do not add value to the competencies
of the firms’ board. Hence, the following hypothesis addresses the impact of the
relative importance of NED’s various reputational capital to the board and the
NED’s turnover:
H2b: There is a significant negative association between an individual
NED’s various reputational capital relative to the board’s capital, and
the NED’s turnover probability.
5.4.5 NEDs’ Turnover and Board Busyness
The relationship between NEDs’ multiple directorships and the board’s effec-
tiveness is a contentious issue. On one hand, several studies indicate a negative
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relationship between the probability of directors’ turnover and the number of ex-
ternal board seats held by the NEDs (Bugeja et al., 2009; Coles and Hoi, 2003).
It is proposed that NEDs with multiple directorships draw on their network in
a way that benefit the firm (Johansen and Pettersson, 2013), and will not shirk
their responsibilities or harm their firms’ performance (Ferris et al., 2003). The
results is consistent with the notion of ‘selection effects’ that talented NEDs are
more busy (Falato et al., 2014).
On the contrary, another line of studies argues that directors with multiple
directorships might be overburdened with board responsibilities that could jeopar-
dise their independence and ability to effectively monitor the management which
may consequently decrease shareholder value (Falato et al., 2014). For instance,
Devos, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2009) found shareholders reacting negatively
to appointments of interlocked directors as this can weaken governance. Conse-
quently, those NEDs who are sitting on multiple boards may face higher turnover.
In summary, although a high number of board seats could cause a director
to have less time to devote to the firm, the absence of other board appointments
could suggest director’s lack of experience. Consequently, although anticipating
the direction of the association between NEDs’ multiple directorships and turnover
is as difficult as fully disentangling the potential benefit of having those ‘talented’
NEDs on board from its cost ( Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010), we suggest
the next hypothesis as follows;
H3a: There is a significant positive association between an individual
NED’s busyness and the NED’s turnover probability.
One possible explanation for the inconclusive results of studies on directors’
busyness is that the negative consequences of NEDs’ busyness are not necessarily
triggered by the presence of one busy NED on the board but rather when most
of the directors on that board are busy (i.e. board busyness). Several studies
documented how board busyness can be detrimental to shareholders’ value and
firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Kaczmarek et al., 2014). Hence, it
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is further hypothesised that busy NEDs are more likely to lose their board seats
if their board is deemed busy.
H3b: There is a significant positive association between the individual
NED’s busyness relative to the board busyness, and the NED’s turnover
probability.
5.4.6 NEDs’ Turnover in BOFIs and the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis has to a certain extent been attributed to the failure of
check and balance mechanisms by the boards along with the incompetence and/or
naivety of NEDs in allowing excessive risk-taking by management (Cornett et
al., 2009). Hence, regulators have responded by bolstering the corporate gover-
nance codes related to the processes and functions of board members including
those specifically addressed to the NEDs. Indeed, post-crisis, the UK market wit-
nessed the launch of several reforms that address corporate governance issues for
all public listed firms (e.g. the Combined Code (FRC, 2010a) and the Steward-
ship Code (FRC, 2010b)) and specifically for BOFIs (e.g. the Walker Review
(Walker, 2009) and the Senior Management Regime (Parliamentary Commission
on Banking Standards, 2013)).
A considerable number of studies have examined corporate governance issues
pre- and post- the financial crisis to observe how the markets have changed and
anticipate how successful the regulators’ endeavours might be in preventing fu-
ture crises (Aebi et al., 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2013). However,
such studies of the BOFIs sector are mostly centred around the remuneration and
independence issues (Cornett et al., 2009; Minton et al., 2011) and their effect
on firm performance. Little is known on the implications of the financial crisis
on NEDs’ turnover in the UK’s BOFIs and examining this effect will contribute
to the literature in this area. One of the main governance issues that post-crisis
codes emphasised was the importance of NEDs’ qualifications and skills (Walker,
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2009; Dodd-Frank-Act, 2010).81 NEDs’ qualities, experience and abilities – includ-
ing having an independent mind and getting the right mix of financial industry
capability and critical perspectives from high-level experience in other major busi-
nesses – were among the Walker Review’s (2009) thirty-nine recommendations for
the BOFIs.82 Hence, this study hypothesises the following:
H4a: The association between the NED’s competences relative to the
board, and the NED’s turnover probability is more significant negative
in the post- financial crisis period.
Furthermore, there was increasing regulatory calls to tackle the issue of board
busyness. Specifically, the Walker Review recommends that “the overall time
commitment of NEDs as a group on a FTSE 100-listed bank or life assurance
company board should be greater than has been normal in the past”. Therefore,
this study hypothesises the following for board busyness:
H4b: The association between the NED’s busyness relative to the board
busyness, and the NED’s turnover probability is significantly positive in
the post- financial crisis period
Finally, following the crisis, more attention is given by concerned shareholders
and the media on who gets appointed on the boards of BOFIs. Also, the FRC
launched its first Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010b) for institutional investors, which
aims to promote better stewardship of investee firms and to “enhance value and
accountability to the ultimate beneficiaries”.83 Given the launch of these reforms
in corporate governance and regulations, popular press pressure, and the increased
monitoring by shareholders following the crisis, which ultimately increase NEDs’
81In the US, the Dodd-Frank-Act (2010) requires directors to have “... a bachelor’s degree or higher
from an accredited college or university in risk management, business administration, finance, eco-
nomics,...to demonstrate minimum competence in risk management [p.415]”.
82Furthermore, Walker Review encourages regulators (i.e. FSA) to “. . . give closer attention to the
overall balance of the board in relation to the risk strategy of the business, taking into account the
experience, behavioural and other qualities of individual directors and their access to fully adequate
induction and development programmes” (Walker, 2009)
83For instance, the first principle of the Stewardship Code encourages institutional investors to exercise
proxy voting.
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accountability, it is imperative to examine if that has reflected on NEDs’ turnover
sensitivity to firm performance. So, this study hypothesises the following:
H4c: The association between the accounting and market performance
of firm and the NED’s probability of turnover is significantly negative
for the post- financial crisis period.
5.5. Research Design
5.5.1 Sample and Data Collection
The sample includes all NEDs sitting on the boards of all the public firms
listed on the London stock exchange over the period 1999–2014. Spanning over
a period of 15 years, the data allows studying not only what influence NEDs’
turnover in general but also the extent to which the market has changed after the
global finical crisis. Hence, the models are tested separately for NEDs who are
sitting on the BOFIs and non-financial firms’ boards, and over the pre-and post-
the global financial crisis periods (2008).
The construction of the dataset starts by identifying all the public listed firms
on LSE over the sample period and grouping them into BOFIs and non-financial
firms based on the UK standard industrial classification of economic activities
(2008). The BOFIs in the sample fall under section K of SIC (Financial and
insurance activities) which comprise banks, insurance, investment, life assurance
and other financial firms. Then, using the BoardEx database and firms’ annual
reports, the director years for those firms, along with the directors’ reputational
capital data and other director-characteristics were collected.
Firstly, firms that have less than two successive years of directors’ data were
dropped because the dependent variable, NED’s turnover, requires at least two
years of directors’ data in a row. Secondly, using firms’ ticker codes, director years
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were matched with the financial data of their firms downloaded from the DataS-
tream database.84 The matched data includes accounting and stock performance
information as well as other financial related control variables (i.e. leverage ratio,
total assets, market value, and interest on debt).
Overall, 36,447 NED years observations were dropped either due to missing
firms’ tickers, missing financial data, and/or missing directors’ data, ending with
a total of 17,744 firm years and 66,368 NED years. Of those observations, 3,272
and 14,762 of firm years and NED years, respectively belongs to BOFIs. Table 5.2
presents a summary of the operationalisation of the variables used in this study.
5.5.2 Model Specification and Variable Construction
The developed hypotheses were tested using a model that comprised a vector
of variables related to NEDs’ reputational capital, busyness, and their firm per-
formance as the main independent variables of interest while controlling for other
variables. The model, estimated using logit, is as follows:
NEDs′ Turnover i,t = α0 + β1 NEDs
′ affiliated F irm average performance
measures i,t,t−1 + β2 NEDs
′ Reputational Capital i,t + β3 NEDs
′ Busyness i,t
+ Control V ariables i,t + εi,t
(5.1)
The study is interested in β1, β2, and β3 which allows for the testing of the first,
second, and third hypotheses, respectively. NED’s reputational capital comprised
of educational background, social networks, and board level experience. NED’s
busyness is based on the number of board seats the NED has in a given year.
The NED’s affiliated firm’s financial performance is gauged by either accounting
or market measures. The model includes other personal control variables such as
NED’s tenure, age, gender, independence, and memberships in audit, remuneration
84The sample period is from 1999-2014. However, stock market and accounting data, downloaded from
Datastream, were from 1996-2014 due to the inclusion of lagged variables. Firms’ annual reports were
used to complete the dataset when data is unavailable from the database.
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and nominations committees, as well as firm-specific control variables such as firm
size, sectors, sub-sectors of the BOFIs and time.
5.5.2.1 Dependent Variable: NEDs’ Turnover
To determine NEDs turnover, the names of NEDs in the sample are compared
each year over the entire 1999-2014 period. Then, consistent with prior literature
(Davidoff et al., 2014; Fischer et al., 2009; Sharad and Steven, 2010; Yermack,
2004), turnover is measured as a binary variable that equals to one for a given
year’s observation if the NED is on the firm’s board in that year, but does not
appear on the board in the following year. NEDs who lost their seats because
their firms are delisted either due to acquisitions or bankruptcies, are not counted
as a ‘turnover’, since settling-up by shareholders for such directors cannot be
observed (Davidoff et al., 2014). In such cases, the turnover variable is treated
as a missing data for the year of delisting. Also, the turnover variable equals to
zero for NEDs whose status changes from outsiders to insiders during the sample
period (Yermack, 2004).
5.5.2.2 Independent Variable: NEDs’ Reputational Capital
Three aspects were focused upon in capturing NEDs’ reputational capital
viz. educational qualifications, social networking, and board level experience as
they reflect important reputational capital that firm’s board and shareholders may
consider when appointing or retaining NEDs. With regards to educational qualifi-
cations, several studies treat it as a continuous variable where the NED’s highest
level of education is coded as PhD, masters, bachelors or other (Zhu et al., 2014)
while other studies measure educational background based not only on the depth
but also the breadth. For instance, Anderson et al. (2011) examines the types of
degrees that a director has. This study considers NEDs’ educational qualifications
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based on the number of professional and academic (e.g. undergraduate level and
above) qualifications they possess.85
Social networks are established through educational ties (Cohen et al., 2010),
club memberships, and working activities (Kuhnen, 2009). Given the arduous
task in identifying social networks and connections that a NED possesses, re-
searchers have used different proxies to capture this aspect. For instance, drawing
on directors’ employment history, Renneboog and Zhao (2011) used direct and
indirect centrality measures to capture directors’ networks. Another measure uses
proximity of the NED to the firm’s headquarters based on the assumption that
directors who live closer to the firm have a greater ability to monitor and exchange
information, as well as to develop long-lasting relationships compared to distant
directors (Wilson et al., 2013). In this study, directors’ networks were collected
from BoardEx database based on the time directors have spent together in the
same firm.
Board level experience has been captured in different ways in prior studies.
Several studies considered director’s age as a proxy for experience (see e.g. Doucou-
liagos et al., 2007; Eminet and Guedri, 2010; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Wilson
et al., 2013) but age is used in this study as a control variable rather than proxy for
experience.86 Instead, similar to Anderson et al., (2011) and Coles and Hoi (2003),
governance experience is measured as the number of external quoted board seats
held by a NED in year (t). In addition, another dummy variable was included to
capture board’s leadership experience, specifically if NED has previously worked
as chairman on other listed firms.
85Given the large dataset and reliance on BoardEx for information, we are not able to identify more
specific industry qualifications such as banking, risk management, economics, etc. This is only possible
if data is collected manually.
86Although age may capture a NED’s general experience, it may not be a good proxy for the different
types and levels of experience, which are valued differently in the directors’ employment market.
However, several meta-analyses indicate little or no association between age and directors’ performance
(see Ng and Feldman, 2008; Rhodes, 2004). Indeed, Several researchers (see e.g. Coles and Hoi,
2003; Davidoff et al., 2013; Yermack, 2004) use age as a control variable or to differentiate between
disciplinary turnover and retirement (Fischer et al., 2009).
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5.5.2.3 Independent Variable: Busy NEDs and Board busyness
As mentioned earlier, operationalising NEDs’ busyness, as a potentially neg-
ative incidence, is a challenging task due to the difficulty of finding a proxy that
captures directors’ busyness without reflecting those directors’ attractiveness and
talents as well. Although the number of board seats a director holds has been
used as proxy for busy directors, there is no clear directorship threshold that has
been established in the literature. For instance, previous studies use the total
number of external board seats (Sharad and Steven, 2010), a dummy equals to
one if the NED hold three board seats or more (Ferris et al., 2003; Harford and
Schonlau, 2013), and a dummy equals to one if the NED hold four board seats or
more (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Since all these measures are highly correlated,
only the first measure is reported. As robustness check, a separate model is used
for the other two measures of directors’ busyness as well (i.e. dummy variables for
busy NEDs using three and four seats threshold).87 To examine if the association
between directors’ board seats and turnover might be moderated by their board’s
busyness; the interactive term (i.e. Individual’s Busyness × Board’s Busyness)
was regressed on the dependent variable, director’s turnover.
With regard to board’s busyness, the literature uses two different proxies. The
first one classifies a board as busy if the average number of external board seats
held by all the NEDs sitting on that firms’ board is equal to or more than three
directorships (Ferris et al., 2003). The second measurement classifies a board as
busy if the majority of the NEDs on that board are busy (i.e. holding three or
more directorship). This study uses the latter measurement to control for board
busyness as it is suggested to be more accurate (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).88
87One possible explanation for the divergent results in prior studies is the possibility of non-linear
relationship (Baran and Forst, 2015). However, the empirical analysis shows no existence of such
curvilinear relationship between number of directorships and turnover.
88The wide dispersion in the number of NEDs’ directorships renders the average measurement of direc-
torships noisy. Therefore, similar to Fich and Shivdasani (2006), boards were classified as busy if the
majority of their NEDs hold three or more board seats.
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5.5.2.4 Independent Variable: Measures of Financial Performance
Market-based measures are usually used in related studies as they reflect
firms’ performance from the shareholders’ perspective and are deemed more future-
oriented (Kennedy and Limmack, 1996). The most common market-based measure
used is the firm’s annual stock return adjusted for either market (Yermack, 2004),
industry (Fischer et al., 2009; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997) or size (Dahya et al.,
2002; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997). However, the use of market-based measures
has been criticised for possible contamination by noise in equity markets (e.g. Fis-
cher et al., 2009). Hence, others use accounting-based measure as it is relatively an
accurate reflection of firms’ performance. Among the accounting measures used
include return on assets (Doucouliagos, Haman, and Askary, 2007; Renneboog
and Zhao, 2011) and its variations such as industry-adjusted ROA (Fischer et al.,
2009; Harford and Schonlau, 2013) and average ROA (Dahya et al., 2002; Eminet
and Guedri, 2010), operating margin (Mikkelson and Partch, 1997; Ferris, et al.,
2003), sales growth (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012), return on equity (Colpan and
Yoshikawa, 2012; Doucouliagos et al., 2007) and earnings per share (Doucoulia-
gos et al., 2007). In this study, return on equity (ROE) and market adjusted
annual stock return were used as proxies for accounting and market measures,
respectively.89
To account for the possibility of time lag between firm performance and its
consequences on NEDs’ career prospects (i.e. turnover), it is imperative to use lags
in examining this association. Indeed, a considerable number of studies included
this variable up to lagged four years in their models. Since the UK Combined
Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2003, 2008) suggests that NEDs should
be subject for re-election either annually (for FTSE350) or every three years (for
other firms), the average performance of two years (t, and t-1) is used for the
purpose of this study.
89Regarding accounting measures, this study also uses ROA and EPS and the results still hold.
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5.5.2.5 Control Variables
The control variables include NEDs’ other personal characteristics, namely,
age, gender, tenure and independence (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Yermack,
2004).90 In addition, the model also controls for NED’s membership of the board
three committees: audit, remuneration and nomination. Control for firms’ char-
acteristics includes firm size (Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Mikkelson and Partch,
1997; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011), BOFIs’ sub-sectors, and non-financial firms’
sectors. Year-dummies were included to capture the unobserved factors related to
that year.
5.6. Data Analysis and Findings
5.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.3 presents descriptive statistics for the characteristics of NEDs’ serving
on the UK’s BOFIs’ between 1999-2014 and comparing them to other NEDs in
non-financial firms in the sample. Consistent with the increasing criticism to the
busyness of NEDs, the mean number of board seats held by a NED in BOFIs is two
seats and in extreme situations five seats. The data further shows that NEDs in
BOFIs hold relatively more external board seats (mean of 2.03) compared to NEDs
in non-financial firms (mean of 1.8). This is consistent with bank control theory
which suggests that directors on BOFIs are sought on the directors’ employment
market for easy capital access, and thus they are busier.
90Prior work suggests that the appointment of female directors to the board is not random. In addition,
there is regulatory pressure to appoint more female directors. Hence, their possibility of turnover could
vary from their male counterparts.
Director’s board tenure is also used differently in the literature. On the one hand, director’s tenure is
used as a control variable to count for turnover caused by firms’ policies on tenure in position (Sharad
and Steven, 2010). On the other hand, it is used as proxy for board’s and firm’s level experience
(Anderson et al., 2011; Yermack, 2004) and/or managerial entrenchment. In the first, tenure is
expected to be positively associated with turnover, while it is expected to be negatively related to
turnover in the later.
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In addition, as can be seen in Table 5.3, BOFIs’ NEDs appear to be more
experienced (3.67), socially connected (559), and independent (0.77), compared to
their counterparts in non-financial firms. On the other hand, on average, they seem
to have less chairmanship experiences (0.26) compared to NEDs in non-financial
firms (0.29). One explanation is that BOFIs’ NEDs are usually busier and hence
less inclined to take on chairmanship positions.
Apart from the remuneration committees (48%), more than 60% of BOFIs’
NEDs have held memberships in either audit and/or nomination committees,
which is relatively higher than an average NED in non-financial firms. This can
be attributed to their relatively better financial knowledge and connections that
make them better candidates for those two board committees.
A typical NED in non-financial firms spent around five years on their firms’
boards, compared to almost 6 years for BOFI’s NEDs. Again, this may show
firms’ overall compliance with UK corporate governance codes requiring a NED
not to stay longer than six years on the boardroom. Finally, the median age of
NEDs in BOFIs is sixty as they normally take on non-executive positions in the
later stages of their career.
Table 5.4 presents the correlation matrix for all variables. It shows a sig-
nificant and negative relationship between turnover, the dependent variable, and
performance of BOFI(s) affiliated to the NEDs based on both accounting and mar-
keting measures. There is also a significant negative association between turnover
and all of NEDs’ reputational capital variables both individually and relative to
the board. One exception is NED’s chairmanship experience relative to the board
which is negatively associated with turnover but not significant. Contrary to ex-
pectations, measurement of NEDs’ busyness are negatively correlated to NEDs’
turnover. Furthermore, the table shows a significant positive relationship between
the dependent variable and both NED’s age and his/her tenure in current firm.
However, turnover is negatively correlated with different committees membership,
gender, independence and firm size. There is no multicollinearity problem between
the independent variables. Overall, the correlation matrix suggests that NEDs’
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turnover is significantly associated with their reputational capital, busyness and
the performance of their affiliated BOFIs.
5.6.2 Do BOFIs’ Performance, Reputational Capital, Busyness Affect NEDs’ Turnover?
This section will cover the first three research questions (RQ6a, RQ6b and
RQ6c) in this chapter. Specifically, it will answer these questions:
- Is there a significant relationship between performance of
firms affiliated to the NED and probability of NED’s turnover?
- Is there a significant relationship between a NED’s reputa-
tional capital relative to the board and probability of NED’s
turnover?
- Is there a significant relationship between a NED’s commit-
ment status (busyness) relative to the board and probability
of NED’s turnover?
Table 5.5 presents the results for three sets of models. The regression in models
1 and 2 test for the hypotheses 1, 2a and 3a, with the independent variables being
the individual NEDs’ reputational capital, busyness, and their affiliated BOFI’s
financial performance and the dependent variable being NEDs’ turnover. Models
3 and 4, on the other hand, consider the board balance of skills and qualifications
i.e. NEDs’ reputational capital variables relative to their boards’ total competitive
capital instead of the absolute measurement of NEDs’ reputational capital to test
hypothesis 2b. In addition, these two models also include an interactive variable
to examine the effect of board’s busyness on the association between busy NEDs
and their turnover probability to test hypothesis 3b.
For comparison purposes, models 5 and 6 are replica of models 3 and 4 but
based on NEDs sitting on the boards of the UK’s plc non-financial sector. Each
set of the models includes two sub-models where firms’ average ROE (accounting)
and firms’ average stock return (market) are used alternatively as measures of
performance.
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- NEDs in UK Listed BOFIs.
As regards firm performance, logit models 1 to 4 show a significant negative
association, at 1% significance level, between NEDs’ turnover and their affiliated
firms’ average ROE and market adjusted stock return, thus supporting hypothesis
1. Consistent with prior literature (Davidoff et al., 2014; Yermack, 2004), this
findings indicate that NEDs are more likely to retain their seats (less probability
of turnover) when their affiliated firms’ show good performance.
Compared to the other model’s variables, an estimation of marginal effect of
models 2 and 4 variables indicates that ROE and average stock return of BOFIs
are the best explanatory variables for NEDs turnover.91 The discrepancies of the
marginal effect between market and accounting measures of performance could
reflect the heterogeneity of shareholders (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012) who use
different proxies for evaluating firm performance.
With respect to NEDs’ reputational capital and busyness, results in models
1 and 2 show an insignificant relationship between individual NEDs’ reputational
capital based on NEDs’ educational qualification, social networks, chairmanship
experience, and NEDs turnover. However, NEDs’ number of board seats is sig-
nificantly and negatively associated with NEDs’ turnover. Therefore, hypothesis
2a is only partly supported and hypothesis 3a is fully supported. As a robust-
ness check, NEDs’ number of board seats was replaced by a dummy variable that
capture NEDs’ busyness more strictly (i.e. using three and four board seats as
threshold for busyness). It is found that ’busy’ NEDs are still significantly more
likely to keep their board seat, hence further supporting hypothesis 3a. The re-
sults is consistent with the notion of ‘selection effects’ that talented NEDs are more
busy (Falato et al., 2014), hence more likely to keep their seat and also consistent
with the line of studies suggesting that NEDs with multiple directorships are seen
as valuable additions to the board, possibly due to their reputation, competencies
and connections to other firms.
91In models 1 and 2, the average marginal effect of BOFI’s average stock return on the probability of
NEDs’ turnover is 3%, while it is 3.6% for the BOFIs’ average ROE. Noteworthy, all models in this
thesis consistently reports only raw coefficient. That is to facilitate comparison with other similar
studies conducted in different countries.
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Models 3 and 4 explore how boards overall competitive capital and busyness
may affect the association between NEDs’ individualities and turnover. The re-
sults indicate that all NEDs’ relative reputational capital to be significantly (at 1%
level) and negatively related to NEDs’ turnover, thus support hypothesis 2b. Both
these results provide important insights into the role that board’s overall balance
of skills and qualifications plays in determining turnover probability of individual
directors. Regarding board’s busyness, models 3 and 4 further explore the effect of
the individual NED’s busyness relative to their board busyness on turnover prob-
ability, using an interactive variable (i.e. Individual’s Busyness Board’s Busy).
Although, NEDs’ number of board seats is still negatively associated with turnover,
results of the interactive term indicate that board’s busyness turns this associa-
tion into positive direction. In other words, in busy boards, an increase in the
NEDs’ number of board seats may increase their turnover probability. However,
the coefficient of the interactive term is insignificant, hence hypothesis 2b is not
supported.
As for NED-specific and firm-specific control variables included in models 1
to 4, results indicate NEDs’ tenure on the board and age squared to be positively
associated with the likelihood of turnover, at 1% significance level. This is not
surprising as they may reflect the regulatory limitation on NEDs’ years of services
and directors’ reaching retirement, respectively. Female NEDs seem to have a
higher probability of turnover compared to their male counterparts, but the asso-
ciation is insignificant. Results indicate independence of NEDs to be negatively
and significantly associated with turnover at only the 10% level for the BOFIs’
models (3 & 4).
- NEDs on Boards of UK Non-Financial Listed Companies. To further explore
the extent to which the results are sensitive to the BOFIs, a sample of NEDs in
the UK non-financial firms was selected and regressed using the same variables as
in models 3 and 4.
Although the associations between reputational capital variables and turnover
in models 5 and 6 to a large extent mirror those for BOFIs in models 3 and 4, the
significance level of the NEDs’ number of board seats are different. Specifically,
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model 5 shows negative association between NEDs’ number of board seats and
turnover but it is only significant at 10%, while in model 6 the seats-turnover
association is not significant. When NEDs’ number of board seats was substituted
with more restrict dummies for NEDs’ busyness (i.e. using three and four board
seats as threshold for busyness), the negative association between seats-turnover
still holds, yet became insignificant in both models 5 and 6.
Overall, these results indicate that number of board seats a given director has
is seen as sign for talent in both financial and non-financial sectors. However, it
seems that boards of BOFIs are more tolerant to directors’ and boards’ busyness
compared to their counterparts in non-financial sector. This could be due to the
nature of BOFIs’ boards, where it is common for such firms’ boards to be busy
(Kaczmarek et al., 2014). Hence, shareholders do not ‘punish’ firms with busy
boards or attempt to rectify that by voting against busy NEDs sitting on these
firms.
With respect to firm performance-turnover, similar to the BOFIs’ models, the
average marginal effect of non-financial firms’ performance on the probability of
their NEDs’ turnover is weaker than it is for BOFIs.92 This could be attributed to
BOFIs’ directors being under greater institutional surveillance, compared to their
counterparts in non-financial firms. Hence, turnover of directors is significantly
tied to the perception on their affiliated firms’ performance.
5.6.3 Did the Determinants of Turnover Change After the Financial Crisis?
This section will cover the fourth research question mentioned in this chapter
(RQ6d). Specifically, it will answer this question:
92An estimation of marginal effect of variables in model 3 (4) shows that 1 SD decrease in the ROE of
BOFIs’ (average stock return) is associated with an increase in the probability of NEDs’ turnover by
4% points (3.2%), compared to 1.4% (2.7%) for non-financial firms in model 5 (6).
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- Is there a significant change in the relationship between
NEDs’ affiliated firms’ performance, relative reputational cap-
ital, relative busyness, and the probability of NED’s turnover
in the post-crisis period?
Table 5.6 considers the impact of the financial crisis by splitting the sample
into pre- and post-crisis periods: 2000–2007 and 2009-2014, respectively (excluding
2008 as the year of the crisis). Models 1 and 2 present the results for the association
between NEDs’ relative reputational capital variables, busyness of directors and
boards, and firms’ accounting performance (i.e. ROE), and NEDs’ turnover for
the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. Models 3 and 4 replicate the previous
two models using firms’ market performance (i.e. average stock return) instead of
the accounting measure.
As can be seen in models 1 and 2 of Table 5.6, there is variation in the
significance of the reputational capital variables pre- and post- the financial crisis
period. Specifically, in the post-crisis period, only NEDs’ relative educational
qualifications seem to play a more significant role in increasing NEDs’ chance to
keep their board seats, thus hypothesis 4a is partially supported. The significance
of NEDs’ educational qualifications is understandable in the light of the increasing
demand for such qualifications post-crisis.
On the other hand, results suggest that the negative effect that NED’s number
of board seats and network has on their turnover probability weakened in the
post-crisis period. Firstly, NEDs’ number of board seats (busyness) – which is
significant (at 1% level) in the pre-crisis period – is still negatively associated with
NEDs’ probability of turnover in the post-crisis models but no longer significant.
The existence of busy boards renders the association between NEDs’ external
board seats and turnover positive but insignificant. Hence, the results do not
support hypothesis 4b.
However, overall, the decrease in the significance of NEDs’ number of exter-
nal board seats post-crisis may indicate that busy directors, as individuals, are
increasingly losing their attractiveness in the employment market, regardless of
their board busyness. Secondly, although NEDs’ social network is still negatively
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Table 5.6
Logit Models for NEDs’ Turnover for UK Public Listed BOFIs Pre- Financial Crisis (2000-
2007) and Post- Financial Crisis (2009-2014)
Accounting-Performance Market-Performance
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Director’s Reputational capital & Busyness:
NED’s No. of Board Seats
(Individual’s Busyness)
-0.197*** -0.058 -0.200*** -0.056
(0.061) (0.037) (0.059) (0.037)
Individual’s Busyness × Board’s
Busy
0.079 0.002 0.076 0.001
(0.061) (0.035) (0.057) (0.035)
NED’s Educational Qual., relative
to the board
-0.986* -0.958** -0.857* -0.815**
(0.512) (0.427) (0.511) (0.402)
NED’s Network, relative to the
board
-1.513*** -0.529* -1.463*** -0.595*
(0.470) (0.316) (0.476) (0.305)
NED’s Chairmanship Exp., relative
to the board
-0.389* -0.263 -0.435* -0.319*












-0.133 -0.216** -0.184 -0.184*
(0.129) (0.099) (0.123) (0.098)
Current Remuneration Committee
Membership
-0.083 0.038 -0.056 0.112
(0.133) (0.105) (0.132) (0.102)
Current Nomination Committee
Membership
-0.391*** -0.095 -0.415*** -0.128
(0.128) (0.114) (0.126) (0.111)
Tenure in the firm’s board
4.148*** 3.794*** 4.307*** 3.646***
(0.700) (0.472) (0.718) (0.460)
Age
-0.309*** -0.220*** -0.316*** -0.188**
(0.093) (0.075) (0.097) (0.077)
Age2
0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female NED
0.206 -0.065 0.145 0.011
(0.188) (0.164) (0.192) (0.157)
Independence
-0.211 -0.145 -0.214 -0.125
(0.189) (0.161) (0.189) (0.155)
Firm Size (log TA)
0.036 0.090*** 0.063 0.085***
(0.042) (0.033) (0.041) (0.029)
Control for Years Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Financial Sub Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3340 6154 3324 6214
Pseudo R2 0.0907 0.0691 0.094 0.0743
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance for correlations coefficients are
***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
Shown here are logit regressions in which the dependent variable in year t is a binary variable
that equals to one if the NED is on the firm’s board in year t, but does not appear on the board
in year t + 1. In untabulated results, NEDs’ number of board seats was replaced with dummy
variables for NEDs’ busyness that equals one if hold three and four board seats. It is found that
‘busy’ NEDs are still significantly more likely to keep their board seat. The standard errors are
clustered by BOFIs’ ID. Logit command was used to run the regression on STATA.
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associated with NEDs’ probability of turnover in the post-crisis period, the level
of significance of this association has dropped from 1% to 10%. One possible ex-
planation could be that highly connected directors in BOFIs may be perceived as
negative (i.e. cosy clubs) which may contribute to the agency problems faced in
the pre-crisis period.
Models 1 and 3 show that firms’ performance, over the pre-crisis period, has
insignificant negative association with NEDs’ turnover. However, models 2 and
4 show post-crisis firms’ performance to be significantly related to turnover, thus
supporting hypothesis 4c. This could be due to changes in the UK corporate
governance following the crisis which witnessed greater media coverage, more re-
stricted disciplinary regulations by the policy makers, and increased monitoring
by concerned shareholders. For instance, there was documented steady increase in
the voting turnout and ‘beyond expectation’ positive response by the investment
community to the UK new Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010b), with some companies
reporting increase in investors’ engagement (FRC, 2011). Furthermore, contrary
to the pre-crisis period, the association between NEDs turnover and accountabil-
ity for their firm performance becomes more significant post-crisis (Beltratti and
Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012).93
Interestingly, among the three board committees, membership of the audit
committee has the only significant coefficient. The increasing calls for having a
committee for risk management may have created a need for the NED’s audit
experience post-crisis. Results also show some changes, yet insignificant, on the
probability of female NEDs’ turnover. Female NEDs are more likely to keep their
board seats in the post-crisis period which is consistent with the increasing pres-
sure for more representation of female directors in the boardroom.94 Finally, the
remaining variables do not appear to be greatly affected by the crisis.
93For instance, among the amendments in the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010a) was
clarification that directors’ responsibility for risk extends beyond the simple oversight of control system.
Similarly, the introduction of the Senior Management Regime (SMR) promotes individual, rather than
collective, accountability for the board’s decisions.
94Davies Report (2011) in the UK called for increased representation of women on FTSE 100 boards to
at least 25% by 2015 (Mulcahy and Linehan, 2014).
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5.7. Chapter Summary
BOFIs lie at the heart of today’s economy. NEDs of these BOFIs control
strategic resources, and as such, are under greater scrutiny of investors, regulators,
the press and the public in general. However, the financial sector continued to
experience various problems (e.g. corporate failures) and even a cataclysmic event
recently (i.e. the global financial crisis), which can be traced back to NEDs’
incompetency and failure in exercising their ‘gatekeeping’ role diligently. Hence,
changes in firms’ board of directors are expected to take place in the wake of firms’
poor performance. Little is known, however, about NEDs’ turnover especially in
the UK BOFIs. This study explores how NED’s different reputational capital
(i.e. education, network, and experience), relative to his/her board’s collective
skills are associated with the NEDs’ turnover probability, while controlling for
other personal and firm characteristics. Furthermore, the busyness of NEDs is
examined to see if it may affect their turnover probability, especially when those
directors are sitting on ‘busy’ boards. This study also analyses the sensitivity of
NEDs’ turnover to their firms’ performance using a large sample of the UK-listed
BOFIs over a period of 15-year.
Some evidence is found indicating that the association between NEDs’ repu-
tational capital and their probability of turnover is based on the board balance of
skills. Secondly, NEDs’ external number of board seats is found to be negatively
associated with his/her turnover probability only when the board is not deemed
busy. Thirdly, results indicate that the accounting and market performance of
BOFIs where the NEDs serve are significantly – statistically and economically –
associated with the NEDs’ turnover probability.
Finally, following the global financial crisis, the UK BOFIs market witnesses
the launch of several governance reforms (e.g. the Walker Review, the Code, and
the Stewardship Code). Results indicate that post-crisis, NEDs seem to be held
accountable for their firm performance in the UK. Also, it is found that while
NEDs’ different reputational capital (i.e. education, and network) matters for
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their turnover probability in general, only the NEDs’ education is significant post-
crisis. Finally, busy NEDs are less likely to retain their internal slot on the board




The overall aim of this study is to investigate two main prerequisites for dili-
gent executions of boards’ roles, i.e. board’s ability and directors’ incentive. An
effective board needs to possess sufficient ability to make the right decisions as
much as it needs its members to be motivated to do so. Using a large dataset span-
ning over fifteen years (2000-14), this thesis first explores the UK’s boards’ ability,
in terms of board diversity, board competitive capital, and board busyness. It also
investigates the extent to which the employment market for directors, internally
and externally, motivates them to execute their roles diligently. The discussion in
this chapter highlights how the thesis has addressed the research questions about
board’s ability and directors’ incentive. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the research
questions were grouped into two main aims as discussed below.
The first aim is to provide a timely review of the UK plcs’ boards with regard
to their diversity attributes (i.e. statutory, competitive, and demographic), com-
petitive capital (i.e. educational qualifications, social networking, and governance
experiences), and busyness, over the last fifteen years (Q1a, Q2a, Q3a). This
further includes exploring how these board’s characteristics vary across FTSE in-
dex series (Q1b, Q2b, Q3b), how they were affected by the changes in governance
regulations that followed the financial crisis (Q1c, Q2c, Q3c), and the extent to
which they relate to firm’s performance (Q4 ).
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The second aim is to demonstrate the extent to which NEDs in the UK plcs
are exposed to a market-based sanction system in which perceived performance
will be rewarded or penalised externally (via the means of directorships) (Q5a,
Q5b) and internally (via the means of turnover probability) (Q6a, Q6b, Q6c).
This includes investigating how the changes in the UK regulatory environment
that took place in the wake of the financial crisis may have affected the efficiency
of the UK directors’ employment market in incentivising NEDs (Q5c, Q6d).
Overall, this chapter summarises the main findings and contributions of the
study to the field of corporate governance. It then concludes by discussing some
of the limitations of this study, and avenues for future research.
6.2. Board’s Ability: Insights on Board’s Diversity, Capital,
and Busyness
The purpose of chapter 3 is to provide a timely review of the UK boards’
characteristics of most concern to both regulators and scholars. These board char-
acteristics were grouped into three main categories; boards’ diversity attributes,
boards’ competitive capital, and boards’ busyness. Specifically, the chapter shows
firstly, how the boards of the UK public listed firms evolved during the years with
respect to those characteristics. Secondly, the chapter demonstrates the extent
to which boards’ diversity attributes, competitive capital, and busyness varied
within the UK FTSE Index Series and how they were affected by the post-crisis
new environment. Finally, the extent to which the previous boards’ characteristics
(i.e. diversity, competitive capital, and busyness), is related to the firms’ financial
performance, was examined.
With respect to board diversity, unsurprisingly, it was found that statutory
diversity (SD) is the most common diversity attribute among UK plcs’ boards, with
about 41% of the UK firms described as highly diversified. However, the other two
diversity attributes, the competitive (CD) and the demographic (DD), were found
to be significantly less common. The data suggests that only 9% and 7% of firms
in the sample can be classified to have high level of competitive and demographic
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diversity, respectively. Overall, this picture is not surprising given that BSD has
been the main focus of regulators for many years with little attention given to
other types of diversity. However, the analysis indicates that over the last fifteen
years, firms were increasingly diversifying their boards based on other attributes,
i.e. BCD and BDD. This period also witnessed a trend of decreasing board size.
A closer look at the data reveals that the FTSE UK Index Series had a sig-
nificant association with the extent of boards’ diversity. Unsurprisingly, high- and
mid-capitalised listed firms (FTSE100 & FTSE250) are normally associated with
high level of board’s diversity, while low-capitalised firms (FTSE SMALLCAP &
FTSE Fledgling) are associated with lower level of board’s diversity. One possi-
ble explanation for this association is perhaps that larger firms are more exposed
to media and usually show more legitimacy seeking behaviour which eventually
result in high level of board’s openness and diversity. For instance, the UK corpo-
rate governance codes have some provisions tailored specifically to FTSE100 firms
which may in turn, ultimately influence composition of their board.
In addition, post-crisis regulations seem to have some impact on the level of
board diversity in all UK listed firms’ (i.e. non-financial and financial). Inter-
estingly, while diversity level for all firms’ increased after the crisis, the signifi-
cance of that impact seems to differ between non-financial and financial sectors.
The increase was significant for statutory and demographic attributes but not
the competitive attribute in the case of the non-financial sector. In contrast,
the financial crisis appears to have a significant effect only on the competitive
diversity of BOFIs’ boards. Since BOFIs are known for their compliance with
governance codes, this may explain why their boards show high level of statutory
diversity. However, post-crisis, the regulators focused their attention on other di-
versity aspects which could explain the significant increase in competitive diversity
witnessed in BOFIs’ boards following the crisis.
Regarding board’s competitive capital, as one might expect, FTSE100 firms
had the most experienced, educated, and socially connected boards, with a general
trend of boards getting significantly less ‘competitive’ as firm size decreases. These
results suggest that the FTSE UK Index Series are significantly associated with
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the board’s level of competitive capital which seems to gradually decrease as firms
get smaller and the level of complexity lessened. In addition to their need for
competitive boards, large firms have also better means to attain scarce resources
such as highly talented directors.
Post-crisis governance codes seem to have an impact on boards’ competitive
capital as well. It was found that both non-financial and financial listed firms have
witnessed an increase in their board competitive capital, with the latter boards
having considerably more qualified boards than the average firms in the entire UK
market. In terms of the effect of financial crisis, the increase in board’s competitive
capital across the entire market was found to be significant for BOFIs’ boards
except for average number of educational qualifications which was statistically
insignificant.
Chapter 3 also provides useful insights regarding the incidence of board’s busy-
ness among UK plcs. Five different measures that were used in previous studies
were adopted to capture board’s busyness. It was found that the extent of board’s
busyness varies considerably according to the measurement used. Specifically,
based on number of directorships held only by NEDs, the incidence of board’s
busyness ranges from 18% to 40%. However, regardless of the measurement used,
the incidence of board’s busyness seems to be decreasing over the last fifteen years
in the UK. This may simply reflect the regulatory pressure and shareholders’ cam-
paigns to limit the occurrence of overburdened boards. At the directors’ level,
consistent with the related literature, large firms seem to have more busy NEDs.
One possible explanation in literature is the ‘selection effects’ of holding multiple
board seats ( Adams et al., 2010). This concept suggests that the most reputable
or qualified NEDs are more likely to hold more board seats, and eventually clas-
sified as busy directors. Since large firms attract the most qualified directors on
the market, they tend to have more busy boards. Furthermore, NEDs who work
in FTSE100 firms might be perceived as “good” directors in the market, hence
attract even more directorships compared to their counterparts. This explains the
reason for higher percentage of board busyness among the FTSE100 firms.
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At the board’s level, when firms were grouped into two main categories based
on their index (i.e. FTSE350, and FTSE SMALL & FLED), it was found that
small firms have significantly more busy boards than larger firms, suggesting less
tendency of the former group in complying with the Code with regards to busy
boards. In contrast, using the proxy of busyness based on NEDs only instead of
all directors indicates large firms have significantly more busy boards than small
firms. These interesting findings explain to some extent the inconclusiveness of
previous studies on board busyness. In addition, it highlights an important issue
for regulators to consider in the future. The current restrictions by the regulators
on the number of board seats a director can hold are mainly directed towards
executives and NEDs are excluded on those provisions. If directors’ busyness is to
be discouraged, then the number of board seats held by NEDs, who monitor their
EDs counterparts, should be restricted as well. Indeed, the Walker Review (2009)
points to the importance of increasing the BOFIs’ board overall time commitment
rather than focusing on only EDs, an issue that should be encouraged to be con-
sidered for all sectors. The findings to some extent suggest that the post-crisis
attempts to limit the occurrence of board busyness were successful. It was found
that post-crisis years witnessed a significant decrease in the percentage of busy
boards among UK listed firms.
Finally, based on correlation analysis, results indicate a significant positive
relationship between the various diversity indices and board’s competitive capi-
tal, and both market-based measures of financial performance. This suggests that
firms with better performance, as measured by ROE and stock return, on average
have more diversified and competitive boards. Although the analysis shows no
significant relation between most measures of board’s busyness and firm perfor-
mance, there is a negative and significant relationship between board’s workload
and market-based measure of firm performance.
6.3. External Employment Market Incentives: Directorships
Chapter 4 provides evidence that the number of board seats held by NEDs of
the UK BOFIs is mainly associated with their reputational capital i.e. educational
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qualifications, social network, and governance experience rather than the perfor-
mance of their affiliated firm(s). This suggests that NEDs in BOFIs who have
the skills, qualifications, experience and social network may have higher number
of board seats. However, when treating the financial crisis as an exogenous shock
in understanding the market for NEDs, results indicate only reputational capital
was significantly associated with number of board seats in the pre-crisis period
but both the affiliated BOFIs’ market performance and reputational capital were
significant determinants in the post-crisis period. One possible explanation is that
after the crisis, NEDs were held more accountable for their BOFIs’ poor market
performance. This may be attributed to several changes in the corporate gover-
nance codes (e.g. Stewardship Code, 2010; Corporate Governance Code, 2010)
that have increased shareholders’ activism in monitoring and holding NEDs more
accountable for performance of their affiliated firms.
The results also show other interesting changes in the UK BOFIs’ market
after the crisis. For instance, female directors were found to have a higher chance
of getting more board seats, echoing the recommendations in the Davies Report
(2011). In addition, in line with the recommendation in the Walker Review (2009)
for chairmen of major banks to devote around two-thirds of their time to the
business entity, chairman working in large BOFIs do have less chance of getting
additional board seats in the post-crisis period.
6.4. Internal Employment Market Incentives: Turnover
Chapter 5 examines the extent to which the turnover of NEDs serving on
the boards of the UK listed BOFIs is associated with their firm’s market and
accounting financial performance. It also examines whether NEDs’ turnover is
related to their reputational capital (i.e. educational qualifications, social network,
and governance experience) and their busyness, while controlling for their boards’
balance of skills and busyness, respectively.
First, the findings show a statistically significant correlation between NEDs’
turnover and their affiliated firm’s financial performance, based on both ROE
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and market adjusted stock return as proxies. This suggests the existence of ex-
post settling-up mechanism in the UK BOFIs whereby NEDs can lose their board
seats in the wake of a period of poor financial performance. Furthermore, the
results show that NEDs’ turnover is also sensitive to the performance of firms
in the UK non-financial sector but less significant compared to BOFIs as the
latter is highly regulated and monitored. Secondly, it was found that NED’s
turnover is significantly associated with some aspects of their reputational capital
relative to their firm’s board. This is consistent with the UK’s Combined Code
on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2003, 2008) which emphasises on the importance
of considering the board overall balance of skills and competitive capital during
the NEDs’ appointment and annual re-election. Thirdly, over a sample period
of fifteen years (1999-2014), it was found that ‘busy’ NEDs are more likely to
keep their board seats. However, the number of external board seats a NED has is
positively but insignificantly related to the probability of turnover when the board
is considered busy. This suggests that busy NEDs’ are less likely to keep their seat
when their board is considered busy.
Finally, this study further examines NEDs’ turnover in BOFIs in the after-
math of the global financial crisis. Compared to the pre-crisis period, NEDs’
turnover-performance association was found to be statistically significant. This
could be attributed to increased activism of the shareholders and also directors
being encouraged to be more accountable by new regulations (e.g. Stewardship
Code, and SM&CR). Contrary to expectations, apart from the directors’ educa-
tional qualification, NEDs’ reputational capital (e.g. social network) seem to play
less significant role in relation to the NEDs’ turnover in BOFIs. This could be
attributed to the change in the market perception of highly-connected NEDs and
the increased critiques of boards of directors turning into ‘cosy clubs’. In addi-
tion, results show that the number of board seats held by NEDs and other proxies
of NEDs’ busyness, which were significantly and negatively associated to NEDs’
turnover for the pre-crisis, are no longer significantly related to the probability of
turnover after the crisis period. This could be due to the growing compliance with
the Walker Review’s recommendation for increasing boards’ time commitment.
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6.5. Research Policy Implications
The findings of this thesis document an overall increase in the diversity and
the competitive capital of UK PLCs boards in the wake of financial crisis. However
the significance of that increase varies between financial and non-financial sectors
and among different FTSE Indices. One possible explanation for that variation is
the different governance codes and provisions that target specific sector or group
of firms. Overall, although the UK corporate governance environment remains
voluntary in nature, it seems that post-crisis attempts to increase the level of
board’s capabilities and diversity were to some extent successful. Nonetheless,
regulators are encouraged to issue a guideline/code devoted for highlighting the
expected level of competencies and diversity a PLC board should have. The issue
of board competencies has been often neglected and not considered a governance
issue to be regulated in detail. In addition, the findings show a significant decrease
in the level of board busyness in the wake of financial crisis. However, the results
suggest that UK policymakers need to focus on limiting the incidence of board
busyness rather than executive directors’ busyness. Walker Review (2009) was a
step on the right direction in this regard that worth expending to other sectors.
That is, the review recommends increasing the overall time commitment of the
board rather than limiting the number of directorships for individual directors.
Turning to NEDs’ incentives, if regulators are to continue relying on NEDs
through board-centred reforms, then a viable incentive system is crucially needed
to sufficiently motivate NEDs to act in regulators’ and shareholders’ interests.
NEDs’ employment market is expected to be a penal system in which NEDs’
career success in terms of gaining and losing board seat(s) is sensitive to their per-
ceived performance based on NEDs’ firm performance and reputational capital.
The results of this thesis suggest that such a viable employment market for NEDs
exist in the UK only following the financial crisis. Therefore, regulators are en-
couraged to continue enhancing the ‘settling up’ in employment market for NEDs.
Potential avenues for improving the disciplinary role of NEDs’ employment market
are increasing shareholders activism, facilitating proxy access, boosting corporate
disclosure and/or consider making amendments to the director election system.
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6.6. Research Limitations and Future Research
While attempts have been made to conduct the empirical work rigorously, this
thesis acknowledged some of the constraints. First, this study used only three main
measures to capture board’s competitive capital (i.e. educational qualifications, so-
cial network, and governance experience). However, compared to previous studies
regarding board capital, the measures used for the purpose of this study are more
‘holistic’ as it captures multiple aspects of board capital rather than relying on
a single agency theory-based measure (e.g., proportion of independent or outside
directors). Future research could consider other aspects to be included in future
models such as ‘sector knowledge’. Furthermore, owing to disclosure limitation
in the database, this study used straightforward measures of board’s competitive
capital and directors’ reputational capital. For instance, director’s education was
measured by the number of qualifications a director has, yet in the market certain
educational degrees or professional qualifications might be more attractive than
others, which may affect both the board’s competitive capital and individual di-
rector’s career path differently. Therefore, future research may broaden the depth
and the width of measuring directors’ reputational capital.
Secondly, like most of previous studies, the used proxies do not directly capture
the board dynamics and processes. Board dynamics represent the intermediate
processes between boards’ attributes and boards’ outcome. On other words, it
is about how board members make use of the available board capital to take
decisions and fulfil their roles. There has been several calls for exploring board
dynamics and directors’ interactions in the boardroom by moving beyond the
input-output approach (Pugliese, Nicholson, & Bezemer, 2015). Future researchers
are encouraged to directly explore the board processes that could enhance the
effective use of board capital that would lead to better board task performance.
Thirdly, future research may consider assessing social network differently, dis-
tinguishing between its beneficial and harmful consequences. The role of directors’
network has been discussed differently in the literature. On one hand, directors’
networks can be a proxy for ‘cosy club’, whereby network is seen as contributing
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to agency problem and perceived as negative. On the other hand, proponents of
resource dependence theory perceive directors’ networks to be a valuable resource
that would benefit firms through access to information, politicians, and regulators.
Most studies do not distinguish between these two views of networks due possibly
to the inclusive nature of these two views which made it ‘empirically’ challenging
to be separated. The directors’ networks that are being used to influence manage-
rial decision would be also used for information gathering. Hence, future research
may try to differentiate between these two types of networking when examining
market consequences for directors.
Finally, the study did not have the necessary data to assess the effects of firm
ownership structure in the turnover model as this requires hand collected informa-
tion and this is not possible given the sheer size of the dataset. Firms with concen-
trated ownership or where institutional shareholders hold a significant percentage
of firm’s shares may impose greater discipline to underperforming directors. Al-
though, compared to US, the UK market is relatively more concentrated, a better




Summary of the Principles and Provisions in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014)

























· Board should provide
entrepreneurial leadership while
assessing and managing firm’s
risk.
· The board should set the firm’s
strategic aims, aims, and values.
· The board should ensure the
appropriate allocation of financial
and human resources, its
obligations to its shareholder, and
review management performance
· Regular and sufficient meeting of board
should be carried out.
· A formal schedule of matters specifically
reserved for boards’ decision
· The annual reports should include;
– A statement of how the board operates,
types of decisions are to be taken by the
board, and issues delegated to management
– Detailed identification of board members
and its committees.
– The number of board’ and committees’
meetings and individual attendance by
directors.
· Appropriate insurance for directors to cover





















A clear division of executive and NEDs’ duties.
(No Supporting Principles)
· A separation between the roles of chairman
and chief executive. The division of
responsibilities should be clear, written, and
























· Setting the board’s agenda and
ensuring proper discussion of all
its items.· Encouraging a culture
of openness and debate, and
ensuring constructive relations
between executive and NEDs.·
Ensure that an accurate and
timely information is provided to
NEDs · Ensure effective
communication with shareholders.
· Chairman should be independent. CEO
should not be the company Chairman, unless
board got the major shareholders’ approval.
In this case, reasons for taking this decision
need to be disclosed in the annual report.
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· NEDs should carefully monitor
the management performance
regarding goals’ achievement and
reporting of performance.· NEDs are responsible for
setting appropriate executives’
remuneration and have an
essential role in appointing and
replacing executives where
necessary.· NEDs should ensure the
integrity of financial information.· NEDs should ensure that
financial controls and systems of
risk management are robust and
defensible.
· A senior independent director should be
appointed by the board. He is expected to
help the chairman, serve as an intermediary,
be available to shareholders to be contacted
when normal channels has failed to help.· The senior independent director should led
a meeting, at least annually, with other NEDs
to evaluate chairman performance. In
addition, another meeting for NEDs, led by
chairman, should be hold without the
executives’ present.· NEDs should ensure that their concerns
regarding firm’s management, if any, are
recorded in the board minutes.· NED’s resignation should be in written
form, submitted to the chairman, and





































· Ensure sufficient board size to
meet business requirements and to
avoid disruption if changes to the
board’s composition need to be
made.· Ensure appropriate combination
of executive and independent
NEDs, hence, decision taking is
not dominated by a small group.· When appointing chairman and
committees’ members, board
should ensure that membership is
refreshed, and avoid undue
reliance on particular directors.· Only committee members is
entitled to be present at a
meeting of the three committees.
However, the committee can
invite others to attend.
· Company’s annual report should show the
‘independence’ statues for each NED.[1]· At least half of listed companies’ boards,
except for smaller companies, should be



























· The appointments should be
made on merit, while ensuring
board diversity, including gender.· Board should ensure having
appointments plans for orderly
succession to the board and to
senior management. These plans
should maintain board diversity
and balance of skills and
experience.
· The process for board appointments should
led by nomination committee, which make
recommendations to the board as well. The
nomination committee should ‘make available
its terms of reference, explaining its role and
the authority delegated to it by the board’· The nomination committee should be
dominated by independent NEDs. The
chairman or an independent NED should
chair the committee.[2]· A careful evaluation of board diversity of
skills, experience, independence and
knowledge is a crucial prerequisite for
preparing a description of the capabilities
required for a particular appointment.· NEDs should be appointed ‘for specified
terms subject to re-election and to statutory
provisions relating to the removal of a
director’. If a NED is to continue for more
than six years, a rigorous review should be
undertaken with due regard for the need for
progressive refreshing of the board.· The nominations issues should be
addressed in a separate section of firm annual
report. That include the work of committee,
the used appointments process, board’s policy
on diversity, and progress on achieving the
objectives.· The choice of using open advertising or
external search consultancy for directors’
appointment should be explained in the
annual report and ‘a statement made as to
whether it has any other connection with the
company’.
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Directors should commit sufficient time to the
company.(No Supporting Principles)
· Nomination committee is responsible for
preparing a job specification for the chairman
post. It should include the time commitment
expected, and the need for availability in the
event of crises. On the other hand, chairman
should disclose all significant commitments
he/she has before appointment and included
in the annual report. Changes to such
commitments should be reported in the next
annual report.· The letter of appointment should state the
expected time commitment. NEDs should
express their ability to meet these
expectations while disclosing all significant
commitments he/she has before appointment.· The board ‘should not agree to a full time
executive director taking on more than one
non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100

















· It is the chairman’s
responsibility to ensure that
directors’ skills, knowledge and
familiarity with the company are
continually updated.· Resources required for this
matter should be provided by the
firm.
· It is the chairman’s responsibility to
– Ensure that new directors get induction
once appointed. Induction should be full,
formal and tailored and include meeting
major shareholders.




























· It is the chairman’s
responsibility to ensure that the
directors receive accurate, timely
and clear information. On the
other hand, management is
obligated to provide such
information. However, directors
should ask for clarification where
necessary.· It is the secretary’s
responsibility, under chairman’s
supervision, to ensure good flow
of information within the board
and its committees and between
senior management and NEDs. It
is also responsible for ‘advising
the board through the chairman
on all governance matters’.
· Company should provide the required
resources to get an access to independent
professional advice whenever needed by
directors, especially NEDs. In addition,
committees should be provided with sufficient
resources to undertake their duties.· Company secretary’s services should be
available to all directors. Both the
appointment and removal of the company





















· Evaluation of the board should
consider all factors relevant to its
effectiveness, including
– The balance of skills,
experience, independence and
knowledge of the company.
– Board diversity, including
gender.
– How the board works together
as a unit.· This evaluation should be used
by the chairman to decide on
directors’ appointment, removal,
and the training programs.· Evaluation of directors should
be designed to show director’s
contribution and commitment to
the role (incl. devoted time)
· The way the performance evaluation has
been conducted should be disclosed in the
annual report.· For FTSE 350 firms, evaluation of the
board should be conducted externally at least
every three years. The annual report should
clearly identify the external facilitator and
their connection with the firm, if any.· Performance evaluation of the chairman
should be conducted by NEDs and led by the
senior independent director. Executive
directors’ views need to be taken into account
in chairman’s review.
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All directors should be submitted
for re-election at regular
intervals.(No Supporting
Principles)
· For FTSE 350 firms, all directors should be subject
to annual election by shareholders.· ‘All other directors should be subject to election by
shareholders at the first annual general meeting after
their appointment, and to re-election thereafter at
intervals of no more than three years’.· NEDs who have served longer than nine years
should be subject to annual re-election. Sufficient
biographical details should be disclosed to ensure an
informed decision by shareholders.· When appointing a NED, the board need to show
shareholders, in writing, why they believe he/she
should be elected.· When proposing re-election for NED, the chairman
should confirm to shareholders that based on formal
performance evaluation, this NED continues to be









































· It is the board’s
responsibility to






reports and reports to







ensure the quality of
information presented.
· The annual reports should include;
– Explanation of directors’ responsibility for
preparing the information provided in the annual
report and provide any necessary information to
shareholders as required.
– A statement by the auditor about their reporting
responsibilities should be made as well.
– The business model used to generate or preserves
value over the longer term and the strategy for
achieving firm’s goals.· ‘The directors should report in annual and
half-yearly financial statements that the business is a
































It is board’s responsibility to
determine the extent of firm’s
risk, with due regard to the
shareholders’ interest and sound
risk management and internal
control systems.(No Supporting
Principles)
· At least once a year, a review of the effectiveness of
the company’s risk management and internal control
systems should be conduct. Review’s results should
be reported to shareholders. The review should cover

























The responsibility of establishing
corporate reporting, risk
management and internal control
formally and transparently lies
with the board of directors.(No
Supporting Principles)
· The audit committee should be composed of at
least three independent NEDs. For smaller firms,
‘independent’ chairman can be a member of, but not
chair, the committee.· At least one member of the audit committee need
to have recent and relevant financial experience.· The audit committee’s role, responsibilities and the
authority delegated to it should be set out in written
terms of reference, and made available.· The audit committee should;
– Provide advice on the quality of information
provided in reports where requested by the board. In
addition, they should provide the information
necessary for shareholders to evaluate the firm.
– Review channels through which staff can raise their
concerns regarding possible improprieties in financial
reporting issues. They should ensure that
independent investigation, and follow-up actions can
be taken in such scenarios.
Appendices - Appendix A 204
Table A.1(Continued)












– Review the effectiveness of the internal audit
activities. For firms who do not have internal audit
function, audit committee should consider if there is
a need for this function and reasons for its absence
should be disclosed in reports.
– Make a recommendation on the appointment, and
removal of the external auditors. If board chose not
to follow their recommendations, a statement from
the audit committee should be given in the annual
report, explaining their initial recommendations
along with reasons why board took a different
position.· The audit committee issues should be addressed in
a separate section of firm annual report. That
include material issue considered by the committee,
how the external audit process’ effectiveness has been
assessed, the process of appointing the external
auditor, and length of tenure of the current audit
firm. In case if the external auditor provides
non-audit services, a statement regarding auditor’s
independence should be made.

































































· For the executive directors who are released to
serve elsewhere as a NED, the remuneration report
should indicate whether these directors would retain
such earnings or not.· Levels of remuneration for NEDs should reflect ‘the
time commitment and responsibilities of the role’.
NEDs’ remuneration package should not include
performance-related elements (e.g. share options),
unless shareholders’ approval is granted in advance.
Shares acquired by exercise of the options should ‘be
held until at least one year after the NEDs leaves the
board’.· To avoid rewarding poor performance,
remuneration committee should appropriately
consider compensations’ elements for












































· The remuneration committee should be composed
of at least three independent NEDs. Chairman, if
independent, can be a member of, but not chair, the
committee. The remuneration committee’s role,
responsibilities and the authority delegated to it
should be set out in written terms of reference, and
made available. The choice of remuneration
consultants should be explained in the annual report
and ‘a statement made as to whether it has any
other connection with the company’.· The responsibility of setting all remuneration
elements for all executives, chairman, and senior
management lies with remuneration committee.
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· The responsibility of setting remuneration for
NEDs lies with the board itself or the shareholders.
NEDs’ remuneration should be within the limits set
in the Articles of Association. ‘Where permitted by
the Articles, the board may however delegate this
responsibility to a committee, which might include
the chief executive’.· New long-term incentive schemes and significant
changes to existing schemes should be approved by
shareholders.



















































· It the chairman’s responsibility to ensure that
shareholders’ perspectives are understood by the
whole board, discuss governance and strategy with
major shareholders, and arrange for NEDs - major
shareholders’ meetings. The senior independent NED
should sufficiently meet major shareholders to be
aware of major shareholders’ concerns.· Annual report should clearly state the steps (e.g.
meetings) have been taken by the board to ensure






















General meetings represent a
good opportunity to communicate




· At any general meeting, ‘the company should
propose a separate resolution on each substantially
separate issue, and should in particular propose a
resolution at the AGM relating to the report and
accounts’. Shareholders have three options (for,
against, or withhold) to choose from for each
resolution.· At any general meeting, valid proxy appointments
should be properly recorded and counted. The
number of shares associated with valid proxy
appointments should be made available on website
ASAP, along with the number of votes for each one
of the voting options.· All directors, especially chairmen of the three
board’s committees, should be encouraged by
chairman to attend AGM to answer any questions.· Notice of the AGM and all related papers should
be sent to shareholders at least 20 working days
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tobacco 68.75% 3.187277 32
Private Equity 56.36% 3.161212 55
Life Assurance 46.40% 2.67754 125
Steel & Other Metals 43.48% 2.262776 46
Diversified Industrials 41.67% 2.442857 84
Containers & Packaging 40.46% 2.171901 131
Mining 38.46% 2.357551 1,105
Investment Companies 37.54% 2.574898 1,750
Consumer Services 35.71% 2.24983 56
Clothing, , Leisure and Personal Products 35.45% 2.106926 268
Food & Drug Retailers 33.33% 2.134788 135
Forestry & Paper 32.43% 2.148649 37
Beverages 31.53% 2.121371 111
Speciality & Other Finance 31.42% 2.159308 1,375
Pharmaceutic and Biotechnology 30.63% 2.127185 715
Insurance 29.27% 2.321984 287
Automobiles & Parts 29.25% 2.254019 212
Health 28.23% 2.152304 457
Leisure & Hotels 27.80% 2.171212 759
Telecommunication 27.70% 2.077341 361
Renewable Energy 27.42% 2.083257 186
Business Services 27.12% 2.055877 1,648
Engineering & Machinery 26.75% 2.070115 830
Software & Computer Services 26.60% 2.048328 1,410
Chemicals 26.11% 2.079693 226
Information Technology Hardware 25.78% 1.967764 384
Media & Entertainment 25.42% 1.993473 1,353
Food Producers & Processors 25.41% 2.121093 362
Banks 24.67% 2.21397 150
Transport 23.13% 2.107775 441
Electricity 22.95% 2.107865 122
General Retailers 22.76% 1.994785 725
Publishing 22.50% 1.858333 40
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Oil & Gas 22.28% 1.988705 893
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 22.15% 1.882361 614
Construction & Building Materials 21.49% 1.937348 726
Real Estate 19.85% 1.881879 917
Aerospace & Defence 19.68% 2.057633 188
Utilities – Other 19.17% 2.199147 120
Household Products 13.59% 1.807065 184
Total 28.20% 2.129666 19,620
Appendix E
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4






























-0.029*** -0.027*** -0.050*** -0.048***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Age
0.313*** 0.345*** 0.329*** 0.367***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059)
Age2
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (Female NEDs)
0.165 0.184 0.244* 0.268**
(0.136) (0.136) (0.129) (0.128)
NED Independence
-0.012 -0.006 -0.016 -0.003
(0.111) (0.111) (0.116) (0.117)
Busy NEDs
5.484*** 5.503*** 5.397*** 5.412***
(0.113) (0.112) (0.117) (0.115)
Chairmanship
0.790** 0.847** 0.974*** 1.036***
(0.353) (0.349) (0.367) (0.363)
Busy Chairman
(Chairmanship× Firm Size)
-0.048* -0.052** -0.068** -0.074***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Firm Size (log TA)
0.083*** 0.087*** 0.030 0.036
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Sub-Sectors Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 9,875 9,989 9,753 9,867
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.291 0.311 0.312
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance for correlations coefficients are
***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
Shown here are ordered logit regressions in which the dependent variable in year t is the number
of board seats held by NEDs in year t+1 in quoted firms and ranges from one to four board
seats. Busy NEDs variable was replaced with the number of board seats a NED has in year t.
ROE(t−2) was replaced with ROA(t−2). The standard errors are clustered by BOFIs’ ID.
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4






























-0.028*** -0.027*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Age
0.317*** 0.324*** 0.337*** 0.344***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058)
Age2
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Gender (Female NEDs)
0.156 0.155 0.241* 0.241*
(0.135) (0.135) (0.128) (0.128)
NED Independence
0.011 -0.021 0.014 -0.018
(0.108) (0.107) (0.112) (0.113)
Busy NEDs
5.502*** 5.489*** 5.413*** 5.403***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.113) (0.112)
Chairmanship
0.836** 0.901** 1.023*** 1.074***
(0.344) (0.353) (0.356) (0.368)
Busy Chairman
(Chairmanship× Firm Size)
-0.050** -0.055** -0.071*** -0.074***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Firm Size (log TA)
0.090*** 0.091*** 0.036 0.037
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Sub-Sectors Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 10,328 10,292 10,199 10,165
Pseudo R2 0.291 0.292 0.313 0.313
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance for correlations coefficients are
***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
Shown here are ordered logit regressions in which the dependent variable in year t is the number
of board seats held by NEDs in year t+1 in quoted firms and ranges from one to four board
seats. Busy NEDs variable was replaced with the number of board seats a NED has in year
t.Stock Return(t−2) was replaced with Average Stock Return(t,t−1). ROE(t−2) was replaced with

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample of STATA Command Lines Used in Chapter 6
1 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
2 ∗PART ONE: NEW Var iab l e s & Adjustments
3 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
4 ∗1 .1 Chairmanship Exper ience
5 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
6 sort IndividualName year proxy CompanyName
7 gen ChairmanExp=boss
8 r e p l a c e ChairmanExp=. i f boss==0
9 by IndividualName : carry forward ChairmanExp , gen ( ChairmanExp2 )
10 r e p l a c e ChairmanExp2=0 i f ChairmanExp2==.
11 bysort i d d i r e c t o r y e a r : egen bossExp = mean ( ChairmanExp2 )
12 bysort i d d i r e c t o r y e a r : r e p l a c e bossExp = 1 i f bossExp >0 &
bossExp !=.
13 drop ChairmanExp ChairmanExp2
14
15 ∗1 .2 Deputy Exper ience
16 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
17 sort IndividualName year proxy CompanyName
18 gen DeptyExp=v i c e
19 r e p l a c e DeptyExp=. i f v i c e==0
20 by IndividualName : carry forward DeptyExp , gen ( DeptyExp2 )
21 r e p l a c e DeptyExp2=0 i f DeptyExp2==.
22 bysort i d d i r e c t o r y e a r : egen viceExp = mean ( DeptyExp2 )
23 bysort i d d i r e c t o r y e a r : r e p l a c e viceExp = 1 i f viceExp >0 &
viceExp !=.
24 drop DeptyExp DeptyExp2
25
26 ∗1 .3 Chairmanship and Deputy Exper ience
27 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
28 gen BossViceExp=0
29 r e p l a c e BossViceExp=1 i f viceExp==1
30 r e p l a c e BossViceExp=1 i f bossExp==1
31
32 fo r each var o f v a r l i s t bossExp viceExp BossViceExp {
33 l a b e l v a r i a b l e ‘ var ’ ”Chairmanship & Vice−Chairmanship Exper ience ”
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34 tab ‘ var ’ , m
35 }
36 bro IndividualName year proxy Chairman bossExp viceExp BossViceExp
Ind iv idua lRo l e CompanyName i f IndividualName==”Adam Reynolds ”
37 bro IndividualName year proxy Chairman bossExp viceExp BossViceExp
Ind iv idua lRo l e CompanyName i f IndividualName==”Adrian Howard Martin”




41 ∗1 .6 Director ’ s Number o f d i s t i n c t s e c t o r s
42 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
43 egen u n i s e c t o r s = tag ( Sector2 i d d i r e c t o r y e a r )
44 egen d i r e c t o r u n i s e c t o r s = t o t a l ( u n i s e c t o r s ) , by ( i d d i r e c t o r y e a r )
45 /∗ v i s u a l t e s t ∗/ sort i d d i r e c t o r y e a r
46 bro IndividualName year proxy u n i s e c t o r s
d i r e c t o r u n i s e c t o r s Sector2 CompanyName i f IndividualName == ”Adam
Richard Wilson”
47 egen checking = count ( Sector2 ) , by ( i d d i r e c t o r y e a r )
48 bro IndividualName year proxy check ing u n i s e c t o r s
d i r e c t o r u n i s e c t o r s Sector2 CompanyName
49 drop check ing u n i s e c t o r s
50 l a b e l v a r i a b l e d i r e c t o r u n i s e c t o r s ” Director ’ s Number o f d i s t i n c t
s e c t o r s works on yea r ly ”
51
52 egen l e t s e e = t o t a l ( Sector3 ) , by ( i d d i r e c t o r y e a r )
53 /∗ v i s u a l t e s t ∗/ sort i d d i r e c t o r y e a r
54 egen checking = count ( Sector2 ) , by ( i d d i r e c t o r y e a r )
55 bro IndividualName year proxy check ing l e t s e e Sector3
Sector2 CompanyName
56 drop check ing
57 fo r each var o f v a r l i s t l e t s e e boardTenure {
58 bysort i d f i r m y e a r : egen ‘ var ’ t o t a l = t o t a l ( ‘ var ’ )
59 gen ‘ var ’ 2 board= ‘ var ’ / ‘ var ’ t o t a l
60 r e p l a c e ‘ var ’ 2 board=. i f ‘ var ’==.
61 }
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on board research: changing the research agenda. Journal of Management &
Governance, 15(1):5–28.
IMA (2011). Asset Management in the UK 2010-2011. Technical report, Invest-
ment Management Association, London.
Bibliography 230
Jaskiewicz, P. and Klein, S. (2007). The impact of goal alignment on board
composition and board size in family businesses. Journal of Business Research,
60(10):1080–1089.
Jehn, K. (1995). A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of
intragroup conflict. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(2):256–282.
Jensen, M. and Ruback, R. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific
evidence. Journal of Financial economics, 11(1) & (4):5–50.
Jensen, M. and Zajac, E. J. (2004). Corporate elites and corporate strategy: How
demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm.
Strategic Management Journal, 25(6):507–524.
Jensen, M. and Zimmerman, J. (1985). Management compensation and the man-
agerial labor market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1):3–9.
Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., and Lee, C. I. (2009). Ineffective corporate governance:
Director busyness and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking and
Finance, 33(5):819–828.
Johansen, T. R. and Pettersson, K. (2013). The impact of board interlocks on
auditor choice and audit fees. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
21(3):287–310.
Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., and Hill, A. D. (2013). Board Composition Beyond
Independence Social Capital, Human Capital, and Demographics. Journal of
Management, 39(1):232–262.
Joseph, J., Ocasio, W., and McDonnell, M.-H. (2014). The structural elaboration
of board independence: Executive power, institutional logics, and the adoption
of ceo-only board structures in u.s. corporate governance. Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 57(6):1834–1858.
Joyce, W. F. and Slocum, J. W. (2012). Top management talent, strategic capa-
bilities, and firm performance. Organizational Dynamics, 41(3):183–193.
Bibliography 231
Kaczmarek, S., Kimino, S., and Pye, A. (2014). Interlocking directorships and
firm performance in highly regulated sectors: The moderating impact of board
diversity. Journal of Management and Governance, 18(2):347–372.
Kang, H., Cheng, M., and Gray, S. J. (2007). Corporate governance and board
composition: Diversity and independence of Australian boards. Corporate Gov-
ernance: An International Review, 15(2):194–207.
Kashyap, A., Rajan, R., and Stein, J. (2008). Rethinking capital regulation.
Working Paper.
Keenan, J. (2004). Corporate Governance in UK/USA Boardrooms. Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 12(2):172–176.
Kennedy, V. and Limmack, R. (1996). Takeover activity, CEO turnover, and
the market for corporate control. Joumal of Business Finance & Accounting,
23(2):267–286.
Kiel, G. C. and Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board Composition and Corporate Perfor-
mance: How the Australian Experience Informs Contrasting Theories of Corpo-
rate Governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3):189–
205.
Kiel, G. C. and Nicholson, G. J. (2005). Evaluating Boards and Directors. Cor-
porate Governance: An International Review, 13(5):613–631.
Kiel, G. C. and Nicholson, G. J. (2006). Multiple Directorships and Corporate
Performance in Australian Listed Companies. Corporate Governance: An In-
ternational Review, 14(6):530–546.
Kim, K., Mauldin, E., and Patro, S. (2014). Outside directors and board advis-
ing and monitoring performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 57(2-
3):110–131.
Kim, Y. and Cannella, A. a. (2008). Toward a Social Capital Theory of Director
Selection. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(4):282–293.
Bibliography 232
Klein, P., Shapiro, D., and Young, J. (2005). Corporate Governance, Family
Ownership and Firm Value: the Canadian evidence. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 13(6):769–784.
Klein, S. (2005). The FPEC Scale of Family Influence: Construction, Validation,
and Further Implication for Theory. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice,
29(3):321–339.
Knockaert, M. and Ucbasaran, D. (2013). The Service Role of Outside Boards in
High Tech Start-ups: A Resource Dependency Perspective. British Journal of
Management, 24(1):69–84.
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., and Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate
directors and board independence. Review of Financial Studies, 26(6):1561–
1605.
Kochan, T. A. (2003). Restoring trust in American corporations: Addressing the
root cause. Journal of Management and Governance, 7(3):223–231.
Kosmidou, K. and Pasiouras, F. (2006). Assessing performance factors in the
UK banking sector: a multicriteria methodology. Central European Journal of
Operations Research, 14(1):25–44.
Kroll, M., Walters, B., and Wright, P. (2008). Board vigilance, director experience,
and corporate outcomes. Strategic Management Journal, 29:363–382.
Kuhnen, C. M. (2009). Business networks, corporate governance, and contracting
in the mutual fund industry. The Journal of Finance, 64(5):2185–2220.
Lai, J. and Chen, L. (2012). Does Board Experience Matter? Evidence from
Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of Service Science and Management, 5:140–
150.
Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., and Wang, C. C. Y. (2013). Boardroom centrality and
firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(2-3):225–250.
Lel, U. and Miller, D. (2014). The Market for Director Reputation Around
the World: Evidence from Shocks to International Reputation and Experience.
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Bibliography 233
Levit, D. and Malenko, N. (2016). The labor market for directors and externalities
in corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 71(2):775–808.
Li, P., Parsa, S., Tang, G., and Xiao, J. Z. (2012). Is there an Expectations Gap
in the Roles of Independent Directors? An Explorative Study of Listed Chinese
Companies. British Journal of Management, 23(2):206–222.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., and Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board
structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2):308–328.
Linn, S. C. and Park, D. (2005). Outside director compensation policy and the
investment opportunity set. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(4):680–715.
Long, T., Dulewicz, V., and Gay, K. (2005). The Role of the Non-executive Direc-
tor: findings of an empirical investigation into the differences between listed
and unlisted UK boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
13(5):667–680.
Lubatkin, M. and Schulze, W. (2005). The effects of parental altruism on the gover-
nance of family managed firms. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26(3):313–
330.
Machold, S. and Farquhar, S. (2013). Board Task Evolution: A Longitudinal Field
Study in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(2):147–
164.
Maer, L. and Broughton, N. (2012). Financial Services : contribution to the UK
economy. House of Commons.
Mallin, C., Melis, A., and Gaia, S. (2015). The remuneration of independent
directors in the UK and Italy: An empirical analysis based on agency theory.
International Business Review, 24(2):175–186.
Mallin, C., Mullineux, A., and Wihlborg, C. (2005). The financial sector and
corporate governance: the UK case. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 13(4):532–541.
Bibliography 234
Mangena, M., Tauringana, V., and Chamisa, E. (2012). Corporate Boards, Own-
ership Structure and Firm Performance in an Environment of Severe Political
and Economic Crisis. British Journal of Management, 23:S23–S41.
Martynova, M. and Renneboog, L. (2010). A Corporate Governance Index : Con-
vergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulations.
Masulis, R. W. and Mobbs, S. (2011). Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence
from the External Directorship Market. Journal of Finance, 66(3):823–872.
Masulis, R. W. and Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do
talented directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial
Economics, 111(2):406–429.
Matowanyika, K. and Hosho, N. (2013). Are Directors Remunerated for Corporate
Performance? Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 4(15):21–27.
Mazzola, E., Perrone, G., and Kamuriwo, D. S. (2014). The interaction between
inter-firm and interlocking directorate networks on firm’s new product develop-
ment outcomes. Journal of Business Research, 69(2):672–682.
McDonald, M. L., Westphal, J. D., and Graebner, M. E. (2008). What do they
know? The effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 29(11):1155–1177.
McNulty, T., Florackis, C., and Ormrod, P. (2013). Boards of Directors and Fi-
nancial Risk during the Credit Crisis. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 21(1):58–78.
Melis, A., Gaia, S., and Carta, S. (2015). Directors’ remuneration: A comparison
of Italian and UK non-financial listed firms’ disclosure. The British Accounting
Review, 47(1):66–84.
Michael, O. B. and Tobi, B. A. (2014). Performance Measurement in the United
Kingdom (UK) retail banking industry. European Journal of Business and Man-
agement, 6(19):70–81.
Mikkelson, W. and Partch, M. (1997). The decline of takeovers and disciplinary
managerial turnover. Journal of financial economics, 44(2):205–228.
Bibliography 235
Milliken, F. J. and Martins, L. L. (1996). Searching for common threads: Under-
standing the multiple effects of diversity in organizational groups. Academy of
Management Review, 21(2):402–433.
Milton, L. P. and Westphal, J. D. (2005). Identity conformation networks and
cooperation in work groups. Academy of Management Journal, 48:191–212.
Minichilli, A., Zattoni, A., and Zona, F. (2009). Making boards effective: An em-
pirical examination of board task performance. British Journal of Management,
20(1):55–74.
Minton, B. a., Taillard, J., and Williamson, R. G. (2011). Do Independence and
Financial Expertise of the Board Matter for Risk Taking and Performance?
SSRN Electronic Journal, pages 1–66.
Mira, S., Goergen, M., and O’Sullivan, N. (2018). The Market for Non-Executive
Directors: Does Acquisition Performance Influence Future Board Seats? British
Journal of Management, 00:1–22.
Molz, R. (1995). The Theory of Pluralism in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual
Framework and Empirical Test. Journal of Business Ethics, 14(10):789–804.
Mulcahy, M. and Linehan, C. (2014). Females and Precarious Board Positions:
Further Evidence of the Glass Cliff. British Journal of Management, 25(3):425–
438.
Mura, R. (2007). Firm Performance: Do Non-Executive Directors Have Minds of
their Own? Evidence from UK Panel Data. Financial Management, 36(3):81–
112.
Musteen, M., Datta, D. K., and Kemmerer, B. (2010). Corporate Reputation: Do
Board Characteristics Matter? British Journal of Management, 21:498–510.
Ng, T. W. H. and Feldman, D. C. (2008). The relationship of age to ten dimensions
of job performance. The Journal of applied psychology, 93(2):392–423.
Offenberg, D. and Offenberg, D. (2009). Firm size and the effectiveness of the
market for corporate control. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15:66–79.
Bibliography 236
Office for National Statistics (2006). A Report on Ownership of Shares as at
31st December 2006. Technical Report December, Office for National Statistics
(ONS), London.
Office for National Statistics (2012a). Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, 2010.
Technical Report February, Office for National Statistics (ONS), London.
Office for National Statistics (2012b). Share Ownership Methodology. Technical
report, Office for National Statistics (ONS), London.
Ong, C.-H., Wan, D., and Ong, K.-S. (2003). An Exploratory Study on Inter-
locking Directorates in Listed Firms in Singapore. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 11(4):322–334.
Ortiz-de Mandojana, N., Aragón-Correa, J. A., Delgado-Ceballos, J., and Ferrón-
Vı́lchez, V. (2012). The effect of director interlocks on firms’ adoption of proac-
tive environmental strategies. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
20(2):164–178.
O’Sullivan, N. (2000). Managers as Monitors: An Analysis of the Non-executive
Role of Senior Executives in UK Companies. British Journal of Management,
11(1):17–29.
O’Sullivan, N. and Diacon, S. (1999). Internal and external governance mecha-
nisms: evidence from the UK insurance industry. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 7(4):363–373.
Parker, L. D. (2008). Boardroom Operational and Financial Control: an Insider
View. British Journal of Management, 19(1):65–88.
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (2013). Changing banking for
good. Technical report, House of Commons.
Peng, M. W. and Luo, Y. (2000). Managerial ties and firm performance in a
transition economy: The nature of a micro-macro link. Academy of Management
Journal, 43(3):486–501.
Perkins, S. J. and Hendry, C. (2005). Ordering top pay: Interpreting the signals.
Journal of Management Studies, 42(7):1443–1468.
Bibliography 237
Perry, T. and Peyer, U. (2005). Board seat accumulation by executives: a share-
holder’s perspective. The Journal of Finance, 60(4):2083–2123.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A
resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper and Row.
Pombo, C. and Gutiérrez, L. H. (2011). Outside directors, board interlocks and
firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups. Journal
of Economics and Business, 63(4):251–277.
Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (2012). The new institutionalism in organiza-
tional analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Prudential Regulation Authority (2015). Strengthening individual accountability
in banking and insurance — responses to CP14/14 and CP26/14. Technical
Report July, Prudential Regulation Authority, Bank of England, London.
Pugliese, A., Nicholson, G., and Bezemer, P.-J. (2015). An Observational Analysis
of the Impact of Board Dynamics and Directors’ Participation on Perceived
Board Effectiveness. British Journal of Management, 26(1):1–25.
Rechner, P. L. (1999). Boards at Work: How Corporate Boards Create Competi-
tive Advantage. Academy of Management Review, 24(1):151–153.
Renneboog, L. and Zhao, Y. (2011). Us knows us in the UK: On director networks
and CEO compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4):1132–1157.
Renneboog, L. and Zhao, Y. (2014). Director networks and takeovers. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 28:218–234.
Rhee, M. and Lee, J. H. (2008). The signals outside directors send to foreign in-
vestors: Evidence from Korea. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
16(1):41–51.
Rhodes, M. G. (2004). Age-related differences in performance on the Wisconsin
card sorting test: A meta-analytic review. Psychology and Aging, 19(3):482–494.
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., and Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond Agency Conceptions of the
Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom.
British Journal of Management, 16(s1):S5–S26.
Bibliography 238
Robson, C. (2002). Real world research. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2nd editio
edition.
Ryan, H. E. and Wiggins, R. a. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director com-
pensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of
Financial Economics, 73(3):497–524.
Sanders, W. M. and Boivie, S. (2004). Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms
in uncertain markets. Strategic Management Journal, 25(2):167–186.
Santalo, J. and Kock, C. J. (2009). Division Director Versus CEO Compensation:
New Insights Into the Determinants of Executive Pay. Journal of Management,
35(4):1047–1077.
Sarkar, J. and Sarkar, S. (2009). Multiple board appointments and firm perfor-
mance in emerging economies: Evidence from India. Pacific Basin Finance
Journal, 17(2):271–293.
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A. (2009). Research Methods for Business
Students.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., and Dino, R. N. (2003). Exploring the agency
consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms.
Academy of Management Journal, 46(2):179–194.
Segrestin, B. and Hatchuel, A. (2011). Beyond agency theory, a post-crisis view
of corporate law. British Journal of Management, 22(3):484–499.
Sharad, A. and Steven, B. (2010). The impact of changes in firm performance and
risk on director turnover. Review of Accounting and Finance, 9(3):244–263.
Shen, W. (2005). Improve Board Effectiveness: the Need for Incentives. British
Journal of Management, 16(s1):S81–S89.
Shropshire, C. (2010). The role of the interlocking director and board receptivity
in the diffusion of practices. Academy of Management Review, 35(2):246–264.
Siebels, J.-F. and Knyphausen-Aufseß, D. (2012). A Review of Theory in Family
Business Research: The Implications for Corporate Governance. International
Journal of Management Reviews, 14(3):280–304.
Bibliography 239
Sloan, R. G. (1993). Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 16(1-3):55–100.
Smallman, C. (2005). Back to the Drawing Board: Designing Corporate Boards
for a Complex World. Academy of Management Review, 30(2):438–440.
Smith, R. (2003). Audit Committees Combined Code Guidance. Technical Report
January, Financial Reporting Council, London.
Solomon, J. and Solomon, A. (2007). Corporate Governance and Accountability.
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, West Sussex.
Solomon, J. F., Lin, S. W., Norton, S. D., and Solomon, A. (2003). Corporate
governance in Taiwan: Empirical evidence from Taiwanese company directors.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3):235–248.
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
87(3):355–374.
Srinivasan, S. (2005). Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside di-
rectors: Evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members.
Journal of Accounting Research, 43(2):291–342.
Sun, J., Ding, L., Guo, J. M., and Li, Y. (2015). Ownership, capital structure and
financing decision: Evidence from the UK. The British Accounting Review.
Sun, Y. and Shin, T. (2014). Rewarding Poor Performance: Why Do Boards
of Directors Increase New Options in Response to CEO Underwater Options?
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(5):408–421.
Sundaramurthy, C. and Lewis, M. (2003). Control and collaboration: Paradoxes
of governance. Academy of Management Review, 28(3):397–415.
Thompson, S. (2005). The impact of corporate governance reforms on the re-
muneration of executives in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 13(1):19–26.
Tian, J. J., Haleblian, J. J., and Rajagopalan, N. (2011). The effects of board
human and social capital on investor reactions to new CEO selection. Strategic
Management Journal, 32(7):731–747.
Bibliography 240
Tosi, H. L., Shen, W., and Gentry, R. J. (2003). Why Outsiders on Boards Can’t
Solve the Corporate Governance Problem. Organizational Dynamics, 32(2):180–
192.
Tricker, B. (2009). Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices.
Oxford University Press, New York, first edition.
Tuggle, C. S., Schnatterly, K., and Johnson, R. A. (2010). Attention Patterns in
the Boardroom : How Board Composition and Processes Affect Discussion of
Entrepreneurial Issues. The Academy of Management Journal, 53(3):550–571.
Useem, M. and Karabel, J. (1986). Pathways to Top Corporate Management.
American Sociological Review, 51(2):184–200.
Voulgaris, G., Stathopoulos, K., and Walker, M. (2010). Compensation Consul-
tants and CEO Pay: UK Evidence. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 18(6):511–526.
Wales, W. J., Parida, V., and Patel, P. C. (2013). Too much of a good thing? ab-
sorptive capacity, firm performance, and the moderating role of entrepreneurial
orientation. Strategic Management Journal, 34(5):622–633.
Walker, D. (2009). A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other
Financial Industry Entities: Final Recommendations. Technical Report Novem-
ber, HM Treasury (A UK ministerial department), London.
Westphal, J. D. and Milton, L. P. (2000). How Experience and Network Ties Affect
the Influence of Demographic Minorities on Corporate Boards. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 45:366–398.
Westphal, J. D. and Zajac, E. J. (2013a). A Behavioral Theory of Corporate
Governance. The Academy of Management Annals, 7(1):605–659.
Westphal, J. D. and Zajac, E. J. (2013b). A Behavioral Theory of Corporate Gov-
ernance: Explicating the Mechanisms of Socially Situated and Socially Consti-
tuted Agency. The Academy of Management Annals, 7(1):607–661.
White, J. T., Woidtke, T., Black, H. A., and Schweitzer, R. L. (2014). Appoint-
ments of academic directors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28:135–151.
Bibliography 241
Wilmot, G. (2008). Men have messed up. Let women sort it out.
Wilson, N., Wright, M., and Scholes, L. (2013). Family Business Survival and the
Role of Boards. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37(6):1369–1389.
Wincent, J., Thorgren, S., and Anokhin, S. (2013). Managing Maturing
Government-Supported Networks: The Shift from Monitoring to Embeddedness
Controls. British Journal of Management, 24(4):480–497.
Wu, Y. (2004). The impact of public opinion on board structure changes, direc-
tor career progression, and CEO turnover: Evidence from CalPERS’ corporate
governance program. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(1):199–227.
Yermack, D. (2004). Remuneration , Retention , and Reputation. The Journal of
Finance, LIX(5):2281–2308.
Yoshikawa, T. and Rasheed, A. a. (2009). Convergence of Corporate Governance:
Critical Review and Future Directions. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 17(3):388–404.
Zahra, S. and Pearce, J. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Per-
formance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15(2):291–
334.
Zajac, E. J. and Westphal, J. D. (1996). Director Reputation, Ceo/Board Power,
and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks. Academy of Management Proceedings,
1996(1):254–258.
Zakaria, I. (2012). Performance measures, benchmarks and targets in executive
remuneration contracts of UK firms. The British Accounting Review, 44(3):189–
203.
Zaman, M., Hudaib, M., and Haniffa, R. (2011). Corporate Governance Qual-
ity, Audit Fees and Non-Audit Services Fees. Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, 38(1-2):165–197.
Zattoni, A. and Cuomo, F. (2010). How independent, competent and incentivized
should non-executive directors be? An empirical investigation of good gover-
nance codes. British Journal of Management, 21(1):63–79.
Bibliography 242
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F. W., Chrisman, J. J., and Chua, J. H. (2012).
Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs: The Importance of
Intentions for Transgenerational Control. Organization Science, 23(3):851–868.
Zhu, D. H., Shen, W., and Hillman, A. J. (2014). Recategorization into the In-
group: The Appointment of Demographically Different New Directors and Their
Subsequent Positions on Corporate Boards. Administrative Science Quarterly,
59(2):240–270.
Zona, F., Zattoni, A., and Minichilli, A. (2013). A Contingency Model of Boards
of Directors and Firm Innovation: The Moderating Role of Firm Size. British
Journal of Management, 24(3):299–315.
